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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS
LAW COMMISSION'S PATTERN AND PRACTICE COMPLAINT FAILED TO MEET
STATUTORY PARTICULARITY REQUIREMENT, THUS PRECLUDING USE
OF COMMISSION'S FULL INVESTIGATIVE POWERS.

ADMINISTRATIVE

Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. United States
Steel Corp. (Pa. 1974)
In August of 1972, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
(Commission) filed a complaint with itself alleging that the United States
Steel Corporation (U. S. Steel) carried on a "pattern and practice" 1 of
discrimination in its employment practices in violation of section 5 of the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act 2 (Act). The complaint, however, did
not specify particular instances of discriminatory conduct.3 Interrogatories
relating to these allegations were served upon U. S. Steel pursuant to the
1. It is difficult to determine what constitutes a "pattern and practice" of discrimination. Senator Humphrey has defined it as "the denial of rights [which] consists of something more than an isolated, sporadic incident, but is repeated, routine, or
of a generalized nature." 110 CONG. REc. 14270 (1964). The Pennsylvania Human
Relations Commission has referred to such a practice as systemic discrimination
which is precisely what its name says - the system is discriminatory. [July 1,
1970 - June 30, 1971] PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION, ANNUAL
REPORT 7-8 [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT].
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951 et seq. (Supp. 1975). Section 5 of the Act
sets out the discriminatory conduct to which the Act pertains. Id. § 955.
3. The complaint read in pertinent part:
The Respondent has in the past and continues until the present time to maintain a discriminatory system of recruitment, hiring, training, employment, compensation, promotion, demotion, job assignment or placement, transfer, layoff,
retention, referral, dismissal, rehire, retirement, and pensions, and has otherwise
discriminated in the past and continues until the present time to discriminate
regarding terms, conditions and privileges of employment because of sex, race and
national origin.
Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. United States Steel Corp.----.Pa .....
-,
325
A.2d 910, 912 (1974). Compare this complaint with section 5 of the Act which stated
that it was an unlawful discriminatory practice:
(a) For any employer because of the race, color, religious creed, ancestry,
age, sex, national origin or non-job related handicap or disability of any individual
to refuse to hire or employ, or to bar or to discharge from employment such
individual, or to otherwise discriminate against such individual with respect to
compensation, hire, tenure, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, if the
individual is the best able and most competent to perform the services required.
The provision of this paragraph shall not apply, to (1) termination of employment because of the terms or conditions of any bona fide retirement or pension
plan, (2) operation of the terms or conditions of any bona fide retirement or pension plan which have the effect of a minimum service requirement, (3) operation
of the terms or conditions of any bona fide group or employe insurance plan.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 955(a) (Supp. 1975). See text accompanying note 20 infra.

(103)
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Commission's investigative powers, and, after the corporation's repeated
refusal to answer, the Commission filed suit in the Commonwealth Court
of Pennsylvania to have the answers compelled. 4 U. S. Steel filed preliminary objections alleging, inter alia, that the complaint failed to set forth
the particulars of the discriminatory act in violation of section 9 of the Act.5
The court dismissed the suit,6 and on appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, holding that the complaint failed to meet the statutory
requirement of setting forth the particulars of the discriminatory acts, thus
precluding the use of the Commission's full investigative powers. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. United States Steel Corp.-----.
Pa.
,325 -----A.2d 910 (1974).
The Commission was created by the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Act 7 in order to deal effectively with discrimination8 and was empowered
to formulate policies9 and receive and investigate complaints alleging discriminatory practices.10 The Commission was also authorized to hold
hearings, for which documents and witnesses could be subpoenaed, when
a complaint had been properly filed." The Act provided that a complaint
could be filed by an aggrieved individual, the attorney general of Pennsylvania, or, as in the instant case, by the Commission itself.1 2
4......
Pa. at ...... 325 A.2d at 911. See note 11 infra.
5. Id. See note 12 infra.
6. Id.
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 956 (Supp. 1975). Once invoked, the jurisdiction
of the Commission is exclusive and the final determination bars others actions on the
same grievance. Id. § 962(b). Exclusiveness of jurisdiction is designed to discourage
multiplicity of suits and promote efficient administration. Sutin, The Experience of
State Fair Employment Commissions: A Comparative Study, 18 VAND. L. Rv. 965,
1016-17 (1965).
8. See text accompanying note 38 infra.
9. Id. § 957(e).
10. Id. § 957(f).
11. The statute provided the Commission with the following powers:
To hold hearings, subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, administer
oaths, take testimony of any person under oath or affirmation and, in connection
therewith, to require the production for examination of any books and papers
relating to any matter under investigation where a complaint has been properly

filed before the Commission.
Id. § 597(g).
12. The Act provided:
Any individual claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged unlawful discriminatory practice may make, sign and file with the Commission a verified complaint
in writing . . . which shall set forth the particulars thereof ....
The Commission
upon its own initiative or the Attorney General may, in like manner, make, sign
and file such complaint.
Id. § 959. For an analysis of Commission procedure which assumes the necessity of
a complaint to invoke the entire process of investigation for probable cause, hearing
and remedial order, see Comment, Survey: The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 77 DICK. L. REv. 522, 536-38 (1972-73). Whether the Commission can invoke its investigatory powers, but not necessarily its enforcement powers, prior to the
filing of a complaint is an issue raised in the instant case. See text accompanying notes
28-32 infra. It should be noted that the Commission is empowered to investigate
without a complaint in cases of racial discrimination when racial tension may develop,
provided eight commissioners consent. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 957(f.1) (Supp.
1975). However, according to the Commission's statistics, the overwhelming majority
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The U. S. Steel case raised two issues, concerning the application of
the Act, which had never before been considered by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court: 1) what degree of specificity in the complaint was sufficient
to invoke the Commission's jurisdiction; and 2) even if a complaint is not
sufficient, whether the Commission can still use its full investigatory
powers.' 3 Because of the lack of case law on these points, 14 the supreme
court treated these questions as ones of pure statutory construction. In
this regard, the court was faced with conflicting principles of statutory
interpretation. On the one hand, the court had held that investigative
powers given to state agencies by statute should be defined by a strict
judicial construction of the statutory language.'
On the other hand, the
wording of the Act and prior decisions on the Commission's powers suggested a liberal construction was necessary to effectuate the Act's purposes. 16 The court adopted the strict construction approach in deciding
the instant case.
of the complaints are filed by aggrieved individuals. Of the 734 complaints docketed
and investigated between July 1, 1970 and June 30, 1971, 71 were initiated by the
Commission, and those were mostly "pattern and practice" charges. ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 1, at 7-8.
The Act then sets forth the procedures for the Commission to follow:
After the filing of any complaint, or whenever there is reason to believe that
an unlawful discriminatory practice has been committed, the Commission shall
make a prompt investigation in connection therewith.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (Supp. 1975). Moreover, the Commission must seek
conciliation between the parties if a discriminatory act was thereby found, but, if
conciliation fails, hearings can be conducted so long as written notice and a copy of
the complaint are served upon the party. The Commission may then issue a cease and
desist order or take such other affirmative action as would effectuate the purposes of
the Act. Id. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has noted in dicta that the
primary function of the Commission is to seek compliance by way of conciliation and
that the use of hearings and orders should only be a final resort. Pennsylvania Human
Relations Comm'n v. Chester School Dist., 427 Pa. 157, 175, 233 A.2d 290, 299 (1967).
13. The court also seemed to doubt whether the Commission had the power to use
interrogatories as a discovery device. ___-Pa. at ___, 325 A.2d at 914.

14. Brief for Appellant at 26. There were, however, two commonwealth court
decisions which involved the specificity of complaints filed by individuals. In Straw v.
Commonwealth, 10 Pa. Cmwlth. 99, 308 A.2d 619 (1973), a landlord had refused to
rent to blacks. Although the individual's complaint had been amended, the respondent
still challenged the sufficiency of the complaint's specificity, arguing that the inaccurate dates failed to provide adequate notice. The commonwealth court found the
complaint had given reasonable notice of any incidents occurring during a 4-day
period bracketed by the challenged dates. Id. at 102-03, 308 A.2d at 620-21. However,
the court struck down a Commission finding that respondent had violated a section
of the statute not referred to in the complaint. Id. at 103-04, 308 A.2d at 621.
In Pittsburgh Press Employ. Advertising Discrim. Appeal, 4 Pa. Cmwlth.
448, 287 A.2d 161, aff'd 413 U.S. 376 (1973), the National Organization for Women
filed a complaint with the Pittsburgh Human Relations Commission, which was challenged as to specificity. The complaint alleged a discriminatory placement of employment want ads in the local paper. The Commonwealth Court dismissed the suit holding
that respondent was "properly and adequately informed of the charged violation." Id.
at 459, 287 A.2d at 167. Thus, in both cases the complaints were upheld as sufficiently
specific to provide respondents with adequate notice of the charged violations.
15. Commonwealth ex rel. Margiotti v. Orsini, 368 Pa. 259, 81 A.2d 891 (1951)
(dealing with subpoena power).
16. See note 33 and text accompanying notes 33-38 infira.
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The court, analyzing the issue of the complaint's specificity, first considered the Commission's contention that the complaint was sufficiently
specific 17 in that it "clearly delineate[d] the perimeters of the area of concern.""' Adopting the commonwealth court's position, the supreme court
stated that the complaint's formulation ignored the plain language of
section 9 requiring the complainant to "set forth the particulars"' 9 of the
alleged discriminatory conduct and told "the appellee little more than that
it was charged with a violation of section 5 of the Act."' 20 The court also
rejected the appellant's argument that it should adopt the more liberal
interpretation of similar requirements found in federal decisions 21 involving
complaints to the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission 22 on the
ground that those complaints, although not models of specificity, were
clearly more specific than the instant one.23 According to the court, because
the federal courts only require notice pleading, 24 a fact noted in the cases
cited by the Commission,2 5 whereas Pennsylvania law necessitates fact
pleading, 26 any attempt to compare the state and federal administrative
2 7
systems was destined to fail.
17. See note 2 supra.
18 - ----Pa. at __ ,325 A.2d at 912.
19. Id., quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (Supp. 1975).
20 .......
Pa. at325 A.2d at 912.
21. See Spartan Southwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 461 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1972);
Local 104, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 439 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1971).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (Supp. III, 1973). At the time these cases were
before the courts, the pertinent language referring to specificity provided:
Whenever it is charged in writing under oath by a person claiming to be
aggrieved, or a written charge has been filed by a member of the Commission
where he has reasonable cause to believe a violation of this subchapter has
occurred (and such charge sets forth the facts upon which it is based) ....
Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, title VII, § 706, 78 Stat. 259, as amended
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. III, 1973).
23. .__ Pa. at .....325 A.2d at 913. Similarly, the court distinguished Pittsburgh
Press Employ. Advertising Discrim. Appeal, 4 Pa. Cmwlth. 448, 287 A.2d 161, aff'd
413 U.S. 376 (1973), since in that case the complaint was found by the lower court to
clearly pinpoint the "'particular area or activity alleged to be discriminatory.'"
.. Pa. at ......
325 A.2d at 913, quoting Commonwealth v. United States Steel Corp.,
10 Pa. Cmwlth. 408, 413, 311 A.2d 170, 173 (1973).
24. See Local 104, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 439 F.2d 237, 243 (9th
Cir. 1971).
25. Spartan Southwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 461 F.2d 1055, 1059 (10th Cir. 1972);
Local 104, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 439 F.2d 237, 243 (9th Cir. 1971).
26... Pa. at _ 325 A.2d at 913, citing PA. R. Civ. P. 1019.
27.
Pa. at ._, 325 A.2d at 913. In distinguishing the federal cases, this
court stated:
In Local 104 [Local 104, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 439 F.2d 237 (9th
Cir. 1971)], the charge was limited to the discriminatory restriction on union
membership of minority group members because of race or national origin.
Spartan [Spartan Southwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 461 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1972)]
involved a series of separate charges, one of which was that the employer had restricted certain occupational categories to exclude Negroes, Spanish-speaking
Americans, and Indians.
Id. For pertinent text of these complaints, see 461 F.2d at 1056; 439 F.2d at 240.
Although the distinction of the federal precedents relied upon by the Commission is factually sound, it is questionable whether it was sufflicently material to justify
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In answer to appellant's alternative contention that it had the power
to compel answers to interrogatories irrespective of the filing of a complaint, the court observed that the scope of the Commission's "pure investigatory power" was not properly in issue since, in this instance, it had
chosen to proceed by complaint. 2 However, the court, in dicta, did express
its doubts as to the legitimacy of the Commission's investigative powers
29
in the absence of a properly filed complaint.
Even though the court recognized that the Commission had the general
authority and duty to investigate discrimination if given reason to believe
that it had occurred,30 the court concluded that a literal reading of that
section of the Act which gave the Commission its arsenal of formal evidence
gathering powers authorized the use of those powers only when a complaint
had been properly filed. 3 ' Therefore, because the complaint in this case was
not sufficiently specific, it was not properly filed and those powers were
32
unavailable to the Commission.
However, the court's strict construction of the statutory language
appears inconsistent with its past decisions involving the Commission's
powers, as well as contrary to the wording of the statute itself. While
a refusal to consider the rationale of those decisions. While the courts in Spartan
Southwest and Sheet Metal Workers did make reference to notice pleading, their
purpose for doing so was limited to emphasizing the anomoly that would result if a
stricter form of pleading was required for the federal administrative agencies than
for its courts. See 461 F.2d at 1059; 439 F.2d at 243. Concluding that in modern
administrative practice there is little need to rely solely upon the pleadings, the
courts found it unnecessary to require the legal niceties of pleading before an administrative agency. 461 F.2d at 1060; 439 F.2d at 242. Thus, it would seem that the
federal cases do not stand for a requirement of conformity between the courts and
agencies as to pleading, but rather they reflect the view that liberal pleading before
agencies is preferred, especially if it is permitted before the courts. If this reading is
accurate, a comparison between the state and federal cases is not destined to fail,
unless the desire for conformity for its own sake is paramount.
A more valid distinction in these cases is that at the time of their decision,
federal courts, for policy reasons, may have been more willing to find an adequate
complaint because the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission could not investigate without a verified complaint. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970); Note,
Employment Discrimination: State FEP Laws and the Impact of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 16 W. REs. L. REv. 608, 649-50 (1965). However, as of
March, 1974, the formerly withheld authority to investigate and initiate "pattern or

practice" complaints has been completely transferred to the Commission from the
Attorney General's Office. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c) (Supp. III, 1973). That change
may affect the viability of such a distinction.
The U.S. Steel court's emphasis upon the differing pleading requirements is
also inappropriate in light of appellant's limited use of Spartan Southwest and Sheet
Metal Workers - to compel adoption of the liberal approach of the federal courts
which allows these less specific complaints to serve to initiate investigations. See
Brief for Appellant at 9-11, Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. United States
Steel Corp., ___ Pa. -, 325 A.2d 910 (1974).
28. - Pa. at -, 325 A.2d at 913.
29. Id.
30. Id., citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (Supp. 1975).
31.
Pa. at ___ 325 A.2d at 914, citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 957(g)
(Supp. 1975).
32. __ Pa. at .- 325 A.2d at 914.
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on its face, calls for a liberal interpretation in order to

accomplish the Act's purposes, the majority of the court seemingly preferred to accept the appellee's characterization of this language as merely
precatory. 34 Previously, however, such language usually has not been
disregarded in interpreting Pennsylvania's statutes. The presumption has
been that the legislature intended that the public interest be served,3 and
as the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania indicated in Pennsylvania Human
88
Relations Comm'n v. Chester School District,
a statute is to be read
"in a manner which will effectuate its purpose, a task which compels consideration of more than the statute's literal words."'87 As regards the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, the public interest expressly entailed
assuring "equal opportunities to all individuals." 8 It is submitted, therefore, that the majority's failure to follow the more liberal interpretation
will unduly hinder the Commission's investigative function89 and, with it,
the achievement of the Act's express policy goals.
A further shortcoming in the court's analysis resulted from its failure
to provide standards as to exactly what constitutes a sufficient "pattern and
practice" complaint. The court refused to accept the appellant's contention
that only the area of concern need be delineated, 40 but stated that it need
not decide whether specific instances of discrimination must be alleged,
because there was no question that more particularity was required than
that in appellant's complaint. 41 Therefore, as a guideline, the practitioner
is confronted with two extremes - the adequate complaint in Pittsburgh
Press Employment Discrimination Appeal,42 which alleged a particular
policy of discrimination but not a particular act, and the insufficient one
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(a) (Supp. 1975). This section provides:
The provisions of this act shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment
of the purposes thereof, and any law inconsistent with any provisions hereof
shall not apply.
Id.
34. Brief for Appellee at 9.
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1922(5) (Supp. 1975). See Commonwealth v.
Moose Lodge No. 107, 448 Pa. 451, 459, 294 A.2d 594, 598, appeal dismissed 409 U.S.
1052 (1972).
36. 427 Pa. 157, 233 A.2d 290 (1967).
37. Id. at 166-67, 233 A.2d at 295.
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 952(b) (Supp. 1975).
39. See notes 71 & 72 and accompanying text infra. The dissent's approach was
more closely aligned with the public policy expressed by the statute and the interpretations normally applied to this statute by the court since it recognized the purposes of the Act. __ Pa. at
, 325 A.2d at 914-18 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
40. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
41 -... Pa. at __, 325 A.2d at 913.
42. 4 Pa. Cmwlth. 448, 287 A.2d 161, aff'd, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).

The particulars

of the Pittsburgh Press complaint read:
The National Organization for Women has attempted on several occasions to
convince editors and publishers of the Pittsburgh Press that their policy of allowing employers to place advertisements in male or female columns, when the jobs
advertised obviously do not have bona fide occupational qualifications or exceptions, is unlawful.
Id. at 452, 287 A.2d at 163.
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here, which covered the entire range of possible groups to be discriminated
against, as well as the total spectrum of employment activities, thus failing
to pinpoint an area in which the respondent could ease the burden of
investigation or voluntarily comply. 43 Thus, there exist no means to
predict future decisions as to the sufficiency of specificity of "pattern and
44
practice" complaints.
Recognizing the need for more precise standards Justice Roberts, in
a dissenting opinion, posited a two-pronged test based on the purposes which
the complaint serves in proceedings before the Commission :451) to enable

a respondent to facilitate the burden of the investigation and hearing process,
and 2) to encourage voluntary compliance with the Act.46 The dissent
asserted that the "initial complaint need be no more specific than is necessary to serve these purposes. '47 Additionally, he observed that in order
to effectuate these purposes, "pattern and practice" complaints need only
set out the reasons for the belief that the person charged is engaged in
unlawful discrimination.

48

While Justice Roberts agreed that, even under his proposed standards,
the complaint failed for lack of specificity, 49 his analysis seems more aligned
with the precedents on statutory construction 0 in that it looked beyond the
literal meaning of the words of the Act. He stressed that the complaint had
to be viewed in the unique context of the Commission's proceedings, and
therefore, because the complaint in the instant case was not a formal
charge, 51 but rather a device to invoke the Commission's jurisdiction, 52 the
majority's concern with the respondent's ability to prepare a defense was
overemphasized. 53 Indeed, as commentators have noted, there are ample
opportunities to object to the complaint's sufficiency throughout the various
stages of the proceedings,5 4 and frequently, by the time these cases would
43. See note 2 supra for text of the complaint in the instant case.
44. Apparently, the court was continuing to apply the test of reasonable or adequate notice set out in Pittsburgh Press and Straw v. Commonwealth, 10 Pa. Cmwlth.
99, 308 A.2d 619 (1973). See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
45. Initially, Justice Roberts' dissent deemphasized the majority's rationale of the
importance of specificity in the preparation of a defense:
Furthermore, the person under investigation need not, at this stage, prepare
a defense. Only if the Commission finds, as a result of its investigation, probable
cause to believe that there has been a violation of the Act will there be a hearing.
-----Pa. at ___ 325 A.2d at 915 (Roberts, J., dissenting). The opportunity to prepare
a defense may not be crucial at this initial stage of proceedings. Cf. Iron Workers
Local 67 v. Hart, 191 N.W.2d 758, 768 (Iowa 1971).
46 .... Pa. at ----325 A.2d at 915 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at . 325 A.2d at 916.
50. See notes 35-37 and accompanying text supra.
51.

____Pa. at ___ 325 A.2d at 915.

52. Id.; see note 12 supra.
53. See note 45 supra.
54. In Pennsylvania, the respondent would have the opportunity to move for a
more specific statement when he files an answer to the agency's complaint. 1 PA. CODE
§ 35.54 (1971). In most states, these objections can be raised not only during this
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arrive at the hearing stage, the facts will have been brought out in con-

ciliation meetings or by discovery. 5 At this initial stage there is little
need, beyond those purposes pointed out by the dissent, 56 to require particulars.57 Nonetheless, complaints such as these should at least be substantiated by statistics

58

or, as suggested by the dissent, other facts sup-

porting a reasonable belief that discrimination exists,5 9 and as the investigation proceeded, the complaint could easily be supplemented before a
hearing is scheduled. 60
initial investigation, but also, at a public hearing or in court on a motion to dismiss.
Sutin, supra note 7, at 1015. Other opportunities to prepare are set out in 1 K. DAvis,
§ 8.04, at 525 (1959).
55. Sutin, supra note 7, at 1016.
56. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
57. Appellee apparently argued below that a liberal reading of this particulars
requirement would allow the Commission to engage in a fishing expedition to uncover
violations which it would not have found but for that expedition. Brief for Appellant
at 8. However, it is submitted that such fears of a fishing expedition are no longer
viable reasons to limit administrative power.
The only power that is involved here is the power to get information from
those who best can give it and who are most interested in not doing so ...
When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too, may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable
violation of the law.
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950).
58. The use of statistics to show reasonable belief has been upheld as a basis for
a complaint in federal courts. See, e.g., Cameron Iron Works, Inc. v. EEOC, 320
F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (S.D. Tex. 1970); cf. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n
v. Chester Housing Auth., 458 Pa. 67, 73, 327 A.2d 335, 338 (1974), wherein the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled that statistics could be used to prove racial
discrimination. But see State v. Adolph Coors Corp., 29 Colo. App. 240, 486 P.2d 43
(1971), cert. denied, June 28, 1971, by Supreme Court of Colorado. In Coors, a
complaint based on statistical disparity was ruled insufficient. Id. at 245, 486 P.2d
at 45. The complaint was set out in full in Note, The Colorado Civil Rights Commission - Judicial Denial of Effective Investigatory Powers, 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 345,
345-46 n.9 (1972). In the instant case, the. Commission apparently had such statistics
available for 85 Pennsylvania employers, including the respondent corporation, who
were considered appropriate for affirmative action programs. 10 Pa. Cmwlth. at 410,
311 A.2d at 172.
59. The reasonable belief approach has been accepted by the federal courts in
regard to both "pattern and practice" complaints filed by the Attorney General and
complaints filed by individual Commissioners. See, e.g., General Employ. Enterprises
v. EEOC, 440 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1971) (Commissioner's complaint).
60..
Pa. at ... 325 A.2d at 915. Cf. Straw v. Commonwealth, 10 Pa. Cmwlth.
99, 308 A.2d 619 (1973).
An approach similar to the one suggested has been followed in at least one
New York case. In State Div. of Human Rights v. Kilian Mfg. Corp., 42 App. Div.
2d 391, 348 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1973), the division had made an investigation and subsequent thereto issued a direction order for a public hearing. The court upheld a
challenge that the direction did not set forth the facts upon which it was based:
To permit the division to proceed merely upon a statement of its conclusions
would deny to the charged party its due process right to be fully and fairly
apprised of the factual nature of the charges being made against it. . . . We
conclude that in the absence of a statement of the findings of fact either in the
complaint or in the direction for a public hearing the division is without sufficient
basis to proceed . ...
Id. at 393, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 430-31 (emphasis added). It is submitted that Pennsylvania could take an approach analogous to this and allow particulars to be set forth
at a time after an investigation but before a hearing.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE,
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The court's requirement of a relatively high degree of specificity creates
serious problems for the Commission in view of the court's limitation of
the Commission's investigative powers absent a complaint. The court's
position was clear. The Commission has the authority and duty to investigate without a complaint if it has reason to believe unlawful discrimination
exists; 61 however, the investigatory powers listed in section 7(g) of the
Act 2 are available only when a complaint is properly filed before the
Commission. 63 Thus, the Commission is limited in initiating its own complaints to particular instances of discrimination, yet is curtailed in its
independent investigative power until it has discovered sufficient particulars
to support an adequate complaint. In short, the Commission is rendered
less effective.
4
Given the Commission's general authority to investigate,3 the question
of what the limitation on that authority is should be answered in light of
the purposes of the Act. 65 It is submitted that on policy grounds, especially
when the specificity requirement is strictly enforced, the Commission should
be given full investigatory powers whether or not a complaint has been
filed.0 0 The pattern or practice complaint does not depend upon a par07
ticular instance of discrimination but upon a continuing practice. Unless
the Commission has the power to compel answers, etc., the authority to
61. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, 957(g) (Supp. 1975). For text of this section, see
note 11 supra.
63. See text accompanying note 31 supra. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
decision appears broader than that of the lower court which restricted its discussion
to the specific issue of the use of interrogatories. See 10 Pa. Cmwlth. at 414-15, 311

A.2d at 174. The Supreme Court explicitly decided that the entire list of devices in
section 7(g) were unavailable and, subsequently, questioned whether interrogatories
are even included in the power conferred by that section. -_ Pa. at __, 325 A.2d
at 914. A possible explanation for this broader ruling was appellant's request for a
strong statement regarding its powers. Brief for Appellant at 26.
64. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
65. It is submitted that, given the general authority to investigate, and the absence
of specific statutory guidelines as to what powers are available when the authority is
invoked, determining that issue requires an analysis of the ends to which the statute
is directed and the fitness of the means to those ends, an analysis which goes beyond
the language alone.
66. See note 27 supra; cf. Local 104, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 439 F.2d
237, 242 (9th Cir. 1971). Additionally, as the dissent noted, the argument that the
, 325 A.2d at 916
Commission's powers are not cumulative is unfounded. -_ Pa. at
(Roberts, J., dissenting). Accordingly, it is submitted that since the statute provided
two valid alternative methods for initially dealing with the alleged discrimination at
U.S. Steel - the complaint procedure and the "pure investigative power" - this
decision penalized a good faith attempt to comply with the Commission's ordinary
procedures of filing a complaint. Where there is a statutory duty and authority to
investigate, it is an error to impinge upon this authority by striking down the Commission's actions because the court apparently felt that the Commission should not
have filed a complaint without an initial investigation.
67. See note 1 supra.
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investigate is of little value. 68 Recognizing the difficulties involved in
proving discrimination, Justice Roberts noted:
"One intent on violating the Law Against Discrimination cannot
be expected to declare or announce his purpose. Far more likely is
it that he will pursue his discriminatory practices in ways that are
devious, by methods subtle and elusive ....,69

In this regard, the appellants noted in their brief that problems of
compliance with Commission investigations were already occurring. 70 By
compelling the Commission to rely primarily upon individual reports,7 1 a
resulting decrease in agency efficiency can be expected. 72 Problems of
gathering individual reports and the waste of time and resources in the
case-by-case approach underscore the necessity for the use of the "pattern
and practice" complaint. However, such complaints are the result only of
Commission initiative, and this, in turn, would be substantially crippled by
the lack of investigative powers.
Moreover, general administrative cases seem to favor a broader basis
for an agency's investigative power than the individual's report. 73 Other
68. --- Pa. at __ 325 A.2d at 916 (Roberts, J., dissenting). See generally
Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Kansas Comm'n on Civil Rights, 214 Kan. 120, 519
P.2d 1092 (1974).
69. ____Pa. at __ 325 A.2d at 916 (Roberts, J., dissenting), quoting Holland v.
Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 45, 119 N.E.2d 581, 584 (1954).
70. Brief for Appellant at 25. Appellant outlined the problem in this manner:
Respondent and their attorneys . . . are refusing to cooperate with PHRC,

as to interrogatories but also in other facets of the Commission's investigatory
efforts. But even before this opinion, the Commission had met with recalcitrance
from many respondents who challenged the Commission's investigatory powers ....
71. Such reports form the bulk of the Commission's docket. See ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 1, at 7--8. However, this procedure has been criticized as not being the
most effective method of dealing with employment discrimination because it is not an
"accurate barometer of actual discrimination." Note, The Right to Equal Treatment:
Administrative Enforcement of Antidiscrimination Legislation, 74 HAxv. L. REV. 526,
531 (1961). Some of the problems involved with individual complaints, noted by the
commentator, are: 1) the reluctance to jeopardize an already attained employment
position, and 2) the unwillingness of certain minority groups to file complaints, e.g.,
Spanish-speaking Americans. Id. at 531-32.
72. Several commentators have expressed dissatisfaction with exclusive reliance
on individual complaints and have urged Commissions to take their own initiative.
Representative of these criticisms is the following comment of Professor Hill:
State commissions have become complaint taking bureaus that very slowly and
laboriously ... attempt to "conciliate" an individual complaint that may or may
not result in new employment for one person and do not change the racial employment pattern of a company or an industry.
Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice Commissions: A Critical
Analysis with Recommendations, 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 22, 24 (1964-65). See Girard
& Jaffe, Some General Observations on Administration of State Fair Employment
Practice Laws, 14 BUFFALO L. Rnv. 114; Note, supra note 58, at 350-51.
Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Commission has stated that its so-called
systemic complaints "can end more discrimination with the expenditure of less public
money per case." ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
73. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) ; Oklahoma Press
Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Kansas
Comm'n on Civil Rights, 214 Kan. 120, 519 P.2d 1092 (1974).
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jurisdictions which have decided this issue have ruled that investigative
powers are not dependent upon the filing of a complaint. 74 On the federal
level, although a complaint is necessary to initiate an investigation, 7 , the
courts have tended to allow a more liberal reading of the particularity requirement of that statute. 70 In short, the majority's approach rejects both
the liberal reading of the statutory particularity requirement and a broader
use of investigative powers, yielding a result inconsistent with the modern
77
trends in administrative law.
The predominant effect of the U. S. Steel decision will be a curtailment
of the use of the "pattern and practice" complaints. The strict particularity
requirement apparently compels the Commission to present in its complaint
the kind of facts which can only be developed by an investigation, but the
power to begin such an investigation has, at the same time, been restricted. 78
Any decline in the use of the "pattern and practice" complaint could
produce the less than desirable effect of fostering greater reliance upon
individual complainants and the federal Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission (EEOC). The disadvantage of the first is inefficiency and
ineffectiveness in attaining the goals of the Act, 79 while the second, although
74. In deciding In re Broido, 40 Misc. 2d 419, 243 N.Y.S.2d 101, 104 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1963), the Supreme Court for New York County ruled that, even in the
absence of a complaint, investigative powers were available to the State Commission
for Human Rights under its general authority to investigate. Similarly, the Supreme
Court of Kansas held, in an analogous situation, that the State Commission on Civil
Rights' subpoena power could not be restricted to a preliminary probable case investigation. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Kansas Comm'n on Civil Rights, 214 Kan. 120,
124, 519 P.2d 1092, 1095 (1974). However, the Colorado Court of Appeals held in
State v. Adolph Coors Corp., 20 Colo. App. 240, 486 P.2d 43 (1971), a case similar
to the instant one, that the subpoena power could only be used when specific discrimination may have occurred in fact, which then must be set out in the complaint. Id. at
245, 486 P.2d at 45. Nevertheless, it should be noted that under the statute which
was operative at the time of that decision there was no independent investigative
authority vested in the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. Compare CoLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 80-21-7(3) (1963) (recodified as COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-307(3)
(1973)), with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (Supp. 1975).
75. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
76. See United States v. Gustin-Bacon Div., Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 426 F.2d
539 (1970) (pattern or practice complaint) ; cf. Spartan Southwest, Inc. v. EEOC,
461 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1972); General Employ. v. EEOC, 440 F.2d 783 (7th Cir.
1971) ;Local 104, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 439 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1971).
But cf. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Brown, 369 F. Supp. 702 (E.D. La. 1974).
For the text of the statute regarding Federal Commissioner complaints, see
note 22 supra. Pattern or practice complaints are subject to a similar requirement - to
set forth "facts pertaining to such pattern or practice . .. ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1970).
77. The dissent, on the other hand, argued that the Commission's investigatory
powers attach once the responsibility to investigate is established.
Pa. at ... 325
A.2d at 917 (Roberts, J., dissenting), citing In re Broido, 40 Misc. 2d 419, 243
N.Y.S.2d 101 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1963) and Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Kansas
Comm'n on Civil Rights, 214 Kan. 120, 519 P.2d 1092 (1974). It is submitted that
the dissent's position is not only in line with the current trend in administrative law,
but it also correctly allows the Commission to efficiently and effectively achieve its
mandated objectives.
78. - Pa. at __ 325 A.2d at 915 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
79. See notes 71 & 72 and accompanying text supra.
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not inherently disadvantageous, could result in an increased delay in
remedial action. Presently, the federal statute requires the EEOC to defer
any action to the state commissions for a period of 60 days when the state
has a law equivalent in coverage to Title VII.80 Ineffective enforcement
of Pennsylvania's law could result in more frequent federal intervention. 8 '
However, unlike the state commissions, the EEOC possesses only conciliatory powers82 and cannot order affirmative action or relief on its own, but
must resort to court action. 83 One commentator has found this to be a
source of delay in obtaining action on a complaint because, inter alia, the
fact determining process must be repeated in the courts.8 4
However, there may still exist a way in which the Commission might
continue to utilize these complaints. If the complaint could be drawn with
a more definite basis, possibly including a particular instance of discrimination, the Commission could apparently proceed with an investigation
which could include any material "relating to any matter under investigation
where a complaint has been properly filed." 85 Thus, this initial complaint
could then be amended to encompass discrimination within the entire operations. Such a method is now receiving limited use.8 6 Problems with this
approach, however, are twofold: 1) the difficulties in acquiring individual
complaints8 7 and 2) the remaining uncertainty as to the degree of particularity required in "pattern and practice" complaints. 8
Nevertheless, the Commission's authority and power to carry out its
legislative mandate should not needlessly be open to challenge, nor should
this agency be forced to accept judicially imposed standards stricter than
the legislature sought in order to accomplish its aims. As Justice Roberts
observed, the Commission should be given the investigative capabilities
recognized by administrative theory while keeping in view the purposes
its proceedings are to serve.
Jerome C. Murray

80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), (d) (Supp. III, 1973).
81. One commentator saw this type of intervention as deleterious to the concept
of federalism. Note, supra note 58, at 354.
82. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-5(a) (1970).
83. See Cooksey, The Role of Law in Equal Employment Opportunity, 7 B.C.
IND. & CoM. L.REV. 417, 423 (1965). The Pennsylvania Commission is empowered to
make remedial orders including affirmative action. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959
(Supp. 1975). See Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v.Alto-Reste Park Cem.
Ass'n, 453 Pa. 124, 306 A.2d 881 (1973).
84. Cooksey, supra note 83, at 427. For an estimate of the delay involved, see
Purdy, Title VII: Relationship and Effect on State Action, 7 B.C. IND. & Com.L.REV.
525, 532 (1965).
85. See note 11 supra.
86. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1,at 8.

87. See note 71 supra.
88. See text accompanying notes 40-44 supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss1/3

12

Anderson: Administrative Law - Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission's Pa

1975-1976]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

CIVIL RIGHTS

- PUBLIC HOUSING - TENANT ASSIGNMENT AND SITE
SELECTION POLICIES OF MUNICIPAL HOUSING AUTHORITY BASED UPON
RACIAL CRITERIA WARRANT THE IMPOSITION OF AN INTERDISTRICT

REMEDIAL PLAN.
Gautreauxv. Chicago Housing Authority (7th Cir. 1974)
Plaintiffs, blacks who were tenants in and applicants for public housing
in the city of Chicago, commenced a class action against the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) in 1966, alleging that since 1950 CHA had intentionally violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution' by maintaining existing patterns
of residential segregation of races through certain tenant assignment and
site selection procedures. 2 They sought equitable relief in the form of
an injunction restraining the allegedly unconstitutional practice and demanded affirmative remedial action. 3 The district court granted partial
summary judgment for the plaintiffs on February 10, 1969, finding that
the CHA had imposed quotas at four white family housing projects in
order to minimize the presence of, black families. 4 Additionally the district
1. U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment provides in part:
"No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." Id.
2. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted sub norn. Hills v. Gautreaux, 421 U.S. 962 (1975) (No. 74-1047).
3. Id. Plaintiffs' cause of action was based upon 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 2000d
(1970). Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefits of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions
of every kind, and to no other.
Id. § 1981.
Section 1982 provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
Id. § 1982.
Relief was also demanded under section 2000d, which provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.
Id. § 2000d.
4. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 909 (N.D. II1. 1969).
Until 1954 the CHA had refused to permit black families to reside in these projects.
Moreover, even as of December 31, 1967, the black population in the four predominantly white projects constituted only from 1 to 7% of the total occupancy
while blacks constituted 90% of the tenants in all of the CHA projects and 90%
of the waiting list. In addition, CHA officials openly testified to the presence of
"elastic quotas" and a tenant selection policy of preferring whites as tenants for
the white projects. Id.
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court condemned, primarily on the basis of statistical data and uncontradicted admissions by CHA officials, 5 the site selection procedures employed by CHA for determining the location of new projects.( Although
the court found that the defendant housing authority officials did not harbor
a subjectively racist attitude, 7 the CHA was held to have intentionally
maintained a system of public housing on the basis of de jure racial dis8

crimination.

On July 1, 1969, a judgment order granting equitable relief to the
plaintiffs was entered against CHA,9 requiring the construction of at least
700 dwelling units in predominantly white neighborhoods, 10 before any
5. An analysis of an extensive amount of statistical and historical data submitted
by the plaintiffs prompted the court to state:
The statistics on the family housing sites considered during the five major programs show a very high probability, a near certainty, that many sites were vetoed
on the basis of the racial composition of the site's neighborhood. In the face of
these figures, CHA's failure to present a substantial or even a speculative indication that racial criteria were not used entitles plaintiffs to judgment as a
matter of law. The additional evidence of intent, composed mostly of uncontradicted admissions by CHA officials, also establishes plaintiffs' right to judgment
as a matter of law either considered alone or in combination with the statistics.
296 F. Supp. at 913 (citations omitted). Ninety-nine and one-half percent of the
housing units initially located in predominantly white areas were vetoed while only
10% of the units in black areas were rejected. Id. at 910. The rejection of proposed
projects in white neighborhoods was facilitated by a procedure whereby CHA informally submitted proposed site locations to the city council alderman in whose
ward the site was located. Id. at 910, 913. Plaintiffs alleged that white sites were
vetoed because the 90% black waiting list and occupancy rate would create a black
population in a white area. Id. at 910. The court held that, although there was no
evidence that the aldermen who vetoed white sites were necessarily motivated by
racial animus when they followed a policy of excluding blacks from white neighborhoods and acted in response to the desires of their constituency, they could not be
permitted to acquiesce to their constituents' sentiments in order to maintain white
neighborhoods and to deny public housing to blacks through site location. Id. at 914.
6. Id. at 912. The statutory authority pursuant to which the CHA operated
listed several purposes for the preparation and operation of projects. These included
the elimination of unsafe and unsanitary dwellings, the cleaning and redevelopment of blighted or slum areas, the assembly of improved and unimproved land for
development or redevelopment purposes, the conservation and rehabilitation of
existing housing, and the provision of decent, safe and sanitary housing accommodations.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 67%, § 8.2 (1959).
7. Id.
8. De jure segregation means "segregation in the traditional sense, forced,
purposeful separation of the races." Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd., 276
F. Supp. 834, 840 (D.C. La. 1967). The term refers to "segregation specifically mandated by law or by public policy pursued under color of law." Hobson v. Hobson, 269
F. Supp. 401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1969). Segregation
is de facto when it results from policies not based on race or social conditions for which
the government cannot be held responsible. 269 F. Supp. at 493.
9. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
10. Id. at 738. CHA was precluded by the order from building any units within
what was denominated the "Limited Public Housing Area" unless certain conditions
were met. Id. "Limited Public Housing Area" was defined by the order as that part
of Cook County, Illinois lying within census tracts having at least a 30% nonwhite
population, or within a distance of 1 mile from any point on the outer perimeter of
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other units could be built and further ordering that 75% of all public
housing thereafter constructed in Chicago be built in predominantly white
11
areas.
At the time the original complaint was filed against CHA plaintiffs
had also filed a complaint against the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) seeking 1) a declaratory judgment that HUD had
"assisted in the carrying on ... of a racially discriminatory public housing

system, within the city of Chicago"' 2 and 2) an injunction to prevent
HUD from making available to CHA any federal funds to be used in
connection with or in support of the racially discriminatory aspects of the
4
3
Chicago public housing system.' Following a dismissal of the complaint,'
the Seventh Circuit reversed, granting summary judgment upon the grounds
that HUD, through its Secretary, had violated the due process clause of
the fifth amendment to the Constitution and section 2000d'5 by assisting
any such census tract. The "General Public Housing Area" was defined as the
remaining part of the county, and was generally consistent with predominantly white
areas. Id. at 737.
11. Id. at 738. The order also placed restrictions on the number of stories which
such structures could contain, the number of persons which could occupy a project,
permissible densities of project units within a particular census tract, and tenant
assignment policy. Furthermore, the order required CHA to file various statements
on present and proposed activities. No appeal was taken from this judgment order.
The district court retained jurisdiction over the matter for all purposes, including the
issuance and enforcement of supplemental orders. Id. at 739-40. CHA was also
required to use its "best efforts" to increase the supply of dwelling units as soon as
possible. Id. at 741.
This judgment order was later affirmed and modified by the Seventh Circuit to
require CHA's submission of proposed sites in accordance with a specific timetable,
after CHA had refused to submit any sites to the city council for its required approval.
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 922 (1971). At the time the order was entered, the United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development had approved sites for 1500 dwelling units which
were awaiting submission to the Chicago City Council. The CHA attempted to
justify this delay in submission upon the basis of political considerations and community hostility. However, the court held that these justifications had been "properly
rejected by the lower court in the original litigation." 436 F.2d at 313. The supplemental order required CHA, on or before September 20, 1970 to submit sites for no
fewer than 1500 units to the city council for approval. Id. at 311.
Illinois law requires the CHA to submit proposed sites for public housing to the
Chicago Plan Commission and to the Chicago City Council for approval. ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 24, § 11-12-4.1, ch. 673/2, § 9 (Supp. 1975-1976).
12. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 732 (7th Cir. 1971). An order of the
district court stayed all proceedings in this suit until disposition of the companion
CHA case. Id. at 733.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 733. The complaint in this case contained four counts. The first
count was brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), the general federal question provision, and the fifth amendment to the Constitution, alleging that the Secretary of
HUD had violated the due process clause by funding and approving of CHA's
racially discriminatory programs. The second count alleged that the Secretary's conduct had violated section 2000d. See note 3 supra. The dismissal of the remaining two
counts was not contested by the plaintiffs and the subsequent grant of summary
judgment by the Seventh Circuit was based solely on the first two counts. 448
F.2d at 733.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970). For the text of this section, see note 3 supra.
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CHA's 16 maintenance of a racially discriminatory public housing system
17
and by its knowing acquiescence in CHA's programs.
Since a judgment against CHA had already been entered,1 8 the issue
facing the district court in this latest phase of the controversy was the
shaping of relief with relation to HUD. On remand the CHA and HUD
actions were consolidated and an order was entered calling for each of the
parties to file suggestions for a comprehensive plan to remedy the past
effects of Chicago's public housing segregation, including "alternatives
which are not confined in their scope to the geographic boundary of the
city of Chicago."' 9 In a memorandum opinion and judgment order filed
September 11, 1973, the district court ordered that HUD use its "best
efforts" to cooperate with CHA to increase the supply of dwelling units
in conformity with all applicable federal statutes, HUD rules and regulations, and the judgment order entered previously against CHA on July
16. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971). HUD funded the
CHA projects only after having made numerous and consistent efforts to persuade
the CHA to locate low-income public housing projects in white neighborhoods on
the theory that it was better to fund a segregated housing system than to deny
housing altogether to the thousands of needy black families of Chicago. Id. at 737.
Although sympathizing with the dilemma faced by HUD, the court refused to
recognize good faith as a defense and concluded that the Secretary's past actions
constituted racially discriminatory conduct in their own right. Id. at 739. The district
court in the CHA litigation had similarly held that "[a] deliberate policy to separate
the races cannot be justified by the good intentions with which other laudable goals
are pursued."
17. Before questions of relief to be obtained against HUD could be resolved,
however, the district court was confronted with additional problems with respect to
the litigation involving CHA. Illinois law requires that, in cities having a population
in excess of 500,000, a housing authority must obtain the approval of the local
governing body before it can acquire property for development of low-income public
housing. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 67,1%, § 9 (Supp. 1975-1976). As a result, even though
the CHA had submitted sites, the Chicago City Council was able to block development of housing projects in white neighborhoods by merely refusing to approve proposed sites. Subsequent to the opinion in which the Seventh Circuit determined that
HUD's practices were violative of the fifth amendment, the plaintiffs sought and
obtained an injunction against further payments by HUD to the city of Chicago
under the Model Cities Program. Gautreaux v. Romney, 332 F. Supp. 366 (N.D.
Ill. 1971). The injunction prevented HUD from paying out any Model Cities Program money to the city unless and until at least 700 dwelling units had received city
council approval. Id. at 370.
However, the grant of the injunction was reversed on appeal, since the district
court had failed to find that the Chicago Model Cities Program itself had been
improperly administered and the denial of these funds to the city was an inappropriate
means of forcing the city council to approve proposed sites. Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Auth., 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972). On remand the district court circumvented the city council by suspending the statutory requirement of obtaining its
approval. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 342 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Ill.1972).
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 480 F.2d 210
(7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1144 (1974). Noting the broad equity powers
available to a district court once a right and violation have been shown, the Seventh
Circuit held the action of the district court to be well within the range of its discretion.
18. See notes 9-11 and accompanying text supra.
19. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 1974).
The order of the district court is unreported.
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1, 1969.2 o In addition HUD was permanently enjoined from funding any
low-income public housing in the city of Chicago which was inconsistent
with the terms of the judgment order. 21 In doing so, the district court
denied plaintiffs' motion for an interdistrict mode of relief, i.e., a desegregation plan which would encompass the city of Chicago as well as its
contiguous suburban political subdivisions. On appeal the Seventh Circuit
reversed, holding that, to be effective, a remedial plan must be implemented on an interdistrict or metropolitan basis and that the district court's
denial of such relief was clearly erroneous. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority, 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. granted sub. nom. Hills
v. Gautreaux, 421 U.S. 962 (1975) (No. 74-1047).
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution is addressed to state action, 22 whether that
action be executive, legislative or judicial. 23 It also applies to the actions
of subdivisions to which states delegate some of their functions, 24 and
where a violation of federal constitutional rights has been shown, the fact
that the offending entity is a political subdivision has presented no serious
barrier to the imposition of appropriate remedies. Local school boards 25
and state election districts 26 are obvious examples of local government
entities that have received extensive judicial scrutiny in the equal protection
context.
In cases where de jure racial school segregation has been found, the
United States Supreme Court has held that the development of a proper
remedy involves consideration of a wide variety of factors. In Brown v.
Board of Education,27 the initial decision in this area, the Supreme Court
20. Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
21. Id. at 691.
22. See note 1 supra.
23. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879).
24. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
25. See, e.g., Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969)
(denying motions for additional time to implement segregation plans); Monroe v.
Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968) (striking down a free transfer plan whereby
a student could transfer to another district if space was available) ; Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (invalidating a desegregation plan allowing children
to choose the school that they attend); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218
(1964) (holding county school closing a denial of equal protection to black students).
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (refusing to grant school board's request to
suspend an integration plan).
26. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (upholding a lower court
determination that a multimember district scheme for election to state legislature
violated the rights of blacks and Mexican Americans); Avery v. Midland County,
390 U.S. 474 (1968) (invalidating apportionment of county election district) ; Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (striking down the apportionment of a state legislature) ;
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (striking down the Georgia congressional
districting statute) ; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (plaintiffs' claim that they
were being denied equal protection under a state legislature apportionment scheme
held to present a justiciable issue).
27. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I). In Brown I, the Supreme Court struck
down the "separate but equal" doctrine announced in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896), and held that the maintenance of racially segregated public schools violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
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acknowledged that the formulation of decrees presented problems of considerable complexity 25 and ultimately determined that the lower courts

should be guided by equitable principles in fashioning and effectuating
remedial decrees. 29 The impact on the public interest and a wide variety
of administrative problems as well as the "revision of school districts and
attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining
admissions to the public schools on a non-racial basis," were specifically
approved for consideration. 0
In Milliken v. Bradley,3' the most recent of a line of cases 32 elaborating
upon the guidelines set forth in Brown, the Supreme Court attempted to
define more clearly the situation where revision of school districts or other
forms of interdistrict relief would be warranted. In Milliken, the Court
was faced with the question of whether a federal court may impose a multidistrict remedy in response to a situation where de lure segregation was
found to exist within a single school district, where there was no finding
that the other school districts included in the proposed desegregation plan
had committed constitutional violations necessitating equitable relief. Beginning its analysis with the principle that "the scope of the remedy is
'8
determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation,"
the Milliken Court stated that prior to the imposition of a multidistrict
remedy, "it must first be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in
8' 4
another district.
The court stated that the constitutional right of the black school
children residing in a school district is to attend a unitary school system
in that district, and the imposition of a multi-district remedy in the face
of a violation by a single district 3 5 was an expansion of that right "without
28. 347 U.S. at 495.
29. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown II). Brown
II dealt with the relief to be accorded as a result of the Court's decision in Brown I.
30. Id. at 300.
31. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
32. See cases cited innote 25 supra.
33. 418 U.S. at 744.
34. Id. at 744-45. In Milliken, the court reviewed a metropolitan area desegregation plan, involving 54 school districts, which had been ordered by the district
court and affirmed by the court of appeals, Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914
(E.D. Mich. 1972), aft'd, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973). At the root of the Supreme
Court's decision was the finding by the district court of de jure segregation in only
the one school district and the fact that the record revealed no significant violation
or effect upon the other districts which had been included in the plan. 418 U.S. at
744-45. The Court stated:
Thus an interdistrict remedy might be in order where the racially discriminatory
acts of one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent district, or where district lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race.
Id. at 745.
35. The Court noted that the record contained language and some specific incidental findings which were regarded by the district court as a basis for affording
interdistrict relief. Id. at 748. However, aside from one incident, which the Court
rejected as insufficient to justify broad metropolitan relief, these were held to be'
unsupported by the evidence. Id. at 749-50.
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any support either in constitutional principle or precedent."3 The Millike,
Court made it clear that, although boundary lines may be transgressed
where there has been a constitutional violation calling for inter-district
relief,
the notion that school district lines may be casually ignored or treated
as a mere administrative convenience is contrary to the history of
public education in our country. No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of
schools .... 7
The Court also expressed concern for the logistical and administrative
problems which would arise as a result of a school district consolidation 8
and suggested that a complete restructuring of the laws of Michigan required as a result of interdistrict relief would cause the district court to
become a de facto legislative authority and school superintendent for the
entire area. 9 The Milliken Court specifically rejected the argument that
because agencies which possessed statewide authority participated in maintaining the dual school system, the district court should have enjoyed broad
discretion to restructure school districts other than the single district in
40
violation.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart emphasized that the
issue before the Court concerned the appropriate exercise of federal equity
36. Id. at 747 (footnote omitted).
37. Id. at 741.

38. Id. at 743.
39. Id. at 743-44.
40. Id. at 746. Mr. Justice White, dissenting, characterized the Court's decision
as setting up an "arbitrary rule, and as ignoring the legal reality that
the constitutional violations, even if occurring locally, were committed by governmental entities for which the State is responsible and . .. it is the State that
must respond to the Fourteenth Amendment. An interdistrict remedy for the
infringements that occurred in this case is well within the confines and powers
of the State, which is the governmental entity ultimately responsible for desegregating its school.
Id. at 781 (White, J., dissenting). Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall joined
in this dissent. Mr. Justice Marshall also wrote a separate dissenting opinion, joined
by Justices Douglas, Brennan and White, in which he expressed the view that where
state-imposed segregation has been demonstrated, it becomes the duty of the state to
eliminate all vestiges of racial discrimination and to achieve the greatest possible
degree of actual desegregation. Id. at 787 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Relying on the district court's finding that a Detroit-only plan would not accomplish desegregation, id. at 788. Justice Marshall continued:
Because of the already high and rapidly increasing percentage of Negro
students in the Detroit system, as well as the prospect of white flight, a Detroit
only plan simply has no hope of achieving actual desegregation . .

.

. The very

evil that Brown I was aimed at will not be cured, but will be perpetuated for
the future.
Id. at 799. Mr. Justice Douglas also wrote a dissenting opinion emphasizing the
overwhelming state influence and control of the Michigan public school system and
urging that ruling against the interdistrict remedy sets blacks back to the period that
antedated the separate but equal regime of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
418 U.S. at 757-62 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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jurisdiction, 41 and that the district court and court of appeals were in
error for the "simple reason the relief they thought necessary was not
commensurate with the constitutional violation found. 42
Interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in Milliken was crucial
to a resolution of the problem of fashioning a proper remedy in Gautreaux.
In interpreting Milliken, the Seventh Circuit essentially came to the conclusion reached by Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion in that case 43 that the basic issue before the court concerned the appropriate exercise of
federal equity jurisdiction. 44 Viewing Milliken as a logical link in a line
of precedent developing the scope of federal equity power,45 the court
stated :
In view of the dominant theme of the majority opinion as a whole,
the fact that any application of the opinion to factual situations other
than the one before the Court would be dictum, and particularly in
view of Justice Stewart's opinion for the fifth vote, we conclude that
the majority opinion 46in Milliken v. Bradley deals with equitable
limitation on remedies.
The issue before the Gautreaux court was, therefore, defined as one
of determining to what extent desegregation of public housing was practical. 47 The conclusion reached by the Seventh Circuit was that, in order
to be effective, it was necessary and equitable that any remedial plan be
48
applied on an interdistrict or metropolitan area basis.
The decision was predicated upon four factors. First, the court noted
that an important equitable factor which prevented interdistrict relief in
Milliken was not present in the instant case as there was no deeply rooted
tradition of local control of public housing. Rather, it was an activity
where federal involvement was pervasive and where a clear statutory
commitment to nondiscrimination existed. 49 Secondly, the court charac41. Id. at 753 (Stewart, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 754. Justice Stewart's opinion indicated no area of disagreement with
the majority opinion of the Court written by Mr. Chief Justice Burger but rather was
overwhelmingly supportive. Id.
43. See notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra.
44. 503 F.2d at 935.

45. Id. at 936. The court stated:
Beginning in Brown I, the Court recognized that remedial complexities may limit
or delay implementation of the Constitutional rights to school desegregation. In
Brown II, the Court emphasized local school problems, and in a passage quoted
by both the Chief Justice and Justice Stewart in Milliken, reminded that "Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its
remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs."

Id. at 935, quoting 418 U.S. at 737-38, 753 (citations omitted).
46. 503 F.2d at 935.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. A large amount of funds for construction of the Chicago public housing
system came from HUD. Between 1950 and 1966 alone, HUD had spent nearly
$350,000,000 on CHA projects. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 739 (7th Cir.
1971).
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 represents the most
recent federal activity in this area. Pub. L. No. 93-383 (Feb. 27, 1974). The main
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terized the administrative problems of building public housing outside
Chicago as insignificant and not comparable to ,the problems of daily
bussing of thousands :of children and restructuring'school systems as proposed in Milliken. This conclusion was based upon the fact that CHA
and HUD could build housing much like any other landowner. 50 Thirdly,
while the Supreme Court had recognized the absence of an interdistrict
violation in Milliken, the court pointed to two examples in this case in
support of the existence of suburban discrimination and discriminatory
effects throughout the metropolitan area. 51 One example was an exhibit
offered by the plaintiffs indicating that of 12 suburban public housing
projects, 10 were located in or adjacent to predominately black census
tracts. The second example was provided by the Seventh Circuit's opinion
in Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc.,5 2 wherein judicial notice was taken
of widespread residential racial segregation in Chicago and its environs,
leading the court to hold that a prima facie. showing had been made that
this segregation had produced discriminatory effects throughout the metropolitan area. Finally, although the parties disagreed as to what relief the
district court should order, they were in agreement that the metropolitan
area was a single, relevant locality for low income public housing purposes
and that a remedy limited to the city would not function sufficiently to
alleviate the segregation. 53

In addition to these factors, plaintiffs had offered expert testimony
that every census tract in Chicago would be 30% black by the year 2000
if present trends continued, whereas the rate of white exodus from the
city would diminish if desegregated housing opportunities in the suburban
areas were provided.5 4 Noting that White flight had produced similar
conditions in other major cities55 the court remarked that "[t] he realities
of white flight to the suburbs and' the inevitability of resegregation by
rebuilding the ghettos as CHA and HUD were doing in Chicago must
therefore be considered in drawing a comprehensive plan." 56 Additionally,
thrust of this legislation is to consolidate and simplify existing programs although it
also contains authority for the development of several new problems. S. REP. No. 693,
93d Cong., Sess. 1 (1974).
50. 503 F.2d at 936.
51. Id. at 937.
52. 501 F.2d 324, 334-35 (7th Cir. 1974). The Clark court, in reversing a
directed verdict for the defendant building-contractor, held that evidence of exploitation of a black housing market was sufficient to warrant sending the case to a jury.
Judicial notice taken of racial residential segregation was based upon a recent study
which had indicated that Chicago was the second most segregated of the 30 largest
cities in the United States. Id. at 335 n.10.
53. In support of the inefficacy of a city-only remedy, the Court quoted statements of HUD's General Counsel, Secretary Romney, the former Assistant Secretary
for Equal Opportunity for HUD, a CHA memorandum, and HUD regulations.
503 F.2d at 937.
54. Id. at 938.
55. Id.; see Calhoun v. Cook, 332 F. Supp. 804, 805 (N.D. Ga.), modified, 451
F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Board of .School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp.
655, 676 (S.D. Ind. 1971).
56. 503 F.2d at 938.
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having quoted from an exhibit offered by the plaintiffs which supported
the argument that as whites have left the city so have job opportunities,
the court provided a statement of underlying policy:
"We must not sentence our poor, our underprivileged, our minority
to the jobless slums of the ghettos and thereby forever trap them in
the vicious cycle
of poverty which can only lead them to lives of crime
'57
and violence."
Thus the district court's failure to include within the desegregation plan
certain political subdivisions contiguous to the city of Chicago was held to
be clearly erroneous. 58
Judge Tone dissented, relying upon the controlling principle set forth
in Milliken and stating that in his view, "the remedy must be commensurate
with the constitutional violation found, and, therefore, inter-district remedy
is not justified unless the evidence shows an inter-district violation." 5
He added that no interdistrict violation had been averred or proved in the
district court.60
On rehearing, 6' the court reaffirmed its position on the basis that
the record in general, and the statements of the parties in particular were
fully supportive of plaintiffs request for interdistrict relief.0 2 The court
noted that the impact of defendants' intra-city discrimination appeared to
be far reaching in that it had significantly affected housing patterns throughout the metropolitan region. 3 The court was convinced that in this situation the Milliken standard for the imposition of interdistrict relief had
been satisfied.
The Seventh Circuit's resolution of this particular phase on the
Gautreaux controversy presents a number of difficulties. Initially, the
precise standard applied by the Gautreaux court to determine that interdistrict relief was necessary and equitable is not altogether clear. Despite
its extensive analysis of Milliken, 4 the court indicated that it may have
applied an independent test since "Milliken v. Bradley dealt only with
schools" and "public housing may be quite different."0' 5 Since Milliken
was interpreted as dealing with equitable limitations on remedies,60 the
application of a different standard would be supportable upon the premise
that where equitable factors substantially differ from those presented in
Milliken, the standard to be applied should likewise differ. In support of
this argument, the Gautreaux court noted that both the majority opinion
of the Supreme Court and the concurring opinion of justice Stewart in
57. Id.
58. Id. at 939.

59. Id. at 939 (Tone, J., dissenting).
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 940.
See text accompanying notes 31-40 supra.

65. 503 F.2d at 936.

66. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
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125

Milliken had implied that the result in that case might have been different
7
had evidence of housing discrimination been adduced.
In addition to distinguishing Milliken on its facts, the Gautreaux
court suggested that the elements which would necessitate interdistrict
relief, absent in Milliken, were present in the instant case. 68 The court
thus implied that under either test interdistrict relief would be warranted.
The court's finding of public housing discrimination in the Chicago suburbs
based upon an exhibit introduced by plaintiffs indicating that several suburban housing projects may have been located according to racial criteria.69
The court added in this context that it was not irrelevant that it had recently
taken judicial notice of widespread residential segregation in Chicago and
70
its environs.
However, in its opinion on rehearing, 71 the court, in addition to finding
further support for its conclusion that public housing discrimination of
interdistrict scope existed, also indicated that it may actually have applied
the Milliken standard rather than a separate public housing standard:
[I]t is reasonable to conclude from the record that defendants' discriminatory site selection within the city of Chicago may well have
fostered paranoia and encouraged the "white flight phenomenon .... "
It is in this sense, we believe, that the Supreme Court requires
a showing that "there has been a constitutional violation within one
district72 that produces a significant segregative effect in another district."
If the court did employ an independent test relating to public housing
to determine whether multidistrict relief was appropriate, reference to what
the Supreme Court required when bussing between school districts was
at issue was not entirely relevant or helpful. Rather, the opinion on rehearing would have provided an excellent opportunity for the Seventh
Circuit to reaffirm and clarify the position that adherence to the standard
for public schools was not required, since the Milliken decision was based
upon equitable factors which were not present where the issue centered
on public housing. Since the court did not offer a reaffirmation on re67. 503 F.2d at 936. In Milliken it was emphasized that while the district court
had correlated Detroit school segregation with longstanding housing patterns that
had been induced in part by the state, the court of appeals in affirming, had disclaimed
reliance upon this analysis. Milliken, therefore, did not present any question concerning possible racial discrimination with respect to public housing, 418 U.S. at 728, n.7.
Concurring Mr. Justice Stewart felt that purposeful, racially discriminatory use of
the state housing laws might be sufficient to warrant a transgression of the boundaries
of political subdivisions. Id. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring).
68. 503 F.2d at 936-37.
69. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
70. 503 F.2d at 937; see Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 335
(7th Cir. 1974) ; note 52 supra.
71. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
72. 503 F.2d at 939-40, quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974)
(footnote omitted).
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hearing and only referred to the Milliken standard, it appears despite
ambiguity in the opinion, that the Seventh Circuit specifically applied the
Milliken test and abandoned its attempt to develop a different test for public
housing.
Assuming that application of the Milliken standard was intended, it
is doubtful that the elements necessary to warrant interdistrict relief were
present in Gautreaux. Nowhere in the opinion did the court find that
constitutional violations within the city of Chicago produced a significant
segregative effect in the suburban districts or were the substantial cause
of interdistrict segregation as is required by Milliken. 73 The assumption
that the defendants' acts "may well" have fostered racial paranoia and
"white flight" is speculative and would not appear to satisfy the plain
meaning of the substantial cause requirement of Milliken74 nor justify the
conclusion that the district court's failure to include suburban districts
within its desegregation scheme was clearly erroneous. Although racial
imbalance and undesirable demographic trends may be widespread, both
the Milliken decision and common sense would seem to require that causation by the defendants' conduct be clearly shown before they are held
accountable.

75

The Gautreaux court's reliance upon evidence of suburban public
housing discrimination presents further difficulties in terms of meeting the
requirements of Milliken, the most significant of these being that the suburban political subdivisions included within the desegregation scheme were
not parties to the litigation. Thus they had no opportunity to present
evidence or answer the charges against them. The site selection procedures
for the suburban public housing projects could forseeably have been explained and justified had the suburban districts been given an opportunity
to do so. Additionally, the judicial notice taken in the Clark case 76 was
of "widespread residential segregation" and not public housing segregation
and would not appear to be related to the conduct of the suburban political
subdivisions in operating their public housing programs. It is quite possible
that general residential segregation could exist in a situation where con73. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
74. Id.
75. The Milliken Court rejected certain findings of the lower courts, which had
been thought to afford a basis for interdistrict relief, on grounds of lack of causation.
State legislation which had the effect of rescinding Detroit's voluntary desegregation
plan was likewise rejected by the Supreme Court as a basis for interdistrict because
relief, as there existed no apparent causal nexus between the plan and the distribution
of pupils by race among Detroit and the other school districts. 418 U.S. at 750. State
activity with regard to school construction or site acquisition was not found to have
affected the school population outside of Detroit. Id. at 751.
Prior to Milliken, there was case law to support a refusal to limit remedial
decrees to the political subdivision in which the unconstitutional action occurred,
even where a causal relationship between the unlawful conduct and the adverse efforts
in other districts was not established. See generally Freund, The Supreme Court,
1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REv. 61, 67 (1974).
76. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss1/3

24

Anderson: Administrative Law - Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission's Pa

1975-1976]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

temporaneously suburban districts operate low income public housing programs in a manner entirely consistent with the fourteenth amendment.
The Gautreaux court's assertion that the parties were in agreement
that the metropolitan area was a single relevant locality for public housing
purposes 77 also fails to provide a sufficient basis for fashioning interdistrict
relief. The statements offered to illustrate the parties agreement in this
matter appear to concern themselves with the proper approach to be
taken toward public housing problems as a matter of policy determination
78
rather than with the problem of formulating an appropriate remedy.
The same difficulties affect the validity of the "white flight" analysis and
the problem of diminishing job opportunities in the inner city areas.
Clearly, they are relevant factors to be considered in establishing policy
goals for public housing programs. However, they do not provide evidence
of the interdistrict, segregative effect that Milliken required as a prerequisite to a political subdivision's forced participation in a scheme of interdistrict relief. Absent causation by the defendant's acts, these factors seem
more appropriate for consideration in a legislative rather than a judicial
context. The task of the federal courts would appear to be to rectify, by a
balancing of the individual and collective interests, the condition that
violates the Constitution. 79 While the imposition of racial quotas for public
housing projects and the use of racial criteria for determining site selection
are constitutionally unsound, the fact that industry and whites migrate to
the suburbs, in and of itself, is not. Moreover, although the parties may
agree to the proper objectives of a public housing program in general, the
very existence of the present litigation is conclusive evidence that their
agreement does not extend to the facts of this case of the appropriate relief
to be granted in this particular instance. Actual agreement is in fact
illusory.
The Gautreaux decision also conflicts with Milliken in a second area
since the interdistrict relief awarded by the Seventh Circuit was apparently
contrary to the theory upon which the case had proceeded. In Milliken,
the Supreme Court had criticized the award of interdistrict relief because
77. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
78. The Gautreaux court quoted from an opinion of the HUD General Counsel
which remarked that statutory provisions authorizing housing authorities to operate
outside their jurisdictions represent a legislative determination that the city and its
surrounding area comprise a single relevant location for low-income public housing
purposes. 503 F.2d at 937. Also quoted were a HUD regulation, opinions of the
HUD Secretary and the former Assistant Secretary for Equal Opportunity of HUD
to the effect that the problems of the inner city cannot be resolved in the inner city
alone, and a CHA memorandum stating that public housing programs should be metropolitan in nature. The only statement cited by the court which clearly dealt with the
question of an appropriate remedy was a joint statement made by the parties in 1972,
to the effect that "a metropolitan remedy is desirable." Id.
79. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
In Swann, the Supreme Court purposely engaged in an attempt to clarify guidelines
to assist school authorities and lower federal courts in dealing with remedial problems.
Id. at 14.
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the original theory of the case related solely to the establishment of violations in the city of Detroit and, at the time, neither the parties nor the
district court was concerned with establishing a basis for interdistrict relief.80 The district court in Gautreaux similarly concluded that the plaintiffs' request for interdistrict relief went "far beyond the. issue of the case." 81
Judge Tone emphasized this problem in his dissent in Gautreaux, noting
that "no violation outside the city has ever been alleged, let alone proved. '8 2
This criticism of the Gautreaux court's analysis is more readily supported if the case is viewed as requiring an application of the Milliken
standard, since the presence of either an interdistrict violation or effect is
doubtful on these facts. 83 However, if the approach originally suggested
by the Gautreaux court is adopted and an independent public housing
standard is applied, proof of a violation outside the city may not be required. Of the four factors used by the court to distinguish Milliken and
to provide support for the conclusion that an interdistrict plan was appropriate, 84 two provide persuasive support for the argument that a different
standard should be used in the public housing situation: the tradition of
local control and the foreseeability of problems in administering interdistrict
relief. 85 These factors, present in the busing cases, are absent in public
housing. Where present, and where no interdistrict violation or effect
is shown, imposition of an interdistrict remedy means that a political subdivision which engages in no illegal conduct wll be forced to shoulder
extensive capital outlay and administrative burdens as well as to sustain
substantial disruption of its existing programs. In the absence of these
factors, however, programs of different political entities could conceivably
operate simultaneously within the same jurisdiction without interfering
with each other or requiring each other's cooperation. There appears to
be no explanation, therefore, for not requiring a public housing authority
which has violated the constitutional rights of the residents of its jurisdiction from building in other jurisdictions, as well as its own. The presence
of a tradition of local control and a plethora of administrative burdens were
significant in Milliken and, if the Supreme Court considered closely the
equitable limitations on remedies in that case as the Seventh Circuit suggested, the factual dissimilarity may have been sufficient to warrant different
results. Although the results reached in Gautreaux may be justified by
this analysis, it is especially significant that, as previously noted, the courts'
opinions, originally and upon rehearing, leave doubt as to what standard
80
it actually did apply.
80. 418 U.S. at 745.
81. 363 F. Supp. at 690-91.
82. 503 F.2d at 939 (Tone, J., dissenting) ; see notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
83. See text accompanying notes 73-77 supra.
84. See text accompanying notes 48-53 supra.
85. See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
86. See text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss1/3

26

Anderson: Administrative Law - Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission's Pa

1975-1976]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

A final problem presented by the Gautreaux decision is defining the
scope of the order to be rendered by the district court on remand. The
district court decision from which this appeal was taken dealt with the
relief to be obtained from HUD87 since, as the Seventh Circuit noted, no
appeal was ever taken from the order previously,,entered against CHA.8 8
Yet the Seventh Circuit suggested that not only CHA but also five other
housing authorities from surrounding suburban political subdivisions should
be included within the ambit of the district court order. The court advised
that "a court directing that those not volunteering be made parties might
help." 8 9 Since the finding of a constitutional violation was the minimum
prerequisite for requiring the defendants' to participate in a plan for interdistrict relief, in the absence of a determination of an interdistrict effect
it would seem that at least as much should be required of the suburban
districts before forcing their participation. Certainly the detection by the
court of suburban public housing discrimination cannot be dispositive of
the rights of the suburban political subdivisions since they were not parties
when that finding was made. 90 Therefore, joining the suburban districts as
parties would be ineffective in itself to force their participation in an interdistrict scheme.
In addition, Illinois law requires that in order for a housing authority
to operate within the jurisdiction of another housing authority a contract
between the two authorities is required. 91 If the suburban districts refused
to enter into a contract and were not shown to have engaged in acts of public
housing discrimination, implementation of a metropolitan plan could ef92
fectively be blocked.
87. 363 F. Supp. at 690.
88. 503 F.2d at 933.

89. Id. at 936.
90. It is fundamental that a court can make no decree in the absence of a party
whose rights must necessarily be affected thereby. See Gregory v. Stetson, 133 U.S.
579, 580 (1890); Keegan v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 155 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1946).
Moreover, in another recent case the Seventh Circuit adopted the rule set forth
by the Sixth Circuit in Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 252 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd
on other grounds, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), which requires that any party against whom
relief is sought be afforded an opportunity to offer additional evidence and crossexamine prior witnesses on any issue raised by the pleadings. United States v. Board
of School Comm'rs, 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding metropolitan remedy
improper).
91. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 67%, § 27c (1959).
92. In Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metro. Housing Auth., 355 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D.
Ohio 1973) a district court held that suburban political subdivisions which failed to
enter into cooperation agreements with the county housing authority, thereby blocking
the construction of low-income public housing in their jurisdictions, could be compelled to accept such projects. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that
the suburban political subdivisions could not be compelled to accept low-income public
housing projects and that discrimination could not be inferred from such a refusal
alone. Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metro. Housing Auth., 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974).
The Sixth Circuit found support for its conclusions in several recent Supreme
Court decisions. In Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), where Oregon's judicial
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From the standpoint of policy, the interdistrict relief imposed by the
Gautreaux court represents a clear preference for a dispersal strategy95 as
a means of dealing with the problem of the urban ghetto. Thus, it reflects
the viewpoint of the majority of federal courts which have confronted the
problems of low income public housing. 4 In Crow v. Brown95 the Fifth
Circuit noted:
For better or worse, both by legislative act and judicial decision,
this nation is committed to a policy of balanced and dispersed public
housing . . . Among other things this reflects the recognition that in

the area of public housing local authorities can no more confine low
income blacks to a compacted and concentrated area that they can
confine their children to segregated schools.9 6
The concept of dispersal is based upon the assumption that the problems of the ghettos cannot be resolved so long as low income blacks and
other minorities remain segregated within the confines of the inner city
and urges that incentives be created to move these groups into suburban
areas.9 7 Although the Seventh Circuit's resolution of this phase of the
procedure for tenant eviction for nonpayment of rent was upheld in part, the Supreme
Court found no constitutional right to adequate housing:
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing.
But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and
economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional
guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality ....
Id. at 74. From this the Mahaley court urged that since individuals have no right
to public housing in their own city, it follows that they have no such right in a city
in which they do not reside. 500 F.2d at 1093.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has upheld the right of the community to determine whether to construct public housing. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding California's community mandatory referendum scheme for all public housing
proposals). It was recognized in Valtierra such a proposal could be rejected due to
a variety of legitimate community interests, including the necessity for large expenditures of local government funds for increased public services and a diminution
of tax revenues that could foreseeably result. Id. at 143.
Additionally, it has been held that the fact that a facially neutral policy which
affects all groups has a greater practical impact upon a minority group in itself,
is sufficient to render that policy unconstitutional. Citizens Comm. for Faraday Wood
v. Lindsay, 362 F. Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 507 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1974)
(holding that a denial of approval of an application for construction of a housing
project did not constitute racial discrimination).
93. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
94. See Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970) (increase or maintenance
of racial concentration is prima facie likely to lead to urban blight and is thus prima
facie at variance with national housing policy) ; Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175
(N.D. Ohio 1972), modified, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973) (enjoining future public
housing in black neighborhoods in Cleveland, Ohio and adopting a dispersal policy) ;
Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (N.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Hicks v.
Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969) (location of public housing in all black
neighborhoods creates a strong inference of discrimination); Dailey v. City of
Lawton, 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
95. 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
96. 332 F. Supp. at 390 (citations omitted).
97. See Downs, Alternative Futures for the American Ghetto, 3-4 DAEDALUS
1331, 1349 (1968). Downs argues that dispersal would increase minority job oppor-
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Gautreaux controversy rests on a sound policy basis, its primary deficiencies are its failure to provide a precise articulation of the standard applied
to resolve the issue and its failure to provide specific guidance for the
district court as to the approach to be used on remand in fashioning an
enforceable order. Its usefulness as precedent in other jurisdictions may,
as a result be significantly reduced.
Edward P. Welch

CONSUMER
PRACTICES

PROTECTION AND

CONSTRUED OF LAW.

CONSUMER

PENNSYLVANIA UNIFORM TRADE
PROTECTION LAW TO BE LIBERALLY

LEASING OF RESIDENTIAL HOUSING WITHIN PURVIEW

Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties,Inc. (Pa. 1974)
The attorney general of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth) brought a civil action against 25 landlords and 4 printers and
sellers of form leases, alleging violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law (Act).' The complaint alleged,
inter alia, that the landlords were violating the Act by using agreements
which contained archaic and technical language beyond the easy comprehension of the consumer of average intelligence; which contained nine
provisions 2 which were illegal, unconscionable, unconstitutional, and hence
tunities, which will primarily develop in the suburban areas, improve minority education, and have a positive effect on the levels of crime and violence in the inner
city. Id. at 1346, 1365.
However, it has also been argued that it is unlikely that any judicial remedy
can both consider all of the competing interests and be effectively implemented. See
Comment, The Limits of Litigation: Public Housing Site Selection and the Failure
of Injunctive Relief, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1330 (1974). This argument deserves special
consideration in light of more recent developments in the Gautreaux controversy.
See Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 384 F. Supp. 37 (1974) (master appointed
to determine and identify the precise causes of a 5-year delay in implementing the
court's judgment orders).
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 201-1 et seq. (1971).

2. Provisions complained of were:
a) lessor's right to distrain for rent,
b) lessee's unconditional warrant of attorney,
c) lessor's unconditional right to confess judgment,
d) lessee's unconditional waiver of unexplained rights, including statutory
rights,
e) lessor's unlimited discretion to accellerate [sic] lessee's rent,
f) lessee's waiver of claim for lessor's negligence, for himself and for third
parties,
g) lessor affidavit of default is conclusive evidence of default,
h) lessee's waiver to oppose "amicable" action in ejectment,
i) lessee's waiver of demand, notice, right to appeal, to a stay and standing
to open or strike judgments.
Record at 6a, Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., -- Pa. _, 329 A.2d
812 (1974).
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unenforceable; and which failed to inform the lessees of their statutory
rights3 such as those under the Landlord and Tenant Act.4 The Commonwealth sought to enjoin 5 the sale and use of the form leases, to have the
existing leases declared void at the option of the lessee, to have the landlords offer new leases for the existing term at the same rental, and to have
any new form leases submitted to the court for approval 60 days prior to
6
their utilization or sale.
Ruling upon defendants' preliminary objections, 7 the Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania held that since the Act did not apply to the leasing
of real property the complaint failed to state a cause of action.8 On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed and remanded in part, 9
3. Id. The complaint also alleged that the leases in question, in whole or in
part, constituted agreements of adhesion, were unlawful, unfair, unclear, deceptive
and misrepresented the respective rights and obligations of the parties. Id. at 5a.
As an additional claim against the printer-sellers, the complaint alleged that
they deceived and confused their customers, the landlords, by selling them lease forms
which appeared to protect them but which were unenforceable. Id. at 6a. See note 9
infra.
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 250.101 et seq. (1965), as amended, (Supp.
1975).

5. The Consumer Protection Law specifically authorizes the attorney general to
seek injunctive relief, providing in pertinent part:
Whenever the Attorney General . . . has reason to believe that any person
is using . . . any method, act or practice declared . . . to be unlawful . . . he may

bring an action . . . to restrain by temporary or permanent injunction the use
of such method, act or practice.
Id. tit. 73, § 201-4 (1971).
6. Record at 8a.
7. The defendants contended that the court lacked jurisdiction under the Act
Pa. at _, 329 A.2d at
and that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action. 814.
8. Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 10 Pa. Cmwlth. 596, 607-10,
314 A.2d 333, 338-39 (1973). In the course of its opinion the commonwealth court
rejected a number of contentions raised by the plaintiffs, holding: the nine specifically
challenged provisions were not illegal or unconstitutional per se; it could find no law
which required the landlord to notify a tenant of his statutory rights; and although
it was conceivable that the Act could apply to the sale of form leases by the printersellers under certain circumstances, the complaint failed to state a cause of action
with respect to them because none of the lease provisions were illegal per se. Id. at
610-18, 314 A.2d at 339-43.
The commonwealth court failed to address the allegation that the use of archaic
and technical language which was beyond the easy comprehension of the consumer
of average intelligence violated the Act. This was one basis upon which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded. See note 53 infra.
9. The supreme court affirmed the lower court's holding that since none of
the nine lease provisions were unenforceable in all circumstances, it could not be
said that they were misleading or deceiving within the meaning of the statute.
Pa. at __, 329 A.2d at 828. See note 8 supra. The supreme court also affirmed
-_
the dismissal of the action against the printer-sellers, although its reason as to why
the complaint failed to state a cause of action differed from that of the lower court.
The commonwealth court had merely asserted that since the form leases were not
illegal as a matter of law, there was no violation by the printer-sellers. 10 Pa.
Cmwlth. at 617, 314 A.2d at 342-43. The supreme court, on the other hand, specifically
based its decision upon the media and publisher exemption set forth in section 3 of
the Act. ____Pa. at ..... 329 A.2d at 827. For the text of section 3, see note 15 infra.
The court determined that the printers' actions with regard to the form leases were
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holding that the leasing of residential housing is within the purview of the
Act, and that the Act may require a landlord to notify a tenant in the lease
of his statutory rights. Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc.,
329 A.2d 812 (1974).
Pa .......
The Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
Law was enacted in December, 1968,10 and has remained virtually unchanged since that time." The basic proscription found in section 3 of the
Act, which is similar to that of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act 12 (FTC Act), provides: "Unfair methods of competition and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce
are hereby declared unlawful.' 3 Section 2(3) of the Act defines "trade"
and "commerce" as "the advertising, offering for sale, or distribution of
any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or
mixed .... "14
exempted since the printing had been undertaken "'in good faith and without knowledge
Pa. at _-, 329
of the falsity or deceptive character' of what they print[ed]." A.2d at 827, quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201J3 (1971). The court, however,
appears to have disregarded the limited nature of the exemption, which speaks only
of "advertisement," and on its face would not seem to apply to the form leases in the
instant case. PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 73, § 201-3 (1971).
10. Act of December 17, 1968, No. 387 [1968] Pa. Laws 1224.
11. The Act is an adaptation of a model law proposed in 1967 by the Counsel
of State Governments. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 1970 SUGGESTED STATE
[hereinafter cited as 1970 SUGGESTED LEGISLATION]. The
LEGISLATION 142 (1969)
model act was similar to the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 7 UNIFORM
LAWS ANNOTATED at 347 (1970), the original version of which was presented by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1964. Id.
Portions of the Act concerning the jurisdiction of the courts were repealed by the
Appellate 'Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970, Act of July 31, 1970, No. 223, [1970]
Pa. Laws 673.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974). Section 5(a) (1)
of the FTC Act provides in pertinent part:
Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practice in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.
Id. § 45(a) (1).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-3 (1971). For the text of section 3, see note 15
infra.
14. Section 2(3) of the Act provides in full:
"Trade" and "commerce" mean the advertising, offering for sale, sale or
distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal
or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situate,
and includes any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of
this Commonwealth.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-2(3) (1971).

Section 2(4) of the Act sets forth 13 acts, any one of which is deemed an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice. Id. § 201-2(4).
The last category in section 2(4) constitutes a catchall definition, providing that the

"[ejngaging in any other fraudulent conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion
or of misunderstanding" is also an unfair or deceptive act or practice. Id. § 201-2(4)
(xiii). Although section 2(4) (xiii) is a broad definition, the presence of the word
"fraudulent" makes it narrower than its counterpart in the model act, which simply
reads "engaging in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion

or misunderstanding." 1970

SUGGESTED LEGISLATION,

supra note 11, at 147.
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In deciding whether the Act applies to the leasing of residential housing, the court had to interpret sections 315 and 2(3) 16 of the Act to determine whether the leasing of residential housing fell within the ambit of
the statutory terms "trade" and "commerce." The supreme court held
that the proscriptions of the Act did apply to this type of transaction and
developed four bases for its decision. 17
First, the court found strong support for its conclusion under the
contemporary view of the modern apartment dweller as a "consumer" Is
of housing services. 19 The reasoning of the District of Columbia Circuit
Court in Javins v. First National Realty Corp.20 and of an increasing
number of state courts 21 exemplifies this new view of the landlord-tenant
relationship. The Monumental court concluded that since the modern
lessee necessarily seeks what is essentially a package of goods and services,
the lessee should be protected in his purchase as is any other consumer
22
of goods and services.
The second rationale for the court's decision rested upon traditional
common law concepts of a lease of real property. 23 Citing numerous cases
wherein it was held that the lease of real property is a "sale" of the
15. Section 3 of the Act provides:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful. The provisions of this act shall not apply to any owner, agent or employe of any radio
or television station, or to any owner, publisher, printer, agent or employe of a
newspaper or other publication, periodical or circular, who, in good faith and
without knowledge of the falsity or deceptive character thereof, publishes, causes
to be published or takes part in the publication of such advertisement.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-3 (1971).
16. Id. § 201-2(3). For the text of section 2(3), see note 14 supra.
17. --- Pa. at _, 329 A.2d at 820.
18. See generally Note, The Tenant as a Consumer, 3 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 59
(1971).
19. _ Pa. at _ 329 A.2d at 821.
20. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). The lavins
decision implied a warranty of habitability in leases of urban dwelling units, the breach
of which gave rise to usual remedies for breach of contract. The Monumental court
quoted with approval the following language in Javins, designating it a "now-classic
description" of the modern residential lessee:
"When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek 'shelter' today, they
seek a well known package of goods and services - a package which includes not
merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable
plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper
maintenance."
Pa. at -, 329 A.2d at 821, quoting 428 F.2d at 1074.
21. E.g., Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 517 P.2d
1168 (1974) ; Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972) ; Steele v. Latimer, 214
Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974) ; King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973) ;
Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d
22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
22. - Pa. at _, 329 A.2d at 821.
23. Id. at -, 329 A.2d at 822.
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premises for a term,2 4 the supreme court was able to conclude that the
language of section 2(3), which defines "trade" and "commerce" in terms
of a "sale," is broad enough to include residential leases. 25
The lower court had quoted with approval 26 the Uniform Commercial
Code's (UCC) definition of sale, which speaks in terms of "passing of
title."'27 The supreme court's third rationale was that the legislature's
modern, pragmatic and functional approach to solving societal problems
makes the requirement of passage of title unimportant within the context
of the Consumer Protection Law. 28 The court reasoned that the analogous
FTC Act 29 has been applied without regard to the form of the challenged
transaction." After refuting the lower court's application of the UCC by
noting that a sale can occur under the UCC even though the seller retains
title, 3' the supreme court recognized that the legislative intent in enacting
the UCC was a question entirely divorced from the intent underlying the
enactment of the remedial Consumer Protection Law.32 The Monumental
court did not hold the distinction between title and possession to be irrelevant for all purposes, but only that the definition of trade and commerce in
33
the Act is not bound by such a distinction.
Finally, the court was solicitous of the consequences of a contrary
interpretation.3 4 Acknowledging that the present and continuing housing
shortage places the landlord in a superior bargaining position in lease
negotiations, 5 the court noted that a great percentage of consumer transactions would be left beyond the scope of a law designed for the benefit of
consumer if tenants were not protected by the Act.3 6 Such a holding, in
24. Id. at _, 329 A.2d at 822-23, citing, e.g., Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Morris
County Bd. of Tax., 41 N.J. 405, 416, 197 A.2d 176, 182 (1964), Pines v. Perssion,
14 Wis. 2d 590, 594, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412 (1961).
25. Id. at _, 329 A.2d at 822-23. Since all the cited authorities pertained to
leases of real property, the same rationale presumably would not be applicable to
leases of personal property, leaving such transactions beyond the reach of the Act.
However, the court was careful not to rely too heavily upon this single rationale and
concluded its discussion of this issue by stating that these precedents "help guide us
to the conclusion that the business of leasing housing services is covered by the
Consumer Protection Law." Id. at _, 329 A.2d at 823 (emphasis added).
26. 10 Pa. Cmwlth. at 607, 314 A.2d at 338.
27. Section 2-106(1) of the UCC, adopted without modification in Pennsylvania,
provides in pertinent part:
A "sale" consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a
price .

...

PA. STAT. ANN.

28.

-

tit. 12A, § 2-106(1)

(1970)

(statutory reference omitted).

Pa. at _, 329 A.2d at 823.

29. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
30. Pa. at _, 329 A.2d at 823.
31. Id. at -' 329 A.2d at 824.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id. at __, 329 A.2d
Id. at -, 329 A.2d
Id. at -' 329 A.2d
Id. at
, 329 A.2d

at 823-24.
at 824.
at 824-26.
at 826.
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the court's opinion, would be "exalting form over substance" and violative
8 7
of the legislature's intent.
In resolving the question of whether the Act applies to residential
leases, the court expostulated several general principles which not only
buttressed its immediate decision, but which will also provide future
guidance when interpreting the Act. The court characterized the Act as a
remedial statute, the purpose of which was to place the consumer in a
more equal bargaining position with the seller.38 Further, the court found
that, although the statute sets forth specific practices to be prevented, the
overall purpose of the Act is to "thwart fraud in the statutory sense," 8 9
and therefore that the Consumer Protection Law should not be limited to
the specific acts proscribed therein. 40 Instead, the court held that the Act
must be liberally construed to prevent all unfair or deceptive practices in
42
consumer affairs. 4 1 Finally, acknowledging the similarities of the FTC
and Lanham Trademark 43 Acts to the Consumer Protection Law,44 the
court agreed with the lower court's conclusion that decisions construing
those federal statutes may be looked to for guidance when interpreting the
45
Pennsylvania law.
Having decided that neither the language of section 2(3) nor the
legislative purpose behind the law precluded the application of the Act to
37. Id.
38. Id. at . 329 A.2d at 816.
39. Id. at . 329 A.2d at 817.
40. This was a key point of departure from the majority's opinion for the dissent.
See note 50 infra.
41 ......
Pa. at ......
329 A.2d at 817. The commonwealth court had reasoned that
since section 8 of the Act provides for penalties of up to $5000 for violating an
injunction issued pursuant to the law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-8 (1971), the
statute contained a penal provision and therefore had to be strictly construed. 10 Pa.
Cmwlth. at 607, 314 A.2d at 338. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, without deciding
whether the provision was penal, held that even if it were, only that provision was
to be strictly construed with the remainder of the statute to be liberally construed.
Pa. at ------....
,329 A.2d at 817.
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. (1970).
44. See note 12 supra.
45. -_ Pa. at __, 329 A.2d at 817-18. The theory of looking to federal cases
for guidance was originally set forth in Commonwealth v. Hush-Tone Indus., Inc.,
4 Pa. Cmwlth. 1, 21 (1971) and adopted by the commonwealth court in the instant
case. 10 Pa. Cmwlth. at 608, 314 A.2d at 338. The commonwealth court's declaration
that it had "found no case wherein the leasing of property has been brought within
the purview of the Federal Statutes," 10 Pa. Cmwlth. at 608-09, 314 A.2d at 338, was
rejected by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which enumerated cases where the
leasing of property had been subject to Government action under the FTC Act.
Pa at -----. 329 A.2d at 819 (citations omitted).
Some states with legislation similar to Pennsylvania's Consumer Protection
Law have included provisions stating that federal decisions under the FTC Act are to be
given great weight in interpreting their respective acts. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 501.204(2) (Supp. 1975); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 85-403(1) (Supp. 1974);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13.1-3 (1970). An amendment to the model act requiring
that federal decisions receive such weight was proposed by the Council of State
Governments in 1969. 1970 SUGGESTED LEGISLATION, supra note 11 at 147. The
amendment was not adopted in Pennsylvania.
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residential leases, the supreme court had to determine whether the alleged
violations constituted "unfair or deceptive practices" within the meaning
of section 3 of the Act. 46 Specifically, the court had to construe the general
catchall provision of the definitional section, section 2(4) (xiii) 47 since
none of the twelve unfair or deceptive acts explicitly enumerated in the
statute 48 was applicable. In keeping with its announced policy of liberal
interpretation, 49 the court rejected the defendants' contention that section
2(4) (xiii) be restricted to acts similar to those enumerated in the twelve
preceding subsections and concluded that the general provision of section
2(4) (xiii) was designed to cover all other unfair and deceptive acts. 50
The court also reversed the lower court's holding that no cause of
action could arise under the Act from a failure of the lease to inform tenants
of their rights, such as those established by the Landlord and Tenant Act. 51
The commonwealth court had facilely disposed of the claim by remarking
that "we can find no law which would require the landlord to notify a
tenant of his rights under the Landlord and Tenant Act. '5 2 The supreme
court, after noting that the lower court had misperceived the issue, stated:
The question is whether the Consumer Protection Law requires a
landlord to notify a tenant in a lease of the tenant's statutory rights,
because allegedly the absence of this notification is misleading
or con53
fusing to the tenant as consumer of housing services.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
doctrine

See notes 14 & 15 and accompanying text supra.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-2(4) (i) to (xii) (1971) ; see note 14 supra.
See note 14 supra.
See text accompanying notes 39 & 40 supra.
- Pa. at _, 329 A.2d at 826-27. Justice Pomeroy, dissenting, applied the
of ejusdem generis to limit section 2(4) (xiii) to the same types of activities

as set forth in sections 2(4) (i) through 2(4) (xii) --- Pa. at __, 329 A2d at 832
(Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
51. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
52. 10 Pa. Cmwlth. at 616, 314 A.2d at 342 (emphasis added).
53. --- Pa. at _, 329 A.2d at 829. The supreme court's remand upon this issue
would appear to be in order. However, the supreme court clouded the nondisclosure
issue by pointing to the common law of misrepresentation and concluding that a
lessor may, in some circumstances, have an affirmative duty of disclosure to his lessee.
Id. at _., 329 A.2d at 829. While common law misrepresentation may be relevant
in assessing a tenant's other possible causes of action against his landlord, the issue
in the instant case still remains, as the court aptly observed, whether the failure to
notify the lessee of his statutory rights is misleading under the Act, not whether
common law misrepresentation imposes an affirmative duty upon a lessor to disclose
those statutory rights to his tenant. Id. at __, 329 A.2d at 829. Because the lower
court had failed to pass upon the Commonwealth's claim that the use of archaic and
technical language in the leases was misleading, the supreme court remanded for a
ruling on that allegation. Id. at ___ 329 A.2d at 828.
With regard to the claim that utilizing the nine specific provisions in the form
leases violated the Act (see note 2 supra), the supreme court affirmed the lower
court's holding that since none of the nine were illegal or unconstitutional in all
circumstances, it could not be said that the use of the form leases violated the Act
simply because they contained such provisions. Since the allegation, as phrased, would
require a holding that the provisions were unenforceable in all circumstances, the
supreme court found it could not espouse such a position under existing law. Id. at
-,
329 A.2d at 828. In so holding, the supreme court apparently was not finding
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The proscription of section 3 of the Peinsylvania Act, as is its counterpart in the FTC Act, a very vague provision which arguably could include
every misdeed in commercial and consumer transactions. Unlike the FTC
Act, the Pennsylvania Consumer Protection Law contains a detailed definition of "trade" and "commerce" which speaks in terms of "sale" and
"distribution." 54 It does not, however, speak in terms of leasing. The
commonwealth court, therefore, reached what appears to be the most logical
conclusion regarding the legislature's intent - if the legislature had intended the Act to cover leases, it would have included that term, along with
the term "advertising," "sale," and "distribution," in the definition of
"trade" and "commerce. ' 5 5 By holding that the leasing of residential housing does fall within the purview of the statute, the supreme court considerably expanded the defiritional section of the Act beyond its express language.
Nevertheless, the supreme court's holding is not surprising when
considered in light of the following circumstances. First, the Act is Pennsylvania's only broad-based consumer protection law. If the- Act were
not applicable to leases of residential housing, the Commonwealth would
have no effective means with which to protect a large segment of the public
from the overreaching of landlords who are often in a bargaining position
superior to that of the lessee.56 Second, the court was considering the scope
of the Act for the first time, and had it held that the Act was to be strictly
construed, the Commonwealth would thereafter have been hampered in a
significant area of consumer protection. 57 Third, the modern trend has been
to free the tenant from the confines of traditional property law, 58 and a
finding that the Act does not apply to residential leases would have been
viewed as a reversal of the growing recognition of tenants' rights.
While the court's holding that the terms "trade" and "commerce"
include the leasing of residential housing was significant, of even greater
that the provisions in the form leases must deceive everyone in order to violate the
Act. If such were the case, then the allegations regarding the use of archaic and
technical language beyond the easy comprehension of the consumer of average intelligence and the disclosure of the tenant's rights would necessarily fail, because it is
inconceivable that all tenants could ever be deceived by the challenged form leases.
54. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-2(3) (1971).
55. Id.; see note 14 supra.
56. See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra. The observation that the landlord
and tenant do not enjoy equal bargaining strength is well-founded as is evidenced by
the leases themselves, which are inherently one-sided. For a discussion of one type
of form lease challenged in Monumental, see Note, The Form 50 Lease: Judicial
Treatment of an Adhesion Contract, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1197 (1963).
57. The main responsibility for enforcement of the Act lies with the Commonwealth, for the Act contains no provision granting a private right of action. Only in
the case of an at-home sale can the consumer initiate any remedial steps. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 73, § 201-7 (1971). While the Commonwealth may seek injunctive relief,
the commonwealth court has held that the Act does not permit a court to order
restitution to an injured consumer. Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania APSCO System,
Inc., 10 Pa. Cmwlth. 138, 309 A.2d 184 (1973).
58. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
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potential impact was its overall attitude toward the Act and its treatment
of the catchall provision, section 2(4) (xiii). 59 In the court's opinion, not
only was the Act to be liberally construed in order to place the seller
(landlord) and consumer (tenant) on more equal terms,60 but also the
Act was deemed to have a broader purpose - the prevention of "statutory
fraud" 61 - so that section 2(4) (xiii) was meant to apply to all unfair or
deceptive acts. 62 The court equated the term "fraudulent" with the terms
misleading or confusing, 63 implying that if the defendant's conduct "creates
a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding, ' 64 then that conduct is
fraudulent.6 5 If correct, this reading of the decision means that the omission in the instant case of a statement informing the tenant of his statutory
rights, even though there existed no other statutory or common law duty
to disclose, might be considered misleading or confusing and therefore
violative of the Act.

66

Although the Act may play an important part in consumer protection,
there are several factors which may mitigate its impact upon the landlordtenant relationship. Despite the Monumental decision, as long as there is
a scarcity of suitable housing, landlords will continue to have superior
bargaining power. In addition, the tenant must rely upon the Commonwealth to bring suit since the Act provides for private action only in the
case of door-to-door sales. 67 However, the Monumental court's holding
that the Act may require a landlord to disclose to a tenant his statutory
rights is of great potential benefit to the tenant and suggests a role for the
Consumer Protection Law in the landlord-tenant field if the lower courts
of Pennsylvania choose to follow the supreme court's lead by adopting an
expansive reading of the Act.
Whatever the final outcome of the Monumental case upon remand, the
supreme court has laid a broad foundation for interpreting the Consumer
Protection Law and it has given the Commonwealth considerable power to
protect not only tenants, but other consumers as well.
Richard T. Frazier
59. See note 14 and text accompanying notes 46-50 supra.
60. - Pa. at -, 329 A.2d at 816.
61. Id. at __, 329 A.2d at 817.
62. Id. at -, 329 A.2d at 826; see text accompanying notes 39-41 supra.
63. See - Pa. at _, 329 A2d at 828-30.
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-2(4) (xiii) (1971).
65. By equating "fraudulent" to misleading or confusing the court avoided a
literal interpretation of the word fraudulent and considerably expanded the reach
of the statute. This result is, at the very least, ironic, and may even be contrary to
legislative intent since the legislature added the word "fraudulent" to the model act's
language in order to produce section 2(4) (xiii). See note 14 supra.
66. It might also mean that the use of archaic or technical language would be
deemed fraudulent because it would be likely to create confusion or be misleading.
See note 53 supra.
67. See note 57 supra.
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United States v. Ewig Brothers Co. (7th Cir. 1974)
In separate suits, the United States sought to enjoin defendant food
processors, Vita Food Products of Illinois, Inc. (Vita) and Ewig Brothers
Company, Inc. (Ewig), from violating the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) I by distributing or causing to be distributed in interstate
commerce adulterated 2 smoked chubs. In both cases the Government contended that the chubs were adulterated because they contained residues of
3
pesticides.
1. Section 302(a) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA),
empowers the United States district courts to grant injunctions to restrain violations
of the FDCA. 21 U.S.C. § 332 (a) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 21 U.S.C. § 332(a)
(1970). The decision whether to grant an injunction rests within the broad "discretion of the trial court which is best qualified to form a judgment as to the likelihood
of repetition of the offense." United States v. Article of Drug Designated B-Complex
Cholinos Capsules, 362 F.2d 923, 928 (3d Cir. 1966). The cessation of the violations
of the Act does not necessarily warrant a refusal to grant the injunction. Id.
2. Adulteration of a food is defined by section 402 of the FDCA, which provides
in pertinent part:
A food shall be deemed to be adulterated - (a) Poisonous, insanitary, etc.,
ingredients. (1) If it bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance
which may render it injurious to health; but in case the substance is not an
added substance such food shall not be considered adulterated under this clause if
the quantity of such substance in such food does not ordinarily render it injurious
to health; or (2) (A) if it bears or contains any added poisonous or added
deleterious substance (other than one which is (i) a pesticide chemical in or
on a raw agricultural commodity; (ii) a food additive; (iii) a color additive; or
(iv) new animal drug) which is unsafe within the meaning of section 346 [the
section of the FDCA which establishes tolerances for poisonous or deleterious
substances] of this title; or (B) if it is a raw agricultural commodity and it
bears or contains a pesticide chemical which is unsafe within the meaning of
section 346a(a) [section 408(a) of the FDCA] of this title, or (C) if it is, or
it bears or contains, any food additive which is unsafe within the meaning of
section 348 [section 409 of the FDCA] of this title: Provided, That where a
pesticide chemical has been used in or on a raw agricultural commodity in conformity with an exemption granted or a tolerance prescribed under section 346a
[section 408 of the FDCA] of this title, and such raw agricultural commodity
has been subjected to processing such as canning, cooking, freezing, dehydrating,
or milling, the residue of such pesticide chemical remaining in or on such food
shall, notwithstanding the provisions of sections 346 and 348 [sections 406 and 409
of the FDCA] of this title, not be deemed unsafe if such residue in or on the
raw agricultural commodity has been removed to the extent possible in good
manufacturing practice and the concentration of such residue in or on such residue
in the processed food when ready to eat is not greater than the tolerance prescribed for the raw agricultural commodity . ...
21 U.S.C. § 342(a) (1970). Sections 301(a) and (c) of the FDCA prohibit the
introduction, delivery, or receipt of any adulterated food, drug, device, or cosmetic
in interstate commerce, id. § 331 (a), (c), and section 301 (b) prohibits the adulteration
of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic in interstate commerce. Id. § 331(b).
3. United States v. Vita Food Prods., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 1213, 1215 (N.D. Ill.
1973) ; United States v. Goodman, 353 F. Supp. 250, 251 (E.D. Wis. 1972), aff'd,
486 F2d 847 (7th Cir. 1973).
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Suit was brought against Vita in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois. The Government alleged that Vita distributed or caused to be distributed chubs containing food additives 4 that
were unsafe within the meaning of section 409(a) of the FDCA5 in that
the chubs contained residues of the chemical pesticides DDT 6 and dieldrin.7
The district court refused to grant the injunction, holding that residues of
chemical pesticides were not food additives within the meaning of the
FDCA,8 and even if classified as "poisonous and deleterious substances," 9
the Government had failed to prove that they were injurious to health.10
4. Section 201(s) of the FDCA defines a food additive as:
[A]ny substance the intended use of which results or may reasonably be expected
to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a component or otherwise affecting
the characteristics of any food (including any substance intended for the use in
producing, manufacturing, packing, processing, preparing, treating, packaging,
transporting, or holding food; and including any source of radiation intended
for such use), if such a substance is not generally recognized, among experts
qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate its safety, as having
been adequately shown through scientific procedures .. .to be safe under the conditions of its intended use ....
FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1970).
5. Id. § 348(a).
6. The Government alleged that the amount of DDT exceeded five parts per
million. United States v. Vita Food Prods., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1213, 1215 (N.D. Ill.
1973). Five parts per million was the interim guideline established for DDT concentration in smoked fish. FDA Release Concerning Residues of DDT in Fish (April
22, 1969), [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] F.D. CosM. L. REP. f 60,243, at 60,363
(1970). The interim limit had been established because of the discovery of significant
concentrations of DDT and its derivatives in coho salmon from Lake Michigan. Id.
7. United States v. Vita Food Prods., Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1213, 1215 (N.D. Ill.
1973). No tolerance had been established for dieldrin. See United States v. Ewig
Bros. Co., 502 F.2d 715, 724-25 n.31 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 945
(1975).
8. United States v. Vita Food Prods., Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1213, 1219 (N.D. Ill.
1973).
9. Id. at 1219-20. A food is deemed to be adulterated "[i]f it bears or contains
any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health." 21
U.S.C. § 342(a) (1) (1970). For the full text of this section, see note 2 supra.
10. United States v. Vita Food Prods., Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1218, 1220 (N.D. Ill.
1973). For a discussion of the Government's burden of proof under section 40 2 (a) (1)
of the FDCA, see United States v. 1232 Cases Am. Beauty Brand Oysters, 43 F.
Supp. 749, 751 (W.D. Mo. 1942); 1 H. TOULMIN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
FOODS, DRUGS, AND COSMETICS §§ 14.5-.6, at 244-50 (2d ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited
as ToULMIN].

The lower court also held that, even if the substances could be categorized
as food additives, the Government had not proven that the smoked chubs contained
DDT in excess of the five parts per million interim guideline. United States v. Vita
Food Prods., Inc., supra at 1220-21. The district court found the AOAC method, used
by the Government to ascertain amounts of chemical residues, was "incapable of that
degree of accuracy which ought to exist to support a court judgment enjoining a food
processor from proceeding on in the industry." Id. at 1220. AOAC stands for the
Association of Official Analytical Chemists which provides and approves methods
of analysis used in Food and Drug Administration (FDA) laboratories. See Adelman,
AOAC: Why FDA Analyses Stick, 25 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 487 (1970). See
generally D. PEARSON, THE CHEMICAL ANALYSIS OF FOODS 102-08 (6th ed. 1971).
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's finding that the
Government failed to prove that the residues of DDT in Vita's chubs exceeded five
parts per million. 502 F.2d at 725. The court of appeals, proceeding upon the assump-
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The action against Ewig and five other defendants, all distributors of
raw chubs, was brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin." The Government contended that the chubs were
adulterated because of the presence of DDT in that the chubs were raw
agricultural commodities, containing chemical pesticides not in accordance
with an approved tolerance or exemption. 12 The district court granted the
injunction against all six defendants. 13 Although all six defendants appealed, Ewig was separated from -the original group of defendants and
14
joined with Vita for the purposes of appeal.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed as to Vita and affirmed as to
Ewig, holding that residues of chemical pesticides in processed fish were
food additives within the meaning of the FDCA, and, therefore, the smoked
chubs were adulterated as a matter of law. United States v. Ewig Brothers
Co., 502 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 945 (1975).
The instant case presented the Seventh Circuit with the problem of
determining whether pesticides which migrated through the ecosphere were
food additives for purposes of the FDCA. Since the statutory definition of
food additives is not limited to the term's literal meaning - a substance
which was intentionally added to food - it is necessary to examine the
history of food and drug legislation in general, and the Food Additives
Amendment of 1958 in particular, in order to accurately assess the decision
of the Ewig court.
It has long been acknowledged that protection of the public by ensuring the wholesomeness of foodstuffs is an important and legitimate governtion that the guidelines were binding upon the Government, although they were not
formally promulgated regulations, noted:
[T]he government must be permitted to use the best testing method yet devised
by analytical chemists, for the enforcement guidelines must have been predicated
upon that method. Therefore, without disagreeing with the district court's observation that the AOAC method falls short of perfect certainty, we cannot accept
the view that it may not be used to evaluate appellants' compliance with the guidelines ....
Acceptance of the AOAC method as the proper standard for measuring
residues of pesticide chemicals in fish leads inexorably to the conclusion that the
government met its burden of proving repeated violations of the guidelines.
Id.
11. United States v. Goodman, 353 F. Supp. 250, 251 (E.D. Wis. 1972), aff'd,
486 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1973).
12. 353 F. Supp. at 251.
13. Id. The sole issue confronting the district court in Goodman was whether
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency was required, under
section 408(b) of the FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b) (1970), to promulgate regulations
establishing tolerances of pesticides on raw agricultural commodities. 353 F. Supp.
at 251. The court found that the FDCA does suggest a duty to issue regulations.
However, the court was not persuaded that the failure of the Administrator to promulgate a regulation required the court to refuse an injunction restraining the distribution
of the adulterated chubs. Id.
14. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court as to all
defendants but Ewig. United States v. Goodman, 486 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1973). Since
Ewig was the only distributor of processed chubs among the six defendants, the
Seventh Circuit joined Ewig's appeal with that of Vita. Id. at 849 n.10.
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mental function.' 5 Although the necessity for regulation of the food industry was recognized even at common law, 16 the first comprehensive federal
law regulating this area was not passed until 1906 when Congress enacted
the Wiley Pure Food and Drug Act. 17 The Wiley Act prohibited the
manufacture or introduction into interstate commerce of any food or drug
that was adulterated.' 8 Under the Wiley Act a food was deemed adulterated
if it contained "any added poisonous or other added deleterious ingredient
which may render such article injurious to health"'19 - a definition which
2
the Supreme Court, in United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., o
construed as limited to food which contained deleterious substances in
sufficient quantities to make it injurious to health, 21 rather than merely
containing any added substance which could possibly cause injury. Thus,
not included in the Court's definition were added deleterious substances
which could not possibly be injurious to health in the quantities detected,
but which might be harmful if ingested over a protracted period. The result of Lexington Mill was to render the Wiley Act inadequate protection
against the cumulative effect of ingesting small amounts of a deleterious
22
substance.
In response to criticism of the inadequacy of the Wiley Act, 23 Congress
passed the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938,24 which eliminated the
15. See Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888) (upholding a Pennsylvania
statute prohibiting the sale of butter substitutes and regulating the sale of other dairy
products as a valid exercise of the state's police power).
16. At common law it was a crime to sell unwholesome food for consumption.
See State v. Buckman, 8 N.H. 203, 205 (1836) ; State v. Smith, 10 N.C. 378 (1824) ;
Hunter v. State, 38 Tenn. 101 (1858) ; The King v. Dixon, 105 Eng. Rep. 631
(K.B. 1814). In addition to possible criminal liability, a purveyor could be civilly liable
for the harm caused by impure foods. E.g., Rozumailski v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 296 Pa. 114, 145 A. 700 (1929), where the court held:
Those engaging in the business of manufacturing or compounding food or
beverages must use a high degree of care to see that the food or beverage is free
from foreign or deleterious substances that injuriously affect the user.
Id. at 116, 145 A. at 700.
17. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768. The Wiley Act, named after
Dr. Harvey W. Wiley, an eminent scientist who actively campaigned for enactment
of the legislation, was not the first federal law concerning the regulation of food.
Congress in 1890 passed legislation forbidding the importation of adulterated or unwholesome food. Act of Aug. 30, 1890, ch. 839, 26 Stat. 414. For an enumeration of
federal laws concerning the fitness of food which preceded the 1906 Act as well as a
brief legislative history of the Wiley Act, see TOULMIN, supra note 10, § 1.3, at 3-5,
and for an overview of the political and social struggle which culminated in the
passing of the Wiley Act, see Regier, The Struggle for Federal Food and Drugs
Legislation, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1933).

18.
19.
20.
21.

Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, §§ 1-2, 34 Stat. 768.
Id. § 7.
232 U.S. 399 (1914).
Id. at 410-11. For discussion of judicial treatment of the 1906 Act, see
TOULMIN, supra note 10, § 2.6, at 26-28.
22. Markel, The Food Additives Amendment of 1958, 14 Bus. LAW. 514, 515
(1959).
23. For a discussion of the congressional response to defects in the Wiley Act,
see TOULMIN, supra note 10, § 1.4, at 5-6.
24. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1970). For discussion of the legislative history of
the 1938 Act, see TOULMIN, supra note 10, § 1.5; Cavers, The Food, Drug, and
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limitation imposed in Lexington Mill by specifically including in the definition of adulteration any food which "bears or contains any added poisonous
25
or added deleterious substance."
The FDCA, although a significant step toward consumer protection,
proved to be inadequate in light of the advances made in food technology.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) found the FDCA inadequate
because of the burden put upon the Government to prove that a newly
developed substance was in fact harmful. 26 Until this burden was met, the
Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and its Substantive Provisions, 6 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB.2 (1939). The new act was considerably broader in scope than the
Wiley Act. Toulmin listed 23 major differences between the 1906 and 1938 Acts.
TOULMIN, supra note 10, § 2.3, at 19-20; see Cavers, supra. Courts have generally
recognized that the purpose of the FDCA was to "extend the range" of the Government's control over the flow of poisonous and impure substances through interstate
commerce. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943). It has also
been repeatedly held that the Act should be broadly construed as to give effect to
the congressional policy of protecting the public. See, e.g., 62 Cases of Jam v. United
States, 340 U.S. 593, 596 (1951); United States v. 40 Cases, More or Less, of
Pinocchio Brand Oil, 289 F.2d 343, 346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 831 (1961)
United States v. 55 Cases Popped Corn, 62 F. Supp. 843, 844 (D. Idaho 1943).
25. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a) (2) (A) (1970) (emphasis added). The FDCA distinguished between added and nonadded poisonous and deleterious substances, providing:
[A food is adulterated] [i]f it bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious
substance which may render it injurious to health; but in case the substance is
not an added substance such food shall not be considered adulterated under this
clause if the quantity of such substance in such food does not ordinarily render it
injurious to health ....
Id. § 342(a) (1) (emphasis added). This provision retains the Lexington Mill
standard for adulteration, but only in regard to poisonous and deleterious substances
which are naturally present in food. In United States v. 1232 Cases Am. Beauty
Brand Oysters, 43 F. Supp. 749, 750 (W.D. Mo. 1942), the court held that shell
fragments in oysters were deleterious substances. However, the oysters were not
adulterated since the pieces of shell were not added and there was no excess of shell
in the defendant's product, as compared with its competitors. Id. at 751; cf. Fouke &
Reynolds v. Great Lakes Terminal Warehouse Co., 33 Ohio App. 2d 273, 275, 294
N.E.2d 245, 247 (1972) (mercury consumed by fish in their natural environment is
not an "added substance"). But see United States v. An Article of Food Consisting
of Cartons of Swordfish, 395 F. Supp. 1184, 1186 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Note, Health
Regulations of Naturally Hazardous Foods: The FDA Ban on Swordfish, 85 HARV.
L. REv. 1025 (1972). See also United States v. 1200 Cans Pasteurized Whole Eggs,
339 F. Supp. 131, 136 (N.D. Ga. 1972). There were two contending theories of how
the provision concerning added poisonous and deleterious substances should be construed. Poisonous, to industry scientists, meant that the substance was likely to
cause harm under proposed conditions of intended use. The FDA argued that poisonous
and deleterious meant that the substance had the potential for causing injury, regardless of its proposed use. Markel, supra note 22, at 516. Thus, the Government's
position, condemned by the food industry as unscientific, was that no substance which
was injurious to health could be used, notwithstanding the fact that its intended use
did not pose a health hazard, unless the use of the substance was necessary, and only
then could the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare authorize the use of safe
amounts. Id.
26. See SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, FOOD ADDITIVES AMENDMENT OF 1958, S. REP. No. 2422, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
SENATE REPORT]; HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, FOOD
ADDITIvES AMENDMENT OF 1958, H.R. REP. No. 2284, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]; T. CHRISTOPHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FOOD AND DRUG LAW 468 (1966) ; TOULMIN, supra note 10, § 22.2, at 471; Markel, supra
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food processor was free to continue to use the suspect process, thereby
27
possibly causing serious public harm.
In an attempt to rectify the problems created by the 1938 Act, Congress
passed the Food Additives Amendment of 1958 (1958 amendment).2"
Briefly, the amendment defines a food additive as
any substance the intended use of which results or may reasonably
be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a component or affecting the characteristics of any food . . . if such substance is not generally recognized . . . to be safe under the conditions
of its intended use .... 29

A food is deemed adulterated if it contains a food additive, the use of
which has not been specifically approved by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.30 Thus, in effect, a substance which can be classified
as a food additive, rather than merely poisonous or deleterious, is presumed
to be injurious to health.
It was in this context that the Ewig court had to resolve the question
of what Congress intended by the term "food additive." Although not the
first court to deal with the issue of the statutory definition, 3 ' the Ewig
note 22, at 515; Rankin, Establishing Tolerances for Food Additives, 13 FOOD DRUG
CosM. L. J. 641 (1958). In order to enervate the impact of this rule, some courts
developed a de minimis approach. See 338 Cartons, More or Less, of Butter v. United
States, 165 F.2d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1947) ; United States v. 133 Cases of Tomato Paste,
22 F. Supp. 515, 516-17 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (dictum) ; TOULMIN, supra note 10, § 18.6,
at 373 n.14.
27. In a civil case the Government was required to prove by the preponderance
of the evidence that a substance was harmful. TOULMIN, supra note 10, § 9.24, at
174; see United States v. 4 Cases Slim-Mint Chewing Gum, 300 F.2d 144, 148 (7th
Cir. 1962). In a criminal case the Government had to prove harmfulness beyond a
reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Commercial Creamery Co., 43 F. Supp.
714, 715 (E.D. Wash. 1942) ; TOULMIN, supra note 10, § 8.21, at 132.
28. The Food Additives Amendment of 1958, amending various sections of the
FDCA, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1970). The House Report set forth the following
purposes of the amendment:
(1) To protect the health of consumers by requiring manufacturers of food
additives and food processors to pretest any potentially unsafe substances which
are added to food; and (2) to advance food technology by permitting the use of
food additives at safe levels.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 26, at 1.
29. 21 U.S.C.§ 321(s) (1970).
30. Id. § 342(a) (2) (C). Section 402 of the FDCA provided that a food is
adulterated if it contains an unsafe food additive. Id. Section 409 of the FDCA states
that a food additive is unsafe unless the food additive's use is in conformity with a
regulation providing for the safe use of the additive or is not exempted by the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare for investigative use by qualified experts
in the interest of public health. Id. § 348(a). For procedures required in order to obtain
an exemption for the experimental use of a food additive, see 21 C.F.R. § 121.75 (1975);
TOULMIN, supra note 10, § 22.29, at 525. Regulations specifying the safe use of food
additives may be issued upon the Secretary's initiative, 21 U.S.C. § 348(d) (1970),
or in response to a petition submitted by a food processor. Id. § 348(b). Section 409
also sets forth the procedure for obtaining judicial review of refusals to grant petitions.
Id.
31. See United States Food and Drug Admin. v. City Smoked Fish Co., No.
33,669 (E.D. Mich. date unavailable, 1970). In this unreported case, the district
court ruled that residue of DDT in smoked fish was a food additive within the
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court was presented with a factual situation that posed problems of both
statutory construction and legislative intent which had not received full
consideraion prior to the instant case.
The first issue confronting the Seventh Circuit was whether residues
of DDT and dieldrin were statutory food additives. The court observed
that since the adoption of the FDCA there has been a trend toward reducing
the instances in which the FDA must prove that a substance in a food was
harmful3 2 - a trend culminating in the 1958 amendment. As the court
noted, "The legislative history of the 1958 Bill indicates concern about
the difficulties present when dangerous substances could not be proscribed
33
by per se rules."1
To the court, this was suggestive of a congressional
policy in favor of the use of per se rules -,a policy which could be effectu34
ated only through a broad construction of the statutory language.
Proceeding from that assumption, the court examined the language
of the 1958 amendment. Although it acknowledged that one of the primary
concerns of Congress in passing the amendment was the regulation of
substances used by food processors, the court noted that Congress did not
limit the definition of food additives to substances actually used in food
processing.35 Thus, the court concluded that there was no reason to exclude
pesticide residue from the literal definition of a food additive: "any substance, 'the intended used of which results, or may reasonably be expected
to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a component or otherwise
affecting the characteristics of any food . .

.

.

,,6

Furthermore, to do

otherwise and hold, as the defendant urged, that pesticide residue in the
processed chubs was a poisonous or deleterious substance,3 7 would produce
the anomalous result that raw fish containing DDT or dieldrin would be
adulterated as a matter of law, but once processed, adulteration would have
to be proved on a case-by-case basis. 38
The conclusion that pesticide residues were food additives was further
supported, according to the Seventh Circuit, by the language of subsection
meaning of FDCA. United States v. Vita Food Prods., 356 F. Supp. 1213, 1216
(N.D. Ill. 1973).
32. 502 F.2d at 721.
33. Id.
34. Id. The court used the term "per se rule" in the sense that a food containing
a food additive, not being used in conformity with a regulation or an exemption, was
adulterated as a matter of law. It should be noted that the 1958 amendment did not
actually extend the per se rule to food additives but rather allowed for the use of
food additives under conditions which, but for the amendment, would have been
prohibited by the "per se rule" concerning added poisonous and deleterious substances.
See notes 28-30 and accompanying text supra.
35. 502 F.2d at 722.
36. Id., quoting 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1970) (emphasis supplied by the court).
37. 502 F.2d at 722-23. Defendants had argued that DDT and dieldrin in the
processed chubs were poisonous and deleterious substances, and that therefore, the
Government was required under section 402(a) (1) of FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 342(a) (1)
(1970), to prove that the quantity of the pesticides rendered the chubs injurious to
health. 502 F.2d at 722-23.
38. 502 F2d at 722.
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(a) (2) (C) of section 40239 of the FDCA.40 The court noted that the
subsection's proviso 41 stated that a pesticide chemical is not an unsafe food
additive in a processed food if it is the residue of a pesticide used on the
unprocessed food and is within the tolerances specified under the 1954
Pesticides Amendment for the unprocessed food. 42 This indicated to the
court that Congress intended the category of food additives to be suffi48
ciently broad to include pesticide residues.
The difficulty in making an assessment of whether the Seventh Circuit
reached a correct conclusion in deciding that pesticide residues were food
additives stems from Congress' failure to clearly delineate under what circumstances substances would be considered food additives. A number of
arguments may be made either in support or against the decision in the
instant case, all finding some support in the statutory language or the
legislative history of the amendment.
Since the Seventh Circuit emphasized the importance of the legislative
history of the 1958 amendment, it is necessary to examine congressional
intent to evaluate the court's decision. In both the Senate and House
reports on the 1958 amendment, three types of food additives were delineated: intentional, incidental, and accidental. 44 Only intentional and
incidental food additives were meant to be covered by the 1958 amendment. 45 Clearly the residue of DDT and dieldrin could not be considered
intentional additives, deliberately added to the product. 46 Classification of
the residue of pesticides as either incidental or accidental additives presents
conceptual problems regardless of the classification chosen. Incidental additives were defined in the Senate report on the 1958 amendment as "substances which may reasonably be expected to become a component of any
food or to affect the characteristics of any food." 4 7 Taken alone, it is not
difficult to see how the residue of a chemical pesticide could be classified as
an incidental additive since scientific investigation has shown that migration
of pesticides, particularly DDT, through the ecosphere and into food sources

39. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a) (2) (C) (1970). For the text of section 402 of the
FDCA, see note 2 supra.
40. 502 F.2d at 722.
41. For the text of the proviso to section 402 of the FDCA, see note 2 supra.
42. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a) (2) (B) (1970).
43. 502 F.2d at 722-23. It seems clear that the proviso was added to avoid the
possibility of inconsistant regulations being promulgated under the two amendments,
a possibility which could arise only if pesticide residues could be classified as food
additives.
44. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 26, at 4-5; HousE REPORT, supra note 26,
at 3-4.
45. SENATE REPORT, supra note 26, at 5; HouSE REPORT, supra note 26, at 3.
46. Intentional additives are substances which are purposely added to food.
HouSE REPORT, supra note 26, at 3. The residues of the pesticides were not, as the
Ewig court noted, used in the processing of the chubs, nor were they added by the
fishermen who caught the fish. 502 F.2d at 718.
47. SENATE REPORT, supra note 26, at 5.
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can reasonably be expected. 48 However, the report cites as "principal
examples" of intentional and incidental additives "substances intended for
use in producing, manufacturing, packing, processing, preparing, treating,
packaging, transporting, or holding food. '' 49 This suggests that Congress
intended to include in these categories substances used somewhere in the
producer to consumer chain which can reasonably be expected to become a
component or affect the characteristic of the food that is being readied for
market, and not any substance which might foreseeably become a component
of the food." ° Such a reading is not compelled, however, and it may be
argued that in using the term "principal examples," Congress intended only
to indicate the typical examples - not to delineate an exclusive category.
No less open to argument is the classification of DDT and dieldrin as
"accidental additives."' 51 An accidental additive is a substance which when
"properly used may not reasonably be expected to become a component of
a food or otherwise to affect the characteristics of a food ....
It may
be argued that, since pesticide residues can, even if properly used, reasonably be expected to become a component of food, 5 3 categorization of them
as an accidental additive is improper.
Based on the foregoing observations, it is evident that any attempt to
classify the residues of DDT and dieldrin as either intentional, incidental,
or accidental food additives is fraught with conceptual difficulties. The
problem, it is submitted, stems not from the lack of clearly definable categories from which to choose, but rather from the failure to accurately perceive what substances Congress sought to regulate as food additives. An
examination of the statutory definition of food additives 54 and Congress'
purpose 5 in enacting the 1958 amendment suggests that only substances
used in the production of food could be classified as food additives at all.56
"52

48. See 2 G.
SILENT SPRING

49.

BROOKS,

CHLORINATED

INSECTICIDES

147-50 (1974); R.

CARSON,

178-84 (1962).

SENATE REPORT, supra note 26, at 5 (emphasis added).
50. See note 57 and accompanying text infra.
51. See United States v. Vita Food Prods., 356 F. Supp. 1213, 1218 (N.D.
Il1. 1973). The district court concluded that the pesticide residues must be accidental
additives after it determined that the substances could not be properly classified as
either intentional or incidental additives. Id. at 1217-18. This view is inconsistent,
however, with the argument that a substance is not a food additive merely because
it is detected in a food. See text accompanying note 50 supra and note 57 and accompanying text infra.
52. SENATE REPORT, supra note 26, at 5.
53. See 2 G. BROOKS, supra note 48, at 147-50; R. CARSON, supra note 48, at
178-84.
Even if the district court was correct in its basic assumption that all substances are subject to classification as one of the three types of food additives, it may
nevertheless have erred in its classification of the pesticide residues as accidental
additives, because it may be shown that the residues can be reasonably expected to
become a component of the fish. See id.
54. For the definition of food additives under the 1958 amendment, see note 4

supra.

55. See note 31 supra.
56. The congressional purpose in enacting the Food Additives Amendment of
1958 was twofold: first, to enable industry to take advantage of the post-World War II
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Thus, any analysis must begin with two initial determinations: first, a
determination of whether a substance is a food additive at all, and if so,
a determination of the type of additive. If the questioned substance was
deliberately used in the distributive chain, even if not directly added to
the commodity in which it is detected, the substance is a food additive. "
Assuming it is an additive, it must then be classified as intentional, incidental, or accidental. Only those substances within the first two categories
are regulated under the 1958 amendment.
Acceptance of the foregoing view does not, however, necessarily mandate the conclusion that the Seventh Circuit erred in holding that residues
of chemical pesticides were food additives, since it may be argued that,
even though Congress limited the definition of additives to those substances
which were deliberately used or which reasonably could be expected to
become a component or affect a food, it specifically included residues of
chemical pesticides in the class of food additives by the proviso to subsection (a) (2) (C) of section 402 of the FDCA.5 s It is not clear whether
the Ewig court saw the proviso as an independent basis for deciding that
the DDT and dieldrin residues were food additives, 59 or whether it viewed
it merely as additional evidence of legislative intent, but it certainly may be
argued that this independent support exists.60 This view, however, is not
beyond dispute. By employing language which requires that the pesticide
"has been used in or on a raw agricultural commodity," rather than the
phrase "is contained in" a particular product or some other words of like
import, it may be argued that Congress intended the proviso to apply only
to those processed agricultural products upon which pesticide chemicals
were intentionally used rather than those in which the presence of DDT
is merely fortuitous. The legislative history is unclear, with Congress remarking only that the 1958 amendment was not concerned with "residues
of pesticide chemicals unavoidably remaining on processed foods not in
advances in food technology, and second, to protect the public from possible harm by
providing for extensive pretesting of a food additive in order to determine in what
amounts, if at all, that food additive could be safely used. See Markel, supra note 23,
at 515; note 31 supra. It seems inconsistent with the legislative purpose to maintain
that any substance is a food additive, regardless of whether its use in the distributive
chain was reasonably foreseeable since in such cases there would be no possibility of
pretesting to determine a safe amount. Thus, accidental additives, such as detergents
used to clean the floors of the plant, which might conceivably but unexpectedly become
components of the food, were exempted from the pretesting requirements since industry could have no way of either knowing or controlling the amounts which might
eventually contaminate the food.
57. Under this analysis, the residues of DDT and dieldrin would not be classified
as food additives, since they were not used in the production of the smoked chubs.
58. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a) (2) (C) (1970). For text of the proviso to subsection
(a) (2) (C) of section 402 of the FDCA, see note 2 supra.
59. The court saw the proviso as "confirming" the conclusion that the residues
of DDT and dieldrin were food additives. 502 F.2d at 722.
60. This would require acceptance of the argument that residues of chemical
pesticides are a category of substances which the 1958 amendment was specifically
intended to encompass.
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excess of tolerances prescribed by Food and Drug Administration for raw
agricultural commodities."'
The exact basis for the Seventh Circuit's holding pesticide residues to
be food additives was not clear. If the decision rested upon the fact that
DDT and dieldrin are substances which can reasonably be expected to
become a component of any food - i.e. that they are incidental additives it is not unreasonable to foresee future actions where it is claimed that a
food is adulterated because of the presence of any environmental pollutant
which can reasonably be expected to become a component of or affect food.
On the other hand, even if the case is limited to its facts - pesticide
residues are food additives - a problem, not discussed by the Seventh
Circuit in the instant case, remains.
Subsection (c) (3) (A) of section 409 of the FDCA, 62 the Delaney
Amendment, provides that no food additive shall be considered safe if it
is found to induce cancer in man or animals. 63 Thus, there must be a
"zero tolerance" for food additives which are proved carcinogens.14 Recent
scientific studies have pointed to the tendency of DDT to cause cancer
in test animals. 5 If, as the Ewig court suggests, residue of DDT is a
food additive, food containing any trace of DDT is adulterated as a matter
of law. 6
The decision of the Ewig court in holding that the residue of DDT
and dieldrin in smoked chubs is a food additive is a legally defensible
61. SENATE

REPORT,

supra note 27, at 5.

62. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c) (3) (A) (1970).
63. Id. For the legislative history of the Delaney Amendment, see HouSE COMM.
ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, COLOR ADDITIVE AMENDMENTS OF 1960,
H.R. REP. No. 1761, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-14 (1960) [hereinafter cited as HousE
REPORT ON COLOR ADDITIVE].

64. See R. CARSON, supra note 65, at 225; 1 R. WHITE-STEVENS, PESTICIDES IN
THE ENVIRONMENT 440-43 (1971).
65. 'The FDA is permitted, upon petition from any person, to promulgate regulations, for the safe use of food additives. 21 U.S.C. § 348(b) (1) (1970). However, under the Delaney Amendment any substance which is carcinogenic is unsafe as a food
additive. Id. § 348(c) (3) (A). The rationale behind the Delaney Amendment is that
science is unable to determine how much of a carcinogenic substance will cause cancer
and the general ignorance about the cumulative effects of cancer-producing substances
necessitates their total ban from foods. HOUSE REPORT ON COLOR ADDITIVE, Supra
note 63, at 12-14.
66. See note 65 supra. In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. HEW, 428 F.2d
1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the District of Columbia Circuit ordered the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare to promulgate regulations proposed by the plaintiffs
establishing a zero tolerance for residues of DDT upon all raw agricultural products.
Id. at 1093. In addition, the court ordered the Secretary to consider the scientific
evidence of the carcinogenic nature of DDT. However, the court did not rest its
decision upon the Delaney Amendment, noting: "[W]e do not think the Delaney
anticancer amendment can be held to apply full force to pesticide chemicals." Id. at
1091. Although the Delaney Amendment only applied to food and color additives,
the court nevertheless ordered the Secretary to use the amendment as an expression
of public policy when establishing "tolerances to pesticide residues on or in raw
agricultural commodities 'to the extent necessary to protect the public health.' "
Id. at 1091-92, quoting 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b) (1970). The implication of the court's
opinion is obvious: if DDT was a food additive, the "full force" of the Delaney
Amendment would have applied.
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position. Nevertheless, the decision necessitates a reexamination of Congressional intent in the enactment of the Food Additives Amendment, and
furthermore, may prompt reevaluation of the values expressed by Congress
in the Delaney anticancer amendmentY7 Courts, faced with a similar or
analogous fact situation, will be required to deal with Ewig as a disturbing
precedent, not clearly reasoned, and possibly fraught with far-reaching
ramifications.
Stephen C. Braverman

TRUSTS AND ESTATES

-

FIDUCIARIES' DUTIES -

THE TRUSTEE

WHO PROCURES AN APPOINTMENT UPON A REPRESENTATION OF
GREATER SKILL THAN THAT OF THE ORDINARY PERSON MUST
EXERCISE SUCH SKILL.

Killey Trust (Pa. 1974)
Industrial Valley Bank and Trust Company (IVB), the successor
trustee under an inter vivos deed of trust executed by Jessie A. Killey in
1926,1 filed an account in the estate covering the period from September
22, 1948, to February 16, 1970.2 Two of the remaindermen 3 objected to
the account and sought to have the trustee surcharged on the grounds that
IVB had not exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in handling
the trust res and in particular that IVB had not performed in accordance
with its representations of a high degree of expertise. 4 Although the trust instrument authorized the trustee to make other than legal investments, 5 from
67. See Statement by Robert H. Finch, Secretary of Health, Education, and

Welfare (Nov. 12, 1969), [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] F. D. CosM. L. REP.
at 60,401 (1969). Secretary Finch observed:

60,286,

If the Delaney Amendment, as it is now written, were to be strictly enforced for
pesticide residues it would convert us to a nation of vegetarians. Much of our red
meat, many dairy products, some eggs, fowl and fish - all parts of basic food
groups deemed necessary to a balanced diet - would be outlawed because of very
small pesticide residues from the ecological chain.
Id. at 60,403.
1. Killey Trust, 457 Pa. 474, 326 A.2d 374 (1974).
2. Killey Trust, 23 Fiduc. Rep. 634, 634 (1973).
3. The trust income was to be paid to Jessie A. Killey for her life and upon
her death to three nephews and a niece. Upon each of their deaths, a proportionate
share of the principal was to be distributed to their issue. Jessie A. Killey died in
1948, predeceased by one of the nephews, and another nephew later died without
issue. The current accounting was occasioned by the death of the niece, and it was
her heirs, due to receive one-half of the remaining principal, who objected to the
account. The surviving nephew did not file any exceptions. Id. at 635-36.
4. Id. at 634 & 637-38.
5. Id. at 635-36. A legal investment is one of the investments specifically
authorized by the statute which establishes a "legal list" including such investments
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the early 1930's until 1958 the fund was invested exclusively in government
securities. 6 Between 1958 and 1963, "there were some investments in
common stock," 7 and in 1963, the entire fund was put into the trustee's
common trust fund, where it remained until the current accounting.8 The
remaindermen, in contending that IVB did not "exercise any reasonable
degree of care in the management of the trust,"9 particularly objected to
the trustee's failure to diversify the trust investments prior to 1963 and also
to the trustee's retention of the trust res in the common trust fund since
1963.10
The Orphans' Court of Philadelphia, noting, first, that under Pennsylvania law the trustee has no duty per se to diversify investments" and,
second, that common trust funds are authorized by statute,12 found that
the remaindermen had failed to meet their burden of proving that the
trustee had not used the common skill, prudence and caution required of a
fiduciary. 1 The exceptions were therefore dismissed. 14 The remainderas United States Treasury notes and the preferred stock of corporations which have
had profits in 8 of the last 10 years. Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code of 1972,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 7303(1), 7310(a) (Spec. Pamphlet 1975). In addition
to the investments authorized by statute, any investment authorized by the trust
instrument is also legal, id. § 7319(a), but the term "legal investment" when used
in a trust instrument, refers only to investments authorized by statute. Id. § 7302(a).
A trustee is liable for any loss sustained on an unauthorized investment.
See cases cited in note 46 infra; cf. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 7302 (a) (Spec. Pamphlet
1975). However, the limitation upon a trustee's choice of investments imposed by
this liability was substantially reduced in 1972 when statutory authorization was
given to any prudent, nonspeculative investment. Id.
6. 23 Fiduc. Rep. at 640.
7. Id. at 641. Between 1948 and 1963, the Killey trust investments were
reviewed by IVB at irregular intervals; 3 years passed on one occasion and 18
months on two others. Brief for Appellants at 15.
8. 23 Fiduc. Rep. at 641. The account reveals the following trust transactions.
In 1948, the trust fund amounted to $45,268.89. Fees and inheritance taxes reduced
this to $40,465.21 by 1951. The entire trust was then invested in United States
Government obligations until November, 1957 when $200.00 was invested in a
building and loan association. In 1958, $7,444.32 was invested in common stocks,
and another $8,708.05 worth of stocks were purchased in 1962. In 1963, the entire
trust principal, with the exception of a small cash balance, was invested in IVB's
common trust fund. Each of the Government obligations which were converted
before maturity were sold below inventory cost for a total loss of $3,207.19. The
common stocks all produced gains for a total of $4,359.86. By 1970, the common trust
fund investment had realized a loss of $1,545.73. Thus over the 22-year period of
the account, the trust fund suffered a net loss of $393.06. Record at lOa-12a.
9. 23 Fiduc. Rep. at 637.
10. Id. The remaindermen also claimed that the trustee had acted improperly
in 1962 with respect to certain transactions involving United States Treasury
securities. Since there was uncontroverted testimony that the transactions were
imprudent, the Orphans' Court sustained this exception and awarded the remaindermen a surcharge in the amount of the loss incurred in the transactions. Id. at 640.
11. Id. at 638. See Lentz Estate, 364 Pa. 304, 309-10, 72 A.2d 276, 278 (1950).
12. 23 Fiduc. Rep. at 639. See Fiduciaries Investment Act of 1949, § 13
[19491 Pa. Laws 1828, as amended. Probate, Estates, and Fiduciaries Code of 1972,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 7314(1) (Spec. Pamphlet 1975).
13. 23 Fiduc. Rep. at 639. The lower court specifically refused to hold the trustee
to a higher standard than that of a person of ordinary prudence. Id. at 637-38.
14. Id. at 639. However, after a detailed review of the record, the court
found that the trustee had failed to give the trust a proper amount of attention.
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men appealed, claiming that the lower court had erred in using the standard
of the person of ordinary prudence in judging the trustee's management of
the trust.' 5 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed and reversed the
court below, holding that the trustee who procures his appointment
by representing that he has greater skill than the person of ordinary prudence is under a duty to exercise such skill. Killey Trust, 457 Pa. 474,

326 A.2d 372 (1974).
The person of ordinary prudence standard used by the lower court
was well-established. Early decisions had held that a trustee was required
to exercise only "common skill, common prudence and common caution.' 6
Trustees would not be liable for losses to the trust corpus so long as they
acted "as others do with their own goods and in good faith and are not
guilty of gross negligence." u 7 This rule still remains as the basic measure
of a fiduciary's duty. 18
Id. at 643. Because of this, the lower court disallowed the trustee's commission for
managing the trust and denied the trustee's request for attorneys' fees. Id.
15. 457 Pa. at 476, 326 A.2d at 374.
16. Neff's Appeal, 57 Pa. 91, 96 (1868). This language was derived in part
from Eyster's Appeal, 16 Pa. 372 (1851), in which the court said that "[m]ore
ought not to be expected of guardians than common prudential care." Id. at 376.
The "common prudence" formulation of the rule appears in numerous Pennsylvania cases, see, e.g., Lerch Estate, 399 Pa. 59, 64-65, 159 A.2d 506, 509-10 (1960),
and has been referred to in several texts. See, e.g., G. BoGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS 337
(5th ed. 1972).
17. Neff's Appeal, 57 Pa. 91, 96 (1868). It has been suggested that the
standard which requires a trustee to act as others do with their own goods is
insufficient; because a trustee handles the property of others, it is argued that it
should use more care than one would use in handling one's personal property. In
particular, the trustee should not make speculative investments, even if the risk
involved is one which the ordinarily prudent man would take with his own property.
See, e.g., 2 A. ScoTT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 174, at 1409-10 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter
cited as ScoTT]. This point rarely has been raised in Pennsylvania cases, although
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that "the law demands the common
skill and prudence of an investor of money to be safely kept with such reasonable
income as is commensurate with safety of the principal." Hart's Estate, 203 Pa.
480, 486, 53 A. 364, 366 (1902) (emphasis added). See also Seaman's Estate, 333
Pa. 358, 363-64, 5 A.2d 208, 211 (1939). In addition, in order for investments to
be authorized by statute, they must be made with that degree of care
which men of prudence, discretion, and intelligence exercise in the management
of their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income to be derived
therefrom as well as the probable safety of their capital.
Probate, Estates, and Fiduciaries Code of 1972, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 7302(b),
(Spec. Pamphlet 1975) (emphasis added). See also id. §§ 7307, 7310(a).
In spite of this, some cases have considered an investment by the trustee
of his own money in the trust fund's securities to be evidence of the exercise of due
care. E.g., Stirling's Estate, 342 Pa. 497, 505, 21 A.2d 72, 76 (1941). Furthermore,
investments of a speculative nature have been allowed where specifically authorized
by the trust instrument. See, e.g., Jones Estate, 344 Pa. 100, 23 A.2d 434 (1942)
(common stock of a close corporation).
18. E.g., Denlinger Estate, 449 Pa. 393, 297 A.2d 478 (1972); Lohm Estate,
440 Pa. 268, 269 A.2d 451 (1970). Thus, in Heyls Estate, 331 Pa. 202, 200 A. 617
(1938), where the beneficiaries of the trust sought to surcharge the corporate trustee
because it had invested some of the trust funds in mortgages which were not producing
income, the court found that "common experience" justified investment in the
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The Restatement of Trusts set forth an exception to the prudent man
rule where the trustee had superior skill, requiring the trustee to exercise
such skill as he possessed. 19 This "possession of skill" rule was first adopted
in Pennsylvania in Stirling's Estate,20 and its application was illustrated
in Lohm Estate.2' In the latter case, the exceptants sought a reduction of the
fees charged to the estate by three parties, a tax lawyer, who was consulted
on the estate tax matters, 22 and the two coexecutors of the estate, one of
whom was a layman 23 and the other an attorney inexperienced in estate tax
law.2 4 The reduction was sought because a penalty had been charged to the
estate for late payment of estate taxes. 25 The court held that the parties
should be judged according to the skill they possessed, the tax lawyer being
20
held to the highest standard and the layman to the lowest.
mortgage in question. Id. at 204, 200 A.2d at 618. The court concluded that no
ordinary person "would have been considered an imprudent investor having placed
his money in any of these mortgages." Id. at 206, 200 A. at 619. The court cited
the common prudence rule and held that the corporate trustee had met this standard
of care. Id. at 208, 200 A. at 619.
19. Section 174 of the Restatement provided:
The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to
exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in
dealing with his own property; and if the trustee has greater skill than that
of a man of ordinary prudence, he is under a duty to exercise such skill as
he has.
RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 174 (1935).
It has been suggested that the "possession of skill" rule implies that corporate fiduciaries should always be held to a higher standard of care because they
presumably possess greater facilities and expertise in trust administration when
compared with those of the ordinary individual. E.g., G. BOGERT, supra note 16,
at 338 and cases cited therein. However, in Pennsylvania, it appears that not only
does the exceptant to the accounting have to prove the possession of greater skill,
e.g., Mereto Trust, 2 Fiduc. Rep. 142, 146 (Orphans' Ct. Mont. County 1952), aff'd,
373 Pa. 466 (1953), petition for review dismissed, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 415 (Orphans'
Ct. Mont. County 1956), but also the skill must be particularly related to the area
in which the alleged management error occurred. E.g., Mastria Estate, 413 Pa.
278, 196 A.2d 653 (1964) (trustee, a real estate broker, held to higher standard in
selling a trust-owned house). Exceptants have had little success in invoking a higher
standard of care by claiming that the trustee had general expertise. E.g., Scott
Trust, 14 Fiduc. Rep. 405, 419-20 (Orphans' Ct. Mont. County 1964). In Killey Trust,
the trustee admitted that it had more than ordinary skill. Record at 172a. However,
the court below did not find that the trustee should be held to its special skill. 23
Fiduc. Rep. at 637-38. See note 26 infra.
20. 342 Pa. 497, 21 A.2d 72 (1941).
21. 440 Pa. 268, 269 A.2d 451 (1970).
22. The tax lawyer "had been practicing law for thirty-five years . . . and
was thoroughly familiar with federal estate tax regulations." Id. at 275, 269 A.2d
at 455.
23. The layman was a nephew of the settlor. Id. at 270, 269 A.2d at 453.
24. The attorney "had very little experience in the administration of estates
and no experience whatsoever with federal estate tax problems." Id. at 270-71, 269
A.2d at 453.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 273, 278-79, 269 A.2d at 454, 456-57. The court then went on to
find that all three parties were liable, because the error did not involve a complex
question of tax law but merely the determination of the date on which the tax was
due, something a person of ordinary skill should understand. Id. at 277-79, 269 A.2d at
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The Restatement (Second) of Trusts (Second Restatement) added
another exception to the prudent person rule,'2 stating that
the trustee [who] procures his appointment as trustee by representing
that he has greater skill than that of8 a man of ordinary prudence ...
is under a duty to exercise such skill.2
This "representation of skill" rule had never been squarely adopted by the
courts of any jurisdiction 29 although a number of cases30 and several au2
thorities3 1 have suggested the result. Liberty Title & Trust Co. V. Plews"
33
is typical of those cases which have been cited in support of the rule.
Although the New Jersey Equity Court in that case stated that the trustee
should be held to a higher standard of skill because it had advertised itself
as being an expert,' 4 the trustee was actually surcharged under the person
of ordinary prudence standard, the court having found elements of selfdealing, 35 purely speculative investments, 3 and a lack of even ordinary
care.'3 Thus, the Liberty Title court's discussion of the "representation of
skill" rule was merely dicta.' 8
455-56. Thus, the tax lawyer could have been found liable under the ordinary person

standard.
It appears to be generally true that in the Pennsylvania cases the "possession
of skill" rule has been applied only when the trustee's actions were sufficiently
imprudent to generate liability under the common skill standard. See, e.g., Mastria
Estate, 413 Pa. 278, 196 A.2d 653 (1964) ; Stirling's Estate, 342 Pa. 497, 21 A.2d
72 (1941).
27. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
28. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1957) (emphasis added).
29. SCOTT, supra note 17, § 174, at 1409-10. However, the Uniform Probate
Code has a provision similar to that of the Second Restatement, stating that one
who "is named trustee on the basis of representations of special skills or expertise .. .
is under a duty to use those skills." UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 7-302. This section
has been adopted in a number of states. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-7302
(Supp. 1974) ; FLA. STAT. § 737.302 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 15-7-302 (Supp.
1975) ; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 7-302 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974).
30. For a discussion of some of the cases which have been cited as support
for the rule, see Standards of Care for Corporate Trustees, 16 U. CHI. L. REV. 579,
579-84 (1949).
31. E.g., RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 174, Comment a (1935) ; SCOTT, supra note 17,
§ 174.1.
32. 142 N.J. EQ. 493, 60 A.2d 630 (1948), aff'd on other grounds, 6 N.J. 28,
77 A.2d 219 (1950).
33. Liberty Title is frequently cited for the "representation of skill" rule. See,
'e.g., SCOTT, supra note 17, § 174 at 1411; Note, Standard of Care for Corporate and
Professional Trustees, 42 VA. L. REV. 665, 674 (1956). The Killey court cited Liberty
Title and also Union Commerce Bank v. Kusse, 21 Ohio Misc. 217, 251 N.E.2d
884 (Probate Ct. 1969). 457 Pa. at 478, 326 A.2d at 375. However, the court in
Knsse merely stated the rule that a trustee who actually possesses greater skill must
exercise it. Id. at 225, 251 N.E.2d at 890.
34. 142 N.J. Eq. at 509, 60 A.2d at 642.
35. Id. at 511-19, 60 A.2d at 643-45.
36. Id. at 521, 60 A.2d at 647-49.
37. Id. at 511-19, 60 A.2d at 643-45. The surcharge was affirmed on appeal
because of the evidence of self-dealing, and the New Jersey Supreme Court did
not reach the question of the standard of skill to be applied. 6 N.J. at 37, 77 A.2d
at 224.
38. It is unclear from the Liberty Title opinion whether the court intended
to apply a new rule. In holding the trustee to a higher .standard of skill, the court
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The remaindermen in the instant case claimed that IVB had procured
its appointment by holding itself out as having greater skill than the ordinary
person and urged the court to adopt the Second Restatement's "representation of skill" rule.3 9 In considering this argument, the court noted that, in
spite of the interpretation given to their opinion in Linnard's Estate,40 there
may be circumstances in which a corporate trustee is presumed to have
greater abilities than an individual. 41 Specifically, the court found that the
instant case was an example of such circumstances, stating that "one who
procures his appointment as trustee by representing that he has greater skill
than that of a man of ordinary prudence will be held to have such skill as he
has represented" 4 2 and, therefore, under the "possession of skill" rule, 43 has
a duty to exercise that skill.4 4 Since the court below had analyzed the
trustee's actions in the light of common skill and prudence rather than the
superior skill which the trustee had represented that it possessed, 4 the
case was remanded for reconsideration. 46 However, the court limited this
quoted the established rule that a trustee must exercise the skill that it in fact
possesses. 142 N.J. Eq. at 509, 60 A.2d at 642. Thus, it is very possible that the
court considered the trustee's advertising claims of special facilities and capabilities
merely to be evidence of the actual possession of special skills, rather than action
sufficient in itself to invoke a higher standard. See Id.
39. Brief for Appellants at 13-14.
40. 299 Pa. 32, 148 A. 912 (1930). The case had been cited for the proposition
that a corporate fiduciary could not be held to a higher standard of skill per se.
457 Pa. 477 n.1, 326 A.2d at 374 n.1, citing Rayburn's Estate, 43 Pa. D.&C. 85
(Orphans' Ct. Phila. County 1942).
41. 457 Pa. at 477, 326 A.2d at 374. The language of the court implies that
such a presumption would not always be raised. Compare text accompanying notes
72-74 infra.
42. 457 Pa. at 477, 326 A.2d at 375 (emphasis in original).
43. A trustee must exercise such skill as he has, or, where there is a presumption
of skill, as he is held to have. See notes 19-26 and accompanying text supra.
44. The court thus effectively adopted the Second Restatement's view although
stating it in terms of an irrebutable presumption. The concurring opinion of Justice
Roberts expressly pointed out that the holding is not limited to corporate fiduciaries
and noted that the "holding is mandated by section 174 of the Restatement." 457
Pa. at 480, 326 A.2d at 376 (Roberts, J. concurring).
45. 457 Pa. at 478, 326 A.2d at 375. There were indications that the trustee
could be found liable under the higher standard of skill. See notes 63-66 and accompanying text infra. The supreme court specifically observed that the court below
found that IVB, although meeting the standard of the man of ordinary prudence,
did not give the trust the attention it should have received. 457 Pa. at 478, 326 A.2d
at 374; see note 14 supra.
46. 457 Pa. at 478, 326 A.2d at 375. IVB had argued in part that they should
be held only to what they characterized as the "'legal list' investment standard,"
Brief for Appellee at 17, so that they should not be surcharged because they had
only made legal investments. See note 5 supra. Although the trustee must exercise
common prudence, skill, and care in making legal investments, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 7302(a) (Spec. Pamphlet 1975), a survey of the cases decided in the last 17 years
in which a surcharge was sought for losses sustained on investments does indicate
that it is difficult to recover a surcharge for legal investments absent additional
inculpatory circumstances. A surcharge was allowed in all three cases involving
nonlegal investments. See Saunders Estate, 393 Pa. 527, 143 A.2d 367 (1958);
Kelsey Estate, 393 Pa. 513, 143 A.2d 42 (1958); Coxe Trust, 23 Pa. D. & C.2d
570, 45 Del. County Rep. 41, 7 Fiduc. Rep. 677 (Orphans' Ct. 1957). However, in
the eight cases concerning legal investments, no surcharges were awarded in half
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reconsideration to the time period before the trust res was invested in
IVB's common trust fund 47 because it found no support for the remaindermen's arguments that placing the trust corpus in the common trust fund
was per se a breach of the trust agreement, which presumably contemplated
individual management of the trust, 48 or, in the alternative, that the trustee

had a duty to communicate with the beneficiaries to ascertain their preferences for investments and had not done so before investing in the fund.4 9
of them. See Smith Trust, 21 Fiduc. Rep. 312 (Orphans' Ct. Bucks County 1971);
Luria Trust, 45 Pa. D. & C.2d 749, 19 Fiduc. Rep. 90 (Orphans' Ct. Phila. County
1968); Franklin Trust, 10 Fiduc. Rep. 444 (Orphans' Ct. Lanc. County 1960)
(investments specifically authorized by trust instrument) ; Wheeler Trust, 47 Del.
County Rep. 1, 9 Fiduc. Rep. 371 (Orphans' Ct. 1959) (investments specifically
authorized by trust instrument). In the four cases in which surcharges were allowed
for legal investments, the court noted trustee action approaching self-dealing in
three of them. See Lare Estate, 436 Pa. 1, 257 A.2d 556 (1969) (trustee used idle
trust funds for his own benefit) ; Mastria Estate, 413 Pa. 278, 196 A.2d 653 (1964)
(trustee bought trust property at public auction for one-half of appraised value);
Jones Estate, 400 Pa. 545, 162 A.2d 408 (1960) (idle trust funds used by trustee).
The remaining case involved what the court characterized as gross mismanagement.
See Denlinger Estate, 449 Pa. 393, 297 A.2d 478 (1972) (failure to maintain rental
property, in breach of express statutory duty, was substantial cause of 95-percent
depreciation of property value in 22 years). Thus it appears that courts tend to
assume that due care and skill were exercised when an investment was made that was
either on the statutory "legal list" or was specifically authorized by the trust instrument.
47. 457 Pa. at 478-79, 326 A.2d at 375.
48. Brief for Appellants at 24. The court was justified in its rejection of
exceptant's argument. Putting the trust corpus into a common trust fund is specifically authorized by statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 7314(1) (Spec. Pamphlet 1975),
and, as a practical matter, the common trust fund is the only way that investments
in the kind of growth stocks which provide protection from the effects of inflation
can be safely made for a relatively small trust. To guard against inevitable market
fluctuations, such investments must be diversified, and, with a fund as small as ihe
Killey trust, adequate diversification is effectively impossible unless the assets of a
number of such trusts are pooled in a common trust fund. See Brief for Appellee at 22;
Atnally, Common Trust Funds, 44 N.Y.S.B.J. 229, 230 (1972). IVB also contended
that the common trust fund allowed them to provide better management because the
burden of research and evaluation in the selection of investments was shared by
many trusts. Brief for Appellee at 23. Of course, the trustee is under a duty to
exercise the requisite degree of care and skill in managing the investments of the
fund. See 457 Pa. at 478, 326 A.2d at 375 (no evidence in the record that IVB
mismanaged the trust fund in this case).
49. 457 Pa. at 478, 326 A.2d at 375. The appellants complained that "[tihe
trustee at no time communicated with the settlor or with any trust beneficiary . . .
with reference to their preference as to investments." Brief for Appellants at 22-24.
However, the trustee has no obligation per se to consult with the beneficiaries concerning authorized investments absent express provisions in the trust instrument.
See, e.g., Lieber's Estate, 342 Pa. 246, 249, 20 A.2d 193, 195 (1941). Since the
trustees in the instant case were given the broadest investment powers, the trust
instrument providing that the trustee could make any investments "as said trustee
deems best and advisable," Record at 2a, the remaindermen had no legal grounds
for complaint.
However, there were perhaps legitimate nonlegal grounds for complaint.
The trustee never communicated with the beneficiaries except to send them their
distributions and statements of income, as a result of which the remaindermen
characterized the trustee's attitude as one of "aloofness, disinterest, and lack of concern." Brief for Appellants at 23.
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Even though the "representation of skill" rule is not supported by
direct precedent, it is arguable that a similar result could have been reached
under prior Pennsylvania case law. When a trustee procures his appointment by representing that he has greater than ordinary skill, he either

has the skill or does not have it. If he in fact has the skill, he can clearly
be surcharged for failure to exercise that skill under either the "possession
of skill" 50 or the "representation of skill" rule. It is only when the trustee
does not have the represented skill that it would appear necessary to apply
the "representation of skill" rule to establish the trustee's liability. However, the trustee has a duty of loyalty which in turn creates a duty of
scrupulous honesty 51 and precludes the trustee from taking action for his
own benefit which is detrimental to the interests of the beneficiaries.5 2 Thus
the trustee who misrepresents the skill he possesses has clearly breached
his duty of honesty, 3 and, at least in the case of the nongratuitous trustee,
has done so to his own benefit5 4 and to the detriment of the beneficiaries 55
and, therefore, arguably could be surcharged for the loss resulting from
this breach of loyalty 6 independently from the "representation of skill" rule.
However, the "representation of skill" rule should clarify the duties of
trustees and make it easier for objectors to establish liability for failure
to exercise represented skills. Under the "possession of skill" rule, the
objector must meet his burden of proving the existence of the relevant skill,
and the case law indicates that this is a substantial burden. 57 Because of
the necessarily public nature of representations, it should be easier for
objectors to overcome their burden of proof under the "representation of
skill" rule.58 Furthermore, in the case where the trustee does not possess
50. See notes 20-26 and accompanying text supra.
51. A trustee is held to the highest degree of good faith, "[nlot honesty alone,
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive." Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y.
458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (Cardozo, J.), quoted with approval in Holmes
Trust, 392 Pa. 17, 21, 139 A.2d 548, 551 (1958).
52. E.g., Bolton v. Stillwagon, 410 Pa. 618, 190 A.2d 105 (1963).
53. The trustee could argue that he was dishonest only before the trust relationship was established. However, scrupulous honesty would require him, after
becoming trustee, to disabuse the parties in interest of the misapprehension which he
had previously created. Had he done so, there is the possibility that he would have
been removed as trustee, thus preventing the loss. See note 55 infra.

54. The point is less clear in the case of the gratuitous trustee, although it could
be based upon the proposition that the gratuitous trustee, like the gratuitous bailee,
receives a benefit upon acquiring control of the res. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 29 (1957) (transfer of control over the trust res is sufficient consideration to make trust agreement binding).
55. The detriment would arise because the trustee, due to his representations,
was retained instead of other potential trustees who in fact possessed special skills.
56. E.g., Bolton v. Stillwagon, 410 Pa. 618, 190 A.2d 105 (1963) (surcharge
for breach of loyalty). However, it is only arguable that a trustee should be surcharged for breach of his duty of honesty in representing his skills. See note 59
infra.
57. See notes 19 & 26 supra.
58. Cf. note 74 and accompanying text infra. Given the ease of proving the
existence of a elpresentation of skill, it seems likely that corporate fiduciaries will
admit to possessing special skills.
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the represented skill, it is at best only arguable under prior case law that
he should be surcharged for dishonesty. 9 In addition, it would appear
that the trustee, as a valid defense to the objector's allegations of dishonesty,
could claim that he made the representations with the good faith belief that
they were true," whereas good faith is immaterial under the "representation
of skill" rule.
The language of the Second Restatement,0 ' as well as some of the
theoretical justifications advanced for the rule, 62 clearly indicate that the
trustee has an absolute duty to perform in accordance with his specific
representations. Thus, in the instant case, IVB could be found on remand
to have failed to meet its requisite standard of skill in at least two instances.
63
First, IVB said that it could provide continuous management of the trust,

but the record indicates that it did not do So. 6 4 Second, IVB stated that it
could make investments tailored to the beneficiaries' needs, 65 a promise
which would seem to require communicating with the beneficiaries in order
59. A diligent search revealed no cases in Pennsylvania in which a trustee was
surcharged for breach of the duty of scrupulous honesty. It is possible that the
only remedy available to the objector is removal of the trustee, see, e.g., Holmes
Trust, 392 Pa. 17, 21-22, 139 A.2d 548, 551 (1958), but, in theory, a trustee can
be surcharged for a loss caused by any breach of duty. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 205 (1957).
60. In Bolton v. Stillwagon, 410 Pa. 618, 190 A.2d 105 (1963), a case involving
the trustees' purchase of trust property for their own personal benefit, the court
below refused to charge the fiduciaries with certain costs incurred in connection with
the property because it found that the trustees had acted in good faith. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding that the lower court's finding of good
faith was clearly erroneous. Id. at 628, 190 A.2d at 110. However, the supreme
court did note that, contrary to the Second Restatement view that "[i]t is immaterial
that the trustee act in good faith in purchasing the trust property for himself,"
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 170, Comment b (1957), in Pennsylvania, a
trustee cannot be found liable for a mere error in judgment where he has acted in
good faith. 410 Pa. at 627-28, 190 A.2d at 109-10. Thus it would seem that a
misrepresentation of skill made in the belief that the skill was actually possessed
would be a mere good faith error in judgment upon which liability could not be based.
61. The Second Restatement states that the trustee who represents that he
has greater skill "is under a duty to exercise such skill." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 174 (1957)
(emphasis added).
62. It has been suggested that the "representation of skill" rule could be derived
by analogy from the principle of agency. SCOTT, supra note 17, § 174, at 1411. When
an agent has induced the principal to employ him by representing that he has a
special skill, he is liable for a failure to exercise that skill. See RESTATEMrNT
(SECOND)
OF AGENCY §§ 376-79, Comment c (1957). It has also been argued that the
doctrine of warranty in sales law would be apposite to the law of trusts. See, e.g.,
Note, supra note 33, at 674. Where the parties to a sales contract have made
representations concerning performance which were a basis of the bargain, an express
warranty is raised that the parties will perform according to their representations.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313(1) (a). It would appear that a fiduciary should
at least meet this requirement, one imposed upon parties who deal at arm's length.
63. 457 Pa. at 481-82, 326 A.2d at 377; Record at 182a (advertising representations and admissions contained in record stipulation).
64. See note 7 supra.
65. 457 Pa. at 481, 326 A.2d at 376-77 (advertising representations contained in
record stipulation).
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to determine those needs; again, the trustee did not so communicate. 6
Presumably, on remand, IVB will attempt to explain these apparent dis67
parities between its representations and its performance.
The language of the Sevdnd Restatement also suggests the elements
necessary for liability under the "representation of skill" rule. A literal
reading of the language implies that objectors must show, first, that the
trustee made representations of special skill; second, that the settlor depended upon these representations in selecting the trustee ;68 and finally, that
the trustee's failure to live up to his representations caused a loss.6 9 However, the Killey court clearly held that IVB was subject to a higher standard of skill although the record was barren of evidence that the settlor had
relied upon any representations made by IVB, or even that the settlor was
aware of any such representations. 70 Thus it would appear that a mere
showing that representations of skill had been made to the general public
is sufficient to raise the inference that the trustee's appointment was procured through those representations, and therefore, that the trustee must be
71
held to them.
66. Record at 182a. See note 49 supra. However, IVB did point out that they
had never received any actual complaints. Brief for Appellee at 23; cf. Walton's
Estate, 348 Pa. 143, 146-47, 34 A.2d 484, 485 (1943) (failure of well-informed
beneficiary to complain about investments justifies court's refusal to surcharge
trustee for loss).
67. See 457 Pa. at 479-80, 326 A.2d at 376 (Roberts, J., concurring). It would
be reasonable to assume that IVB did not explain the disparity at trial because,
although the remaindermen assumed from the start of litigation that the trustee's
representations would determine the standard of skill, IVB thought that it's representations were irrelevant. See, e.g., Record at 21a(objection raised by IVB on the
grounds of irrelevance). For instance, IVB admitted in a stipulation for the record
that they had made the representations contained in the inculpatory advertisement
printed in the appendix to the court's opinion although they were not sure of its source.
Brief for Appellee at 12.
68. Both the Second Restatement and the Killey court made the rule applicable
only to a trustee who "procures his appointment" by representations of special skill.
457 Pa. at 477, 326 A.2d at 375; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1957).
69. A trustee cannot be surcharged for a breach of his duty unless the breach
caused a loss. E.g., Mastria Estate, 413 Pa. 278, 196 A.2d 653 (1964). For example,
if IVB could show that a skilled trustee continuously managing the trust with the
changing needs of the beneficiaries in mind also would have bought Government
obligations, a contention that IVB may make, see Brief for Appellee at 22 (investments justified under good trust administration practices), then they could not be
surcharged.
70. Cf. note 67 supra.
71. It would appear that holding objectors to strict proof of the settlor's reliance
upon the trustee's representations would seriously weaken the effectiveness of the
"representation of skill" rule since in many cases the settlor will not be available to
testify, thus making it difficult for the objectors to come forward with evidence on the
question. Killey Trust is an example of this situation, the settlor having died 22
years before the present accounting. See 23 Fiduc. Rep. at 636.
Even if it is accepted that representations to the general public raise an
irrebuttable presumption that the trustee's appointment was procured through those
representations, there is still a question as to whether objectors must show that the
representations were made at the time of the appointment. An emphasis on the
procurement language of the rule (see note 68 supra) would suggest that the raising
of the inference that the settlor relied on the representations should at least require
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A question remains as to how specific the representations of skill must
be in order for the higher standard of skill to attach. For example, it
could be argued that a corporate fiduciary represents that it has special
skill merely by holding itself out as one who makes a business of managing
trusts. It is submitted, however, that objectors will be required to demonstrate the existence of representations of specific skills. Since it appears
that objectors must demonstrate that the trustee had specific skills related
to the nature of the alleged mismanagement in order to establish liability
under the "possession of skill" rule, 72 and since the Killey court expressed
the "representation of skill" rule in terms of raising a presumption of the
possession of skill, 73 it would seem that a representation of general skill,
raising a presumption of only general skill, would be insufficient to establish
liability for a failure to exercise that skill. This should not prove to be a
substantial obstacle for future objectors who attempt to establish trustee
liability since virtually all corporate fiduciaries advertise the specific merits
of their trust services.

74

A further question raised by Killey is what the measure of the surcharge
should be when the trustee fails to exercise the requisite degree of care
under the "representation of skill" rule. For example, it could be argued
that a trustee who represents that he is a securities investment expert should
be held to the performance of the "average" securities expert and that
therefore the surcharge should be for the difference between the average
growth of funds managed by such experts and the actual growth of the
trust fund in question. The remaindermen in the instant case made a
similar argument, stating that the trust fund's poor performance in comparison with the Dow Jones average, various conservative stocks, and
mutual funds 75 was evidence of the lack of exercise of skill and should
provide the measure for the amount of the surcharge.7 6 The court did not
that the representations be made at the time the settlor was selecting the trustee. On
the other hand, emphasizing the dishonesty involved in misrepresenting, at any time,
the skills to be used in the administration of the trust (see notes 51-56 and accompanying text supra), and given the Killey court's apparent lack of concern with the
existence of a strict causal relationship between the representation and the selection of
the trustee, it is possible that courts will hold that a representation of skill, whenever
made, will raise the inference that similar representations were made and relied upon
at the time of the trustee's appointment.
The Killey decision does not answer this question. Although there was no
indication as to when the advertisement contained in the record stipulation was made,
see Brief for Appellees at 12, IVB also stipulated that similar representations had been
made "at all material times." Record at 178a. Thus, in this case, representations
were made at the time of the appointment, but the court did not expressly hold that
this was a necessary condition for the invocation of the higher standard of skill.
72. See note 19 supra.
73. See notes 42-44 and accompanying text supra.
74. See Buek, Investment Performance, 108 TRUSTS & ESTATES 1129 (1969).
75. Brief for Appellants at 27.
76. Id. at 20-21. The remainderman also argued that the comparative performance should be the measure of the surcharge since the securities market indicators
showed the pronounced inflation during the accounting period and the failure to keep
pace with those indicators represented a "destruction of the value of the trust corpus."
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even mention this argument. It is submitted that the court was justified
in ignoring this claim since, although such market indicators reflect to
some extent the amount of inflation, a factor which some authorities have
suggested should be considered in managing the trust,77 it is well estab-

lished in Pennsylvania that a trustee cannot be surcharged merely because
he could have made more profitable investments. 781 In fact, a trustee could
not make the kind of necessarily speculative investments required to effectively compete with a mutual fund's performance without breaching his
duty of care. 0 Justice Roberts may have had these points in mind when
he stated in his concurring opinion that "even the most skillful trustee
may not . .. be able . . .to produce maximum income."8 0 He reaffirmed
the established rule that a trustee is not an insurer 81 and can only be surcharged for actual loss of principal 82 or income83 caused by his lack of
84
skill and care.
Id. at 20. This argument was also raised in and rejected by the court below. 23
Fiduc. Rep. at 641-42.
77. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227(a), Comment e (1957).
See also Wright, Bonds Are Imprudent Investments, 108 TRUSTS & ESTATES 82
(1969) ;note 76 supra.
78. Mereto Estate, 373 Pa. 466, 469, 96 A.2d 115, 116-17 (1953). If it appears
difficult to recover surcharges for losses upon a legal investment (see note 46 supra),
it appears even more difficult to surcharge a trustee for lost profits which could
have been made had the trustee made a different choice between legal investments. In
the case of Scott Trust, 14 Fiduc. Rep. 405 (Orphans' Ct. Mont. County 1964), the
trustee, in 1942, sold some aluminum company stocks which, although speculative, were
specifically authorized by the trust agreement. The exceptants attempted to surcharge
the trustee in the amount of the difference between the current value of the aluminum
stocks and the value of the trust fund. Id. at 408. Although the exceptants produced
substantial evidence, including a large number of financial reports available to the
trustee at the time, that aluminum stocks were an excellent investment in 1942, the
court refused to find the sale of the stocks to be sufficient mismanagement to justify
the imposition of a surcharge. Id. at 418-19. In such situations, the courts often state
that a trustee's actions are not to be judged by the wisdom of hindsight and that
the "question of possible or probable gain is too uncertain and speculative." 3 SCOTT,
supra note 17, § 212A; see, e.g., Mereto Estate, 373 Pa. 466, 469, 96 A.2d 115, 116-17
(1953). However, a trustee may represent that he can match or surpass the
performance of specific market indicators. See, e.g., Advertisement of The First
National Bank of Allentown, Pa., 114 TRUSTS & ESTATES, Jan. 1975, inside front cover.
If he does so, he could perhaps be held to that performance. See notes 61-71 and
accompanying text supra.
79. See 3 SCOTT, supra note 17, § 227.3; Buek, supra note 74, at 1131. Mr.
Buek was particularly concerned that the commercial pressures to match the performance of alternative forms of investment, such as mutual funds, tended to cause
trustees to substantially deemphasize their other obligations to the beneficiaries. Id.
at 1129-32. It would appear unnecessary, if not inadvisable, for a court to adopt the
remaindermen's contention in the instant case, thereby adding legal pressures to the
already strong market forces.
80. 457 Pa. at 481, 326 A.2d at 376 (Roberts, J.,concurring).
81. E.g. Mereto Trust, 2 Fiduc. Rep. 142, 148 (Orphans' Ct. Mont. County
1952), aff'd, 373 Pa. 466 (1953), petition for review dismissed, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d
415 (Orphans' Ct. Mont. County 1956).
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205(a) (1957) ; see, e.g., Denlinger
Estate, 449 Pa. 393, 398, 297 A.2d 478, 481 (1972).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 0 5(c) (1957) ; see, e.g., Lare Estate,
436 Pa. 1, 9-10, 257 A.2d 556, 561 (1969).
84. 457 Pa. at 481, 326 A.2d at 376 (Roberts, J., concurring).
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The only actual losses sustained by the trust in Killey were substan5
tially less than the surcharge sought by the remaindermen8 However,
their dissatisfaction with the trustee's performance is understandable because, in spite of the trustee's representations as'to its special expertise
in investment analysis,8 6 the settlor in this case c6uld have received better
87
performance from her money by putting it into a regular savings account.
This emphasis upon investment performance lo es sight of the other
services a trustee is meant to provide.88 Although tfie new "representations
of skill" rule may prove easier to apply than the established "possession of
skill" rule of Stirling's Estate,s 9 its most beneficial 'effect will be in encouraging corporate trustees to inform their potential Customers of the full
range of services which they can offer,90 rather than emphasizing their
ability to compete with other forms of investment, thereby promoting a
better understanding of the meaning of a trust relationship.
.W. Preston Granbery

FTC DOES NOT HAVE
REMEDIES AUTHORITY TO ORDER RESTITUTION THROUGH: ITS OWN CEASE AND

UNFAIR COMPETITION--.
DESIST ORDER.

Heater v. FTC (9th, Cir. 1974)
Respondent,' subject to a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) cease
and desist order,2 was directed to discohtinue certain unfair and deceptive
85. The losses on the Government obligations amounted to $3,207.19 (see note 8
supra), whereas the exceptants wanted a surcharge of "five times the value of the trust
corpus." Brief for Appellee at 25.
86. 457 Pa. at 481-82, 326 A.2d at 377. (advertising representations contained in
record stipulation).
87. Record at 114a-15a.
88. See 457 Pa. at 480-81, 326 A.2d at 377.
89. See notes 57-60 and accompanying text supra.
90. See, e.g., Greenberg, The Case 'for Triists, 55 WOMEN LAW. J. 89, 89-93
(1969) (the social service aspects of trusts) ; cf. note 79 supra.
1. Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321: (9th Cir. 1974). Respondent, John Clifford
Heater, was an officer of Universal Credit Acceptance Corporation, Continental Credit
Card Corporation, and International Credit Card Corporation, all three of which had
engaged in the practices named in the FTC complaint. Universal Credit Accept. Corp.,
82 F.T.C. 570, 571 (1973). The party against whom an FTC complaint is directed is
called the respondent. If the respondent appeals from an FTC order, he is referred to
as the petitioner. For consistency, Mr. Heater will be called the respondent throughout the casenote.
2. 82 F.TC. at 669-98. The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 41-58 (1970), empowers the FTC to order respondents to cease and desist from
using unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
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practices 3 in his "Honor All Credit Cards" business and to refund all
monies received through such practices. 4 On appeal to the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, respondent did not challenge the FTC's remedial
power in directing a prophylactic cease and desist order, but contended
that the FTC lacked the authority to order restitution. 5 He argued that
the cease and desist language of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act of 19140 (Act, 1914 Act) limited the remedial powers of the FTC
to proscription of prospective activity. 7 He further argued that restitution
was unnecessary to halt the activities found to be unfair and that the order
was a dissembled attempt to levy damages.8 The FTC phrased the issue
differently, arguing that respondent's retention of the monies was itself a
continuing unfair practice, and hence the restitution order was prospective
commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970). Any person, partnership, or corporation subject to a cease and desist order may obtain review thereof by filing in a court of appeals

within 60 days from the date of service of the order a written petition to set the
order aside. To the extent the order is affirmed, the court issues its own order
compelling obedience to the affirmed parts of the FTC order. The appellate court
order is subject to review by the Supreme Court upon certiorari. An FTC order
becomes final upon: 1) expiration of the time allowed for filing the petition to
review the FTC order; 2) expiration of the time allowed for filing for certiorari;
3) denial of the petition for certiorari; or 4) expiration of 30 days from the date of
the issuance of the Supreme Court mandate. Any person, partnership, or corporation
who violates a final order is subject to a maximum civil penalty of $10,000 for each
violation. Id. § 45(b).
3. 82 F.T.C. at 669-98. The respondents represented that they would honor
all credit cards used by the customers of their retail-merchant program members.
The merchant members paid a $240 membership fee and a 6% discount fee on all
charges submitted. These members were guaranteed payment within 30 days for the
charges made upon the credit cards whether or not the credit card users paid the
respondents. In fact, the members did not receive payment, for 45 to 75 days and only
if respondents were paid. If respondents were not paid, they would cite 18 contractual
provisions which effectively obviated respondent's obligation to pay. The FTC held
that a reasonable person could not have understood these 18 provisions even if he
or she had read them. Id. at 584. Other misrepresentations included: 1) the program was operated by reputable businessmen who could rely upon $3,000,000 in
corporate assets; 2) the operation was backed by an efficient and intensive collection
agency; and 3) the program was nationally accepted. However, the administrative law
judge found: 1) respondents had a net working capital deficit of more than $25,000,
and their bank accounts never exceeded $99,000; 2) collection procedures were haphazard; and 3) the program was not nationally accepted. Id. at 643.
4. 503 F.2d at 321. The FTC order was issued against Universal Credit
Acceptance Corporation,- Continental Credit Card Corporation, International Credit
Card Corporation, and two officers of Universal and International, John Clifford
Heater, the respondent in the instant case, and Howard P. Gingold. The refund
provisions ran only against Heater, whom the FTC found had completely dominated
the scheme in question, but did not apply to the corporations, who were adjudged
bankrupt, or to Gingold; against whom the evidence did not warrant a refund order.
82 F.T.C. at 676.
5. 503 F.2d at 322. The FTC order prohibited respondents from engaging in
specified deceptive practices in the future and ordered them to provide franchisees
and members with a 7-day cooling-off period, within which to cancel any franchise
application or membership contract. 82 F.T.C. at 669-98.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970). For the language of this section, see text accompanying note 12 infra.
7. 503 F.2d at 322.
8. Id.
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since it was aimed at the continuing failure to refund. 9 In a case of first
impression, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding
that, although the cease and desist order was justified, the refund provision
was to be set aside because the 1914 Act did not grant the FTC the power
to order restitution. Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974).
Since the parameters of the FTC's powers are defined by statute, the
literal language of the 1914 Act is necessarily the starting point in determining the limitations on authority of the FTC.10 The pertinent part of
section 5 provides:
The Commission is empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition in11commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce.
. . . If upon such hearing the Commission -shall be of the opinion
that the method of competition or the act or practice in question is
prohibited .

.

. it shall .

.

. issue .

.

. an order requiring such person,

partnership, or corporation to cease and
desist from using such method
2
of competition or such act or practice.'
While the language of section 5 sanctions the prohibition of future practices,
it does not explicitly empower the FTC to issue any affirmative orders.
Historically, cease and desist orders were wholly negative, directing the
party in question to refrain from engaging in the forbidden activities. Early
3
commentators believed they could do no more.'
However, it has recently been recognized that the FTC possesses the
power to issue two affirmative orders ;14 affirmative disclosures in advertising' 5 and divestiture.' 6 Both affirmative disclosure and divestiture orders
9. Id. The FTC argued that retention of the monies was an unfair practice
because it upset the competitive balance and respondent's practices were patently
fraudulent. Id. See notes 43-45 infra.

10.
11.
12.
13.

FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 428 (1957).
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (6) (1970) (emphasis added).
Id. § 45(b).
See J. W. Kobi Co. v. FTC, 23 F.2d 41, 43 (2d Cir. 1927) ; J. CHAMBERLAIN,
N. DOWLING, & P. HAYS, THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES 142 (1942).

14. 503 F.2d at 323 n.7.
15. L. Heller & Son v. FTC, 191 F.2d 954, 956 (7th Cir. 1951). See, e.g.,
J. B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967), in which the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the FTC's ruling that Geritol advertisements were misleading because
they implied that tiredness was generally caused by an iron deficiency for which
Geritol was recommended. The order required future advertisements which included
such claims to indicate that the great majority of people suffering from fatigue did
not suffer from an iron deficiency, and hence, Geritol would usually prove ineffective.
Id. at 886. For other examples of affirmative disclosures in advertising, see Bantam
Books, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 680 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 819 (1960)
(abridged or retitled versions of original edition books); Keele Hair & Scalp
Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960) (baldness cure) ; Haskelite
Mfg. Corp. v. FTC, 127 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1942) (paper buffet trays which simulated
wood).
16. The United States Supreme Court formerly took the view that the FTC
could not order divestiture for anticompetitive practices which solely violated section
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have met with little opposition because, although affirmative in nature,
they are intended to remedy future unfair or deceptive practices. If affirmative disclosures were not made in the advertising disclosure cases, then
future advertising would be deceptive. In the divestiture cases, it is the
merger,' 7 patent licensing' or monopolization 19 itself which is unfair, and
thus divestiture is the only means of assuring that such violations cease.
Therefore, these two orders are compatible with the statutory scheme in
that they are the only orders capable of ending the unfair practices. 20
In the last several years, in part as a reaction to severe criticism
of its effectiveness, 21 'the FTC has utilized three additional affirmative
orders which are more controversial than the traditional remedies of
affirmative disclosure and divestiture. 22 In recent cases, the FTC has
remedied violations of the Act by ordering: 1) alteration of contracts ;23
2) corrective advertising ;24 and 3) restitution. The Heater decision
5. FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1926). However, in FTC v. Dean
Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 606 n.4 (1966), the Court apparently reversed its earlier
stance.
17. See, e.g., L. G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971).
18. See, e.g., Charles Pfizer & Co. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969).
19. See, e.g., L. G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971).
20. See "Corrective 'Advertising" Orders of the FTC, 85 HARV. L. REV. 477,
491 (1971) (Discussing all types of affirmative orders issued by the FTC) (hereinafter cited as "Corrective Advertising").

21. See

ABA COMMISSION To STUDY
(1969); E. Cox, R. FELLMETH, & J. SCHULZ,
TRADE COMMISSION (1969).

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF

THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

THE CONSUMER AND THE FEDERAL
22. See S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION 618 (3d ed. 1974).

23. FTC orders requiring alteration of a company's standard sales contract have
received the least criticism because they affect future contracts, not past ones. Hence,
it is basically consistent with the two exceptions already judicially recognized. See
D. ROTHSCHILD & D. CARROLL, CONSUMER PROTECTION REPORTING SERVICE § 3.16
(1973) ; Note, The Limits of FTC Power to Issue Consumer Protection Orders, 40
Gro. WASH. L. REV. 496 (1972). This remedy, normally used in situations involving
high-pressure sales tactics, usually consists of giving the purchaser a cooling-off
period (3-7 days) in which he may cancel the contract without penalty. See, e.g.,
Universal Electronics Corp., 78 F.T.C. 265 (1971); Household Sewing Mach. Co., 76
F:T.C. 207 (1969).
24 The legality of the corrective advertising order has been much debated. For
arguments that the FTC has the authority to order corrective advertising, see
"Corrective Advertising", supra note 20; Corrective Advertising and the FTC: No
Virginia, Wonder Bread Doesn't Help Build Strong Bodies Twelve Ways, 70 MICH.
L. REV. 374 (1971). For arguments that the FTC does not possess such authority,
see Lemke, Souped Up Afirmative Disclosure Orders of the Federal Trade Commission, 4 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 180 (1970) ; Rushefsky, FTC Section 5 Powers
and the Pfizer-Cyanamid Inbroglio: Where Do We Go From Here, or "You Ain't
Seen Nothing Yet," 18 CATH. U.L. REV. 335 (1969); Note, The Limits of FTC
Power to Issue Consumer ProtectionOrders, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 496, 525 (1972).
The purpose of this order is to correct the image of the product which was
created by the advertising prior to the issuance of the cease and desist order. "Corrective Advertising", supra note 20, at 491. The FTC has generally considered that
corrective advertising is needed for three reasons: 1) once consumer purchasing habits
are formed, they endure unless strong countermeasures are taken; 2) if this false
image is not eliminated, then deception will continue; and 3) it is necessary to restore
the competitive balance in the market which was disturbed initially by respondent's
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focuses upon the remedy of restitution, the most controversial of the
new orders. 25
The restitution order, which requires refunding any monies obtained
by the unfair practices, 26 has developed steadily since Windsor Distributing
Co.2 7 where it was used to remedy numerous misrepresentations which
occurred in the advertisement and sale of vending machines. 28 The FTC
order in that case, affirmed by the Third Circuit, required the respondents
to cease and desist from making such representations and, further, to
refund monies to some categories of customers 29 who purchased defendant's
machines subsequent to the FTC order. 30
A second stage of development occurred a year later in Curtis Publishing Co.3 1 in which the FTC asserted its power to order respondents
deceptive practices. Id. at 494-95. For example, in Campbell Soup, 77 F.T.C. 664
(1970), the respondent advertised its soup on television by placing marbles in the
bottom of the soup, thereby forcing the stock to rise to the top and creating the
impression for the consumer that the soup contained more stock than was true. The
corrective advertising order would have been aimed at correcting this false image in
the mind of the consumer. Id. at 668. However, since there was no evidence offered
to prove residual influences on consumer preferences, the FTC did not order corrective
advertising in Campbell Soup.
In a recent case, Warner-Lambert Co., No. 8891 (F.T.C., Dec. 9, 1975),
the FTC ordered the Warner-Lambert Co. "to include a statement in the next $10.2
million worth of Listerine ads - about one year's budget - that 'contrary to prior
advertising, Listerine will not help prevent colds or sore throats or lessen their
severity.'" TIME, Jan. 5, 1976, at 73.
Although there are several variations, the typical corrective advertising order
directs an advertiser who has engaged in false, misleading, or deceptive advertising
not only to cease and desist but to disclose those facts misrepresented in its prior
advertising and, usually for a 1-year period, to devote 25% of its future advertising
to that end. See, e.g., ITT Cont. Banking, 79 F.T.C. 248, 255 (1971); Thain,
Corrective Advertising: Theory and Cases, 19 N.Y.L.F. 1 (1973). As of this writing,
no appellate court has reviewed the legality of a corrective advertising order.
25. The reason that restitution is the most controversial order is that, unlike
the others, it provides for the transfer of monies from private parties, notwithstanding
the respondent's claim that such transfer has retroactive effect.
26. One commentator has argued that the FTC has the power to order restitution.
Sebert, Obtaining Monetary Redress for Consumers Through Action by the Federal
Trade Commission, 57 MINN. L. REV. 225 (1972). But see Rothschild and Carroll,
supra note 23; Note, The Limits of FTC Power to Issue Consumer Protection Orders,
supra note 24.
27. 77 F.T.C. 204 (1970), aff'd per curiam, 437 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1971).
28. 77 F.T.C. at 217, 222.
29. Id. at 222. The pertinent part of the order read as follows:
Refund immediately all monies to (1) customers who have requested contract
cancellation in writing within three days from the execution thereof, (2) customers
who have refused to sign statements indicating satisfaction with respondents'
placement of the machines, and (3) customers showing that respondents' contract,
solicitations or performance were attended by or involved violations of any of
the provisions of this order.

Id.
30. Therefore, the refund remedy was unavailable to those buyers who purchased
before the FTC issued its order. Such orders have been previously employed where a
consumer has ordered merchandise which he or she never received. Footware Assoc.,
40 F.T.C. 654 (1945) (order to return downpayments) ; Interstate Home Equip. Co.,
40 F.T.C. 260 (1945) (order to return deposits or payments).
31. 78 F.T.C. 1472 (1971).
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to refund monies which were obtained prior to the issuance of the cease
and desist order by the FTC.3

2

Counsel argued in support of the com-

plaint that it was an unfair practice for the publishing company to cancel
subscriptions to the Saturday Evening Post while offering a substitute
magazine without notifying subscribers of their right to a refund. 3 The
proposed order required, inter alia, respondents to notify former subscribers
that they were entitled to a refund for any portion of their subscription
not expired when the Saturday Evening Post ceased publication. 4 While
the FTC declined to order restitution on the facts of Curtis, 5 it did posit
two criteria to determine whether restitution should be ordered as constituting prospective relief.3 6 Restitution was deemed appropriate either
where necessary to dissipate the anticompetitive effects of the unlawful
conduct 3 7 or where retention of monies which had been received due to

unlawful conduct was an unfair trade practice in and of itself.38 These
were the criteria which the FTC applied in Heater to justify entering a
cease and desist order requiring restitution for practices which occurred
prior to the order.
The Ninth Circuit, the first appellate court to consider the validity of
a restitution order, 9 began its analysis by noting that the 1914 Act granted
the FTC broad powers in defining unfair practices. 40 However, although
admitting that such a construction was not implausible, 41 the court rejected
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 1512.
Id. at 1510.
Id at 1508-09.
Id. at 1520. The individual Commissioners offered different reasons for denial.

Commissioner Dixon felt that restitution was inappropriate because: 1) there was no
indication that other magazine publishers were disadvantaged by respondent's retention
of the monies; 2) the section 5 violation was not of such magnitude to justify restitution; 3) the publisher made a good faith effort to substitute comparable magazines;
and 4) the subscription costs were only a small fraction of the total cost of publishing
the magazine. These four factors negated any suggestion of unjust enrichment. Id.
at 1518-20. Commissioners Dennison and Jones felt that due to respondent's precarious financial condition, refunds would have been untenable since secured creditors
would have taken respondent to bankruptcy court. They concluded, therefore, that
the subscribers were not prejudiced. Id. at 1520-24.
36. Id. at 1515-17.
37. Id. at 1515-16. The Commission noted that the need would arise where the
seller was placed in a more favorable competitive position due to his action or where
the seller obtained substantial amounts of money through his deceptive practices and
competitors suffered corresponding losses. The remedy of restitution was analogized
to the divestiture cases. Id.; see note 43 infra.
38. Id. at 1516-17. The commission offered the following examples: 1) where a
purchaser paid in advance for goods never received; 2) where a purchaser paid in
advance and then received another product which he or she refused to accept; and
3) where due to the seller's fraud the consumer received something of token value
or no value at all. Id. at 1516.
39. Prior to Heater, several consent decrees which provided for a restitution
remedy had been entered into between respondents and the FTC. See, e.g., Union
Mort. Co., 80 F.T.C. 427 (1972) (violating the Truth in Lending Act).
40. 503 F.2d at 322.
41. Id. at 323. The court, however, did note that this was the first time in the
1914 Act's 60-year existence that the FTC argued before an appellate court that the
FTC possessed such power. Id. at 326. Conceding that the nonuse of a power does
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the FTC's extension of an unfair trade practice to include the secondary
effects of the violation. 42 Thus, the court's opinion left the FTC without
power to restore the competitive balance,43 to deter future violations 44 or
to remedy the defendant's worthless program 45 since these were viewed
merely as the secondary effects of the respondent's principal violation of
the Act. The court reasoned that a limiting construction was justified
by the language of the Act, its legislative purpose, and the undesirable
impact of a contrary construction.

46

While admitting that in some situations the Commission had the power
to order affirmative action, 47 the court viewed the common connotation
of a cease and desist order as essentially negative, 48 a power to restrain
further violations rather than a power to compel affirmative remedies,
49
except in very limited circumstances.
In addition to determining that the FTC contention distorted the
common connotation of the Act's language, the court reasoned that any
expansion of the FTC's power to include affirmative action would contravene congressional intent, evidenced in the Act's legislative history,

not compel its nonexistence, the court quoted other courts, commentators, and congressional members whose statements indicated that the FTC did not possess the
power to order restitution. Id. "'[T]he effect of the Commissions order is not to
punish or to fasten liability on respondents for past conduct but to ban specific
practices for the future in accordance with the general mandate of Congress.'" Id. at
326, quoting FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 706 (1948). See note 57 infra.
42. 503 F.2d at 323.
43. 82 F.T.C. at 651-52. The FTC reasoned that, since the respondents competed with the credit card issuers themselves, the funds obtained by the fraud would
enable the respondents to further their competitive advantage. The public would be
deprived of placing the funds in legitimate business activities, and honest businessmen
would be placed at a continuing disadvantage. The FTC, therefore, viewed restitution
as analogous to divestiture in that the respondents must relinquish their illegal
acquisitions in order to rectify the distorted market place. Id.
44. Id. at 653. The FTC contended that if the presence of the Act itself did not
prevent the respondents from employing this fraud, an order which merely prohibited
them from engaging in similar frauds in the future would probably result in no
deterrent effect. However, if the respondents knew that they could not profit from
their acts, then they would be more likely to refrain from such activities. Id.
45. Id. at 649-51. The FTC argued that respondent's program was totally
worthless in that businessmen paid for a service which was never delivered and,
therefore, if no refund was ordered, justice would be thwarted and the free enterprise
system corrupted. Id.

46. 503 F.2d at 324-26.
47. Id. at 323 n.7. The court cited cases affirming divestiture and affirmative
advertising disclosure orders. Id., citing FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 606
n.4, L. G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971), J. B. Williams Co. v.
FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967), and American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d
757 (6th Cir. 1966). However, the court distinguished those types of orders on the
basis of fair notice considerations. See notes 50-51 and accompanying text infra.
48. 503 F.2d at 323.
49. The court stated that adoption of the FTC position would result in the
authorization of restitution in all cases since the three factors relied upon by the
FTC are present in every case. Id. at 323 n.6. Further, the same position would
support the imposition of punitive sanctions and the awarding of damages, powers
the FTC conceded that it did not possess. Id.
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that the FTC be designed for educational, not punitive purposes. 50 It
was further stated by the court that such a construction would disrupt the
congressional attempt to reconcile the FTC's broad power to define unfair
practices with the due process concepts of prior notice as to what conduct
is unlawful."
The court's interpretation of the legislative history may be challenged,
particularly with regard to the need for prior notice. The court opined
that Congress had limited the FTC's remedies to cease and desist orders
for the express purpose of protecting businessmen from liability for conduct
which had only recently been declared unlawful under the FTC's broad
power to define unfair practices. 52 However, it is at least equally probable
that Congress gave the FTC such broad definitional powers because of the
difficulty of drafting a statute with a sufficient enumeration of all possible
offenses and that Congress was more concerned with preventing circumvention of the statute than with the problems of notice.53 Thus, the legislative history need not be read as requiring a reconciliation of the FTC's
broad powers with due process requirements. In any event, even if such
a reconciliation is required, a remedy for damages prior to the issuance
of the cease and desist order is not necessarily precluded since notice could
54
often be implied from the nature of respondent's activity.
50. Id. at 323. The court determined that the impact of the refund order upon
the respondent would be economically devastating and that Congress was unwilling
to subject a business to such a risk of subsequent FTC condemnation. Id. at 325.
51. Id. at 324. While recognizing the FTC's power to issue an affirmative order
in the divestiture and affirmative disclosure cases, the court distinguished a restitution
order as beyond FTC power on the ground that respondents had no fair notice of
what conduct was illegal, since the Act's language was so broad. Id. at 324-25 n.13
The Ninth Circuit listed several reasons for reading a notice requirement into the
statute. First, there was concern expressed in the legislative history that businessmen
would be unable to determine in advance whether a particular business practice was
illegal. Second, an amendment which would have allowed a private suit based upon
an FTC finding of illegality had been specifically rejected by Congress. Third,
attaching consequences to prior acts would be inconsistent with the FTC's purpose of
educating the business community by developing a body of administrative law. Id.
at 324. Finally, the court noted that the FTC's structure, in that it acted as both
judge and prosecutor in the administrative proceeding, was more appropriate for an
agency acting for the benefit of the public generally rather than adjudicating the
private rights of individuals. Id. at 325.
It should be noted that the holding in Heater encompasses all restitution
orders which require refunds for practices occurring prior to the issuance of the cease
and desist order. If the court's rationale is limited to fair notice considerations,
refunds for practices occurring subsequent to the issuance of the cease and desist
order would certainly be permitted. However, if the Heater decision is partially based
upon the theory that the FTC should not award damages to private parties even
restitution orders applying to future practices may be forbidden; the FTC's remedies
would then be limited to the imposition of sanctions for violations of its order.
52. Id. at 323.
53. This seems to have been the real concern of Congress at the time as demonstrated by the court's own citation of the Act's legislative history. Id. at 322-23
n.5, citing S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914), and H.R. REP. No. 1142,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914).
54. The instant case would be a typical case where notice could be implied,
since the respondent's sale of a totally worthless program was so patently unfair and
deceptive as to preclude any colorable argument that they were not violations of
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In view of the inconclusiveness of the legislative history 5 and the
ambiguity of the Act's language,5 6 the court's failure to discuss the relatively numerous United States Supreme Court cases in this area is puzzling.
The Supreme Court has developed one basic test to determine the validity
of an FTC remedy: Does the remedy selected have a "reasonable relation
to the unlawful practices found to exist" ? 7 In applying such a test, the
nature and character of the unfair practice must be considered.58 In detersection 5. In connection with Heater, the FTC argued that respondent's practices
were not merely technical violations of section 5 but rather a "bunco" operation.
503 F.2d at 322 n.4. The Ninth Circuit said that no distinction was recognized by
Congress and that common law remedies remained available for exceptional violations.
Id. at 325 n.15. However, other facets of the law recognize this distinction between
patent and nonpatent violations. In the closely related field of antitrust, a businessman
has only the language of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970)), to rely upon,
and this is no more concrete than the language of section 5 of the FTC Act. For
example, section 1 of the Sherman Act provides:
every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is hereby declared to be illegal ....
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). See e.g., Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1912) (antitrust).
In the obscenity field a similarly vague standard is applied. See Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973), wherein the Court held that obscenity is to be determined by
applying contemporary community standards, and established three basic guidelines for
the trier of fact:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest ....
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
Id. at 24, citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972), and quoting Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
55. Despite the court's reliance upon the legislative history, several commentators
have argued that the legislative reports and debates will support any construction of
section 5. See Handler, The Jurisdictionof the Federal Trade Commission Over False
Advertising, 31 COLUM. L. Rav. 527, 531 (1931) ; Sebert, supra note 26, at 270.
The Ninth Circuit quoted from the legislative history of the then proposed
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15
Magnuson-Moss Warranty U.S.C.A. § 576 (Pamphlet No. 1, Feb., 1975), to show that the FTC lacked the
power in question: "'At the present time cease and desist orders have prospective
application only and afford no specific consumer redress to consumers already injured.'" 503 F.2d at 326, quoting S. REP. No. 269, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1971).
However, a more complete reading in the context of the appropriate section shows
that Congress did not eliminate the possibility that the FTC might have restitutionary
authority:
This section would not affect whatever power the Commission may have under
section 5 to fashion relief in its initial cease-and-desist order, such as corrective
advertising or any other remedy, which may be appropriate to terminate effectively
unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
(emphasis added). The legislative
S. REP. No. 269, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1971)
history is clarified further in the conference report adopting the final bill. See note
87 and accompanying text infra.
56. See 503 F.2d at 324 n.13.
57. Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 613 (1946). See FTC v. National
Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 429 (1957) ; FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952).
58. Erickson v. FTC, 272 F.2d 318, 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
940 (1960). In Erickson, respondent advertised hair treatments while misrepresenting
their efficacy. The court held that FTC order prohibiting advertisements of "any
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mining whether there is a reasonable relationship between the unfair
practice and the FTC's chosen remedy, the courts have placed great
weight upon the FTC findings, reasoning that the expertise of the FTC, 59
and the broad mandate granted by Congress, afforded the Commission
special powers in the Act's enforcement.60 Thus, it might be argued that
traditional judicial deference to the FTC's choices of remedies compels
the conclusion that the authority of the FTC includes the power to order
restitution if the Commission deems that to be the most appropriate remedy
on a particular set of facts."' While the Supreme Court announced these
principles in cases dealing with injunctive decrees, 62 neither logic nor precedent confines the rationale of these cases to orders granting prospective
relief.
However, the reasonable relation test may in fact be a necessary relation test. The cases in which the Supreme Court has overturned the
FTC's choice of remedy have been those where the FTC had failed to
consider less harsh, alternative relief.63 If the test is so qualified, then
other, less severe forms of redress should have been considered by the
FTC in Heater. Orders need not be limited to the precise form of the
violation but may be framed so as to prevent easy circumvention. 4 One
alternative, for example, would have been to forbid the respondent from
engaging in similar activities. However, if the unfair practice is viewed
as the continuing failure to refund, it would seem that a restitution order
bears not only a reasonable relation to the unlawful activities but a necessary one as well, since a prohibition with respect to future activities could
not arrest a present violation. 65 Furthermore, if the order is aimed at the
other preparations for use in the treatment of hair and scalp conditions" bore a
reasonable relation to the practice in question. Id.
59. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952), wherein the Court stated
that the FTC is the expert in designing forms of redress and Congress expected the
FTC "to exercise a special competence in formulating remedies." Id.
60. Jacob .Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611-13 (1946), wherein the Court
stated that since Congress vested the FTC with such wide discretion, courts should
not lightly modify an FTC order. Id. at 613.
61. One commentator has suggested that the courts' deference to the FTC's choice
of remedy has approached the same deference afforded to the FTC's discretion in
defining an unfair practice. Sebert, supra note 26, at 231. See also Wade & Kamenshine, Restitution for Defrauded Consumers: Making the Remedy Effective Through
Suit by Governmental Agency, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1031, 1058 (1969).
62. For example, the proposed order in Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608
(1946), merely banned the use of respondent's trade name "Alpacuna" on respondent's
coats because its use was deceptive since the coats did not contain any vicuna. Id.
at 610 n.1. In FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952), the respondents were
merely required to stop their price discrimination activities. Id. at 472.
63. See Magniflo Co. v. FTC, 343 F.2d 318 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ; Elliot Knitwear,
Inc. v. FTC, 266 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1959). In Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608
(1946), for example, the Court remanded the case so that the circuit court could
decide, "whether some change of name short of excision would in the judgment
of the Commission be adequate," since such a remedy had not been considered by
the FTC in drafting its original order. Id. at 613.
64. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473-75 (1952).
65. One commentator has suggested that a restitution order is the least severe
redress where the unfair practice is defined as the continuing failure to refund since
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continuing failure to refund, then, arguably, it is prospective, contrary to
6
the Heater court's characterization. G
A further argument against allowing FTC restitution orders could
be based upon the Supreme Court's holding that cease and desist orders
may not be compensatory or punitive, 67 but, as one commentator has argued,
a restitution order is in fact neither:
The former [compensatory damages] is intended to place the plaintiff
in as good a position as if the contract had been performed, while
the latter [restitution] is intended only to reverse unjust enrichment
and restore the status quo by requiring the defendant to disgorge only
those benefits he had directly received from the plaintiff. A penalty
normally connotes a payment required irrespective of or in addition
to any actual loss incurred, whereas a restitution order would merely
return to injured persons money or property of theirs that respondent
had improperly retained."
Assuming, therefore, that judicial precedent permits the conclusion that
the FTC is statutorily authorized to issue restitution orders, section 5's
jurisdictional requirement that the action be in the public interest does not
dictate a contrary result.69 One commentator has observed that FTC orders
have rarely been overturned due to a lack of public interest, even where
the complaints have been trivial ;70 where such orders have been reversed,
it was only because no substantial injury to the public had been shown. 71
Therefore, if a substantial section of the public will be affected, the re72
quirement that the action taken be in the public interest is fulfilled.
Heater seems to meet such a requirement since 6,000 merchants and over
$1,000,000 were involved, and the whole cost of the transaction had ob73
viously been passed on to the consumer.
Similarly, the court's fear that acceptance of the FTC's reasons for
the need for restitution orders would allow restitution is every case ignores
the gradations of violative conduct reviewed by the FTC. For example,
in a bait-and-switch scheme, although the consumer is deceived, he or she
this would be practically the only way to terminate unfair practice. Sebert, supra
note 26, at 232. In Heater, the FTC argued that this was the only order which
could effectively halt the unlawful practices. 503 F.2d at 322.

66. 503 F.2d at 324.
67. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333
U.S. 683, 706 (1948).
68. Sebert, sopra note 26, at 239. See note 88 infra.
69. 503 F.2d at 325-26. The Act itself requires the FTC proceeding to be "in
the interest of the public." 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).
70. Sebert, supra note 26, at 236, citing Posner, The Federal Trade Commission,
37 U. Cal. L. REv. 47, 71-77 (1969).
71. Sebert, supra note 26, at 236.
72. Id. at 237. As evolved, the test is whether the matter is too trivial to justify
FTC intervention. In practice, it is simply an internal screening device of the FTC
and courts simply rubberstamp FTC decisions in deference to its expertise. Id. at
236.

73. 82 F.T.C. at 649.
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loses nothing of value; in such a situation restitution would seem inappropriate.7 4 Furthermore, the FTC has already demonstrated that it does not
view restitution as a panacea for all violations. For example, in Credit
Card Service Corp.,7 5 respondents sold insurance which would reimburse
the insured for any liability in excess of $50 incurred on lost or stolen
credit cards. Respondents failed to disclose that the maximum liability for
such cards, as fixed by Federal law, 76 was $50. The FTC, citing Curtis,
held for the respondent, reasoning that the program was not totally
worthless because people could still be liable for $50 on each card and
therefore those with more than one card were purchasing a service of
77
some value.
Finally, one may dispute the court's contention that there is uniformity
in prevailing views regarding the FTC's lack of power to order restitution.78 Although some decisions do support the Ninth Circuit's limited
view of the Commission's power, others imply that administrative agencies
possess the broad powers of an equity court 79 - a split of opinion also
reflected by the commentators.8 " Likewise, it is misleading to cite the
congressional statements as supporting the proposition that restitution
power does not exist, since most of these statements have been made in
reference to legislation including provisions for money damages as well as
for restitution. 81
One possible effect of the instant decision will be the appeal to the
circuit courts of more FTC orders which incorporate restitution. Respondents, who otherwise might have been disposed to entering a consent
decree, will be encouraged to appeal these orders in the hopes of finding
a court which sympathizes with the Heater decision. However, this
prospect is mitigated by two factors. First, the Heater decision rests upon
uncertain ground, and second, respondents might incur substantial legal
fees in making the appeal. Still, Heater remains sufficient incentive for
respondents to refrain from entering into consent orders providing for
74. Sebert, supra note 26, at 250. This assumes that the purchase price equaled
the current market value of the product actually received. To determine the appropriateness of a restitution order, Sebert proposed a nine-factor test based upon the
totality of circumstances. These nine factors are: 1) nature of the offense; 2) gravity
of the offense; 3) the victims; 4) amount of individual loss; 5) anti-competitive
effects of respondent's unfair acts; 6) effect on the respondent; 7) difficulties of proof
and administration; 8) delay; and 9) FTC resources. Id. at 253-56. Sebert specifically stated, however, that this was not intended to be an exhaustive list of all
factors which might be considered. Id. at 253.
75. 82 F.T.C. 191 (1973).
76. Truth in Lending Act, § 502(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1970).
77. 82 F.T.C. at 207-09, citing Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F.T.C. 1472 (1971).
78. 503 F.2d at 326; see note 41 supra.
79. See, e.g., FTC v. Sperry and Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) ; Pan
Am. World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 312 n.17 (1963).
80. See note 26 supra.
81. Sebert, supra note 26, at 230. In any event, it is impossible to say which
remedies Congress was implicitly rejecting when it rejected the whole package.
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restitution since the most unfavorable result would be an FTC restitution
order being upheld.8 2
The principal direct effect of the Heater decision will be in its preclusion of the FTC's acting as the representative for all injured consumers
seeking restitution.8 3 As a result, injured parties will have to bring a suit
under the common law. If the individual claim is too small to justify
bringing suit or the putative respondent's behavior was not sufficiently
inculpatory to be actionable under common law8 4 the injury will remain
85
unredressed.
However, Heater must be considered in light of the Magnuson-Moss
warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act 80 (1975 Act)
which was enacted by Congress 4 months after the Heater decision. The
7
1975 Act permits the FTC to obtain restitution by means of a civil suit,8
82. Consent orders are negotiated between the respondent and the FTC. Therefore, where respondents are able to obtain significantly lower refund orders than they
would be liable for if the FTC issued a formal cease and desist order, respondents
might be influenced to sign the consent order even if there is a substantial chance of
reversal on appeal.
83. Wall Street Journal, Jan. 20, 1975, at 24, col. 2.
84. It is substantially more difficult to show that a person's actions amount to a
breach of contract than it is to show a violation of the FTC Act, which merely
requires that the practices be unfair or deceptive. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970). For
example, in the instant case, although respondent's actions were clearly within section
5 and may even have been fraudulent (see note 54 supra), there was no breach of
contract. See note 3 supra. Furthermore, under section 5 there is no need to prove
reliance upon respondent's representations, an essential element in a common law action
for rescission of a contract obtained by fraud. Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 326 n.17
(9th Cir. 1974).
85. Of course, the FTC can still provide injunctive relief through a cease and
desist order. See note 2 supra.
86. 15 U.S.C.A. § 57b (Pamphlet No. 1, Feb., 1975).
87. Id. § 57b(a) (2). The 1975 Act authorizes the FTC to bring a civil action
in a federal district court which may, upon a finding that the respondent as a reasonable person should have known that the practices in question were dishonest or
fraudulent, order such relief as is necessary to redress the injury. Id. The 1975 Act,
however, does not dispose of the question of the scope of the FTC's powers with
regard to its own cease and desist orders. The House Committee on Commerce
noted :
The section [of the 1975 Act] is intended to supplement the ability of the Commission to redress consumer and other injury resulting from violations of its
rules or of section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act and is not intended to modify or limit any existing power the Commission may have to
itself issue orders designed to remedying violations of the law. That issue is now
before the courts. It is not the intent of the Conferees to influence the outcome in
any way.
H.R. REP. No. 1606, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1974).
The 1975 Act permits other remedies in addition to mere restitution, providing
in pertinent part:
The Court .
shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the court finds necessary to redress injury . . . resulting from . . . the unfair or deceptive act or
practice ....
Such relief may include, but shall not be limited to, rescission or

reformation of contracts, the refund of money or return of property, the payment
of damages, and public notification respecting the . . . unfair or deceptive act
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but it also imposes a different standard of liability in the civil actions: a
business or individual is only liable for those practices which a reasonable
person would have known were dishonest or fraudulant58 This is a higher
standard than that established by section 5 of the 1914 Act: practices which
are unfair or deceptive or amount to unfair methods of competition. Therefore, the FTC's power to obtain restitution by the 1975 Act's procedure may
be limited. If that is correct, Heater represents a substantial impediment
to consumer protection since restitution will be precluded under the 1914
Act, and available only in limited circumstances under the 1975 Act.
Furthermore, common- law remedies do not present a viable alternative
to the aggrieved consumer.8 9
It is not unreasonable to assume that the Supreme Court would agree
with the Heater result. The Court, reflecting its current conservative composition, seems to have entered a new era, reversing certain trends established in the antitrust ° and unfair competition areas 9' by the Warren
or practice . .. except that nothing in this subsection is intended to authorize
the imposition of any exemplary or punitive damages.
15 U.S.C.A. § 576(b) (Pamphlet No. 1, Feb., 1975) (emphasis added).

For example, on the facts of Heater,a restitution order would merely force the

respondents to disgorge the benefits received from the victims. Therefore, the maximum liability would be the $240 membership fees and the 6% service charge for each
member. However, since compensatory damages are framed so as to give the injured
party the benefit of his or her bargain, members could recover damages in the amount
of any charges made on credit cards which he honored, but for which he was never
paid - a substantial increase in respondent's liability.
88. The 1975 Act provides:
If the Commission satisfies the court that the act or practice to which the cease
and desist order relates is one which a reasonable man would have known under
the circumstances was dishonest or fraudulent, the court may grant relief .
15 U.S.C.A. § 57b(a) (2) (Pamphlet No. 1, Feb., 1975).
89. See notes 83-85 and accompanying text supra.
90. McGee, The Burger Court Looks at the Antitrust Laws: A New Approach?,
BARRISTER, Winter, 1975, at 21. Mr. McGee asserted that "the only consistent thread
throughout the Warretp Court's merger opinions, [was] 'the government always wins.'"
Id. at 21, citing United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (dissenting opinion). McGee then suggests that the Burger Court has developed a more
realistic merger policy and that no longer is there a preordained result in merger
cases heard by the Supreme Court. Id. at 22. See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974) (horizontal bank merger) ; United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974) (horizontal coal mining merger).
91. In 1964, the Supreme Court decided two cases which established the SearsCompco doctrine. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiff el Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). Sears-Compco held that
a state unfair competition law could not protect an unpatented design from being
copied since state protection was preempted in this area by Federal patent law. However, in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), the Court held that
state trade secret protection was not preempted by Federal patent law. In a dissenting
opinion, Justice Douglas stated: "Today's decision is at war with the philosophy of
Sears . . . Compco . . . ." Id. at 495 (emphasis added) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (state protection afforded to sound
recordings not preempted by federal copyright laws). See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp
Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974), wherein the Burger Court limited the jurisdiction
of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970), to purely interstate commerce,
thus excluding those intrastate activities which merely "affect" commerce. But cf.
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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Court. Therefore, it is not unlikely that, if confronted with the Heater
problem, the Court would narrowly define the FTC's remedial power.
Perhaps because of a possible negative decision by the Court, or
perhaps because of the passage of the 1975 Act, the FTC has decided not
to appeal Heater.92 If that decision was influenced by the 1975 Act, it does
not appear to be well-reasoned since, as noted previously, the FTC's power
to obtain restitution orders under the 1975 Act may be limited. Furthermore, common sense dictates the conclusion that the FTC would rather
order restitution through its own cease and desist order, rather than be
forced to bring a civil suit in a federal district court. Therefore, no matter
how the 1975 Act is interpreted, the Heater issue is not moot.
Gary Goldman

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

- AGGRAVATION OF WORK-RELATED
INJURY BY NEGLIGENT MEDICAL CARE PROVIDED BY EMPLOYER'S INSURANCE CARRIER Is NOT INJURY OCCURRING IN THE COURSE OF
EMPLOYMENT AND THEREFORE INSURER IS POTENTIALLY LIABLE AS
A THIRD PARTY TORTFEASOR.

Tropiano v. Travelers Insurance Co. (Pa. 1974)
Plaintiff was injured while working for a company which held a
workmen's compensation insurance policy with defendant.' After receiving
treatment from his own physician for several months, the plaintiff was
ordered by the defendant to accept treatment, first concurrently, and then
exclusively from one of its own physicians. 2 During the course of this
treatment plaintiff's condition became progressively worse and finally,
approximately 15 months after the original accident, the defendant refused to
3
furnish the plaintiff with further medical care. Although the plaintiff was
92. ANTITRUST

AND TRADE REG. REP.

No. 699 (Feb. 4, 1975).

1. Tropiano v. Travelers Ins. Co., 455 Pa. 360, 361, 319 A.2d 426, 427 (1974).
2. Brief for Appellant at 4. At the time of this suit, the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act (Act) impliedly left the selection of a physician to the
employer since the employee was bound to accept all reasonable care offered by the
employer or lose all rights to compensation for any injury or increased incapacity
which might result from such refusal. Law of Dec. 31, 1965, No. 512, 33, [1965] Pa.
Laws 1286.
In 1972, the Act was amended to allow the employee to select his own physician unless his employer submits to him a list of five doctors from which to choose.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 531 (Supp. 1975).
3. Brief for Appellant at 4.
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receiving compensation from the defendant for his disability4 pursuant to
an agreement under the'Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, 5 the
plaintiff brought an action in tort against the insurer, alleging, inter alia,
that the insurer was liable for "negligence arising out of [the] medical
treatment." 6 At trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, defendant's motion for summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings
was granted, apparently on the grounds that, since the Pennsylvania
Workmen's Compensation Act (Act) expressly gives all defenses and
immunities available to an employer to his insurance carrier7 and the Act
is the sole remedy as between employer and employee for injuries in the
course of employment, 8 the present common law action was barred.9 The
Pennsylvania Superior Court, as it was equally divided, affirmed. 10 However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur and reversed,
holding that because the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act only
applies to injuries received during the course of employment, the employer's
immunity could not protect the insurer where the aggravation of the
employee's injuries occurred subsequent to and independently of the originally work-related injury. Tropiano v. Travelers Insurance Co., 455 Pa.
360, 319 A.2d 426 (1974).
Generally, at common law, an injured employee had the right to sue
whomever was responsible for a Work-related injury, including his employer
4. Plaintiff's left arm and shoulder were injured by the initial accident and
subsequent treatment. Brief for Appellee at 2.
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 1 et seq. (1952).
6. 455 Pa. at 633, 319 A.2d at 427. Plaintiff's complaint contained five allegations:
1. Interference with doctor-patient relationship of plaintiff and his first
physician.
2. Interference with medical judgments.
3. Ordering its own physician to stop treating plaintiff.
4. Negligence in selecting a competent physician.
5. Malpractice liability on the basis of respondeatsuperior.
Tropiano v. Travelers Ins. Co., 227 Pa. Super. 487, 489 n.1, 303 A.2d 515, 516 n.1
(1973). Interestingly, while the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania focused on plaintiff's
last two allegations, it was the first three which plaintiff considered as his primary
theories of recovery. Brief for Appellant at 9.
In addition to the instant suit, plaintiff instituted actions in Pennsylvania
against his own doctor, defendant's doctor, and the Presbyterian Hospital of Philadelphia for medical malpractice and filed similar actions against defendant and its
doctor in New York. All of these suits were held in abeyance pending the outcome
of the present action. Brief for Appellee at 3.
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 501 (Supp. 1975). Section 501 reads in pertinent part:
"[The] insurer . . .shall be entitled to all of the employer's immunities and protection . . . ." Id.

8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 481 (1952). Section 481 provides in pertinent part:
[An agreement under the Act] shall ... operate as a surrender by the parties
thereto of their rights'to any form or amount of compensation or damages for
any injury or death occurring in the course of employment, or to any method of
determination thereof ....

Id.
9. 227 Pa. Super. at 491; 303 A.2d at 516.
10. Tropiano v. Travelers Ins. Co., 227 Pa. Super. 487, 303 A.2d 515 (1973).
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or coworker." However, prosecution of such an action was far from easy.
First, a plaintiff had the difficult burden of proving that his employer was
guilty of negligence. Then, the defendant was permitted to assert such
potent affirmative defenses as contributory negligence,' 2 assumption of
risk,' 3 and the fellow servant doctrine. 14 Furthermore, even if a judgment
were obtained, a defendant's lack of assets often made recovery a practical
impossibility. As a result, many injured employees often became burdens
upon the state because they had been inadequately compensated.' 5
Faced with this problem, which was aggravated by the increased
dangers of the industrial revolution, state legislatures began passing workmen's compensation statutes in the early 20th century in order to more
fairly distribute the burden of work-related accidents. 16 The object of these
statutes was to require the employer and, through him, the ultimate consumer of the product or service to share the costs of work-related injuries.17
In practice, an employee injured at work is automatically entitled to
compensation regardless of his own fault. In exchange for this imposition

of strict liability on the employer, the employee relinquishes his common

law right to sue' 8 for all but intentional torts;19 a right which could
potentially bring a worker a higher recovery than the fixed payment
11. See generally S. HoRovITz, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS (1944); 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS §§ 4.00

et seq. (1975) [hereinafter cited as LARSON]; W. PROSSm, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 80 (4th ed. 1971).

12. See, e.g., Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R.&P. Ry., 220 U.S. 590, 596 (1911).
13. See, e.g., O'Maley v. South Boston Gas Light Co., 158 Mass. 135, 139, 32
N.E. 1119, 1121 (1893).
14. See, e.g., Farwell v. Boston & W.RR., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49, 59 (1842).
Under the fellow servant rule, an employer who has exercised due care in the hiring
of employees is not liable for injuries caused to one employee by the negligence of
another employee engaged in the same general business. Id.
15. It has been estimated that as many as 80% of the suits brought for workrelated injuries were lost outright and of the remaining 20%, the lawyers fees and
doctors bills ate up a substantial amount of the employee's recovery. Horovitz, Current
Trends in Basic Principles of Workmen's Compensation, 20 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 1, 3
(1947). Further, before the 20th century the predicament of an uncompensated
injured employee was often quite grave because income-maintenance programs
were virtually non-existent. See, G. CooPER, C. BERG;ER, P. DODYK, M. PAULSEN, P.
SCHRAG & M.

SOVERN,

CASES

AND MATERIALS

ON

LAW AND

POVERTY

7-36 (2d

ed. 1973).
16. Horovitz, supra note 15, at 30.
17. S. HOROVITZ, supra note 11, at 6; LARSON, supra note 11, § 4.00; W. PROSSER,
supra note 11, at 530; Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation,
37 CORNELL L.Q. 206, 209 (1951); Risenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Compensation
for Industrial Accidents Here and Abroad, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 531, 532 (1954);
Risenfeld, Forty Years of American Workmen's Compensation, 35 MINN. L. REv.
525, 529-32 (1951) ; Note, Workmen's Compensation Acts: Their Theory and Their
Constitutionality, 25 HARV. L. REv. 129, 130 (1911).
18. Though in most states employers and employees must voluntarily agree to the
application of the workmen's compensation act, such agreement can be implied. See,
e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 431 (1952). However, in some states the workmen's
compensation act is compulsory, at least as to some classes of employers and employees. See, e.g., Bartram v. City of Atlanta, 71 Ga. App. 313, 315, 30 S.E.2d 780,
782 (1944).
19. S. HOROVITZ, supra note 11, at 336.
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schedules in the compensation scheme.20 However, the right to sue third
2
parties is usually retained by the employee. '
Under most workmen's compensation schemes, an employer is required to obtain insurance to cover possible injury claims. 22 Pursuant to
some of these policies, insurance carriers not only underwrite the risk
but also often perform affirmative acts to lower costs such as making
safety inspections or furnishing medical care for the insured's employees.
The question as to whether an insurer can be sued in a common law tort
action for the negligent performance of these "extras" has arisen with
23
divergent results.
20. At common law, a plaintiff may recover all damages proximately caused by
a tortfeasor's negligence including compensation for pain and suffering. Thompson v.
Innuzzi, 403 Pa. 329, 169 A.2d 777 (1961). However, under workmen's compensation
statutes an injured employee is only entitled to compensation based on a percentage of
his salary and the extent of his disabilities. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 511-13,
561 (Supp. 1975).
21. S. HOROVITZ, supra note 11, at 339-53; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 671
(1952). In some states, an election must be made whether to seek recovery under the
workmen's compensation law or at common law against the third party. See, e.g.,
Markley v. White, 168 Okla. 244, 32 P.2d 716, 717 (1934).
22. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 501 (Supp. 1975). Section 501 reads in
pertinent part:
Every employer liable under this act to pay compensation shall insure the payment of compensation in the State Workmen's Insurance Fund, or in any insurance company, or mutual association or company, authorized to insure such
liability in this Commonwealth, unless such employer shall be exempted by the
department [of Labor and Industry] from such insurance.
Id.
23. An overwhelming majority of state and federal courts have held that, in such
circumstances, the insurance carrier is exempt from common law liability. 2 LARsoN,
supra note 11, § 72.90 n. 29. This conclusion has been reached either because the
particular state's workmen's compensation act expressly gives the insurance carrier the
employer's immunities, see, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 281:12 (1966), or because the word "employer" in the act has been construed to include the insurer.
See, e.g., Martin v. Consolidated Cas. Ins. Co., 138 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1943) (applying
Texas law); Noe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 172 Cal. App. 2d 731, 342 P.2d 976 (1959);
Flood v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 230 Md. 373, 187 A.2d 320 (1963); Matthews v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 354 Mass. 470, 238 N.E.2d 348 (1968).
However, a few courts have permitted common law actions against insurers
on the grounds that their state's compensation statutes, which do not expressly grant
employer immunity to the insurer, should be strictly construed, as must all statutes
which depart from the common law. Bryant v. Old Repub. Ins. Co., 431 F.2d 1385,
1388 (6th Cir. 1970) (applying Kentucky law); Ray v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 10
Mich. App. 55, 59, 158 N.W.2d 786, 787 (1968); Mager v. United Hosp., 88 N.J.
Super. 421, 427, 212 A.2d 664, 666-67 (1965), aff'd per curiam, 46 N.J. 398, 217 A.2d
325 (1966). At least two other courts have agreed with this strict constructionist
approach. See Mays v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 174, 177 (3d Cir. 1963)
(applying Pennsylvania law) ; Smith v. American Employer's Ins. Co., 102 N.H. 530,
533-34, 163 A.2d 564, 566-67 (1960). However, in apparent response to these cases,
the legislatures in Pennsylvania and New Hampshire amended their statutes to expressly entitle a carrier to invoke its insured's defenses. See N.H. Rxv. STAT. ANN.
§ 281:12 (1966); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 501 (Supp. 1975). See generally 2
LARsoN, supra note 11, § 72.90; Perrin, Workmen's Compensation Insurer's Immunity
to Claims of Its Insured's Employee, 3 FORUM 86 (1968); Note, The Workmen's
Compensation Insurance Carrier as a Third Party Tortleasor, 1 CONN. L. REv. 183
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In Pennsylvania, an insurance company is expressly exempted from
common law tort liability because of a statutory provision which entitles
the insurance carrier to assert the immunities of the employer. 24 The policy
behind this immunity was considered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Brown v. Travelers Insurance Co.2 5 In that case the employee sued the
insurance company to recover for injuries allegedly sustained because of
26
the insurer's negligent safety inspection of his employer's place of business.
In holding that recovery was barred by the insurer's immunity, the court
noted that to hold otherwise would discriminate in favor of employers
who were self-insurers or insured with the state insurance fund.2 7 The
court also feared that subjecting the insurance company to liability would
lead to higher premiums from private carriers to reflect this new potential
liability or the termination of the inspection programs to avoid it.2s
(1968) ; Note, The Workmen's Compensation Insurer's Immunity, 74 DICK. L. Rxv.
135 (1969-70); Note, Workmen's Compensation: Liability of Workmen's Compensation Carrieras a Third Party Tortfeasor in Oklahoma, 21 OKLA. L. REv. 356 (1968).
24. The amendment conferring this immunity was passed in 1966. Law of Jan.
25, 1966, No. 542, § 1, [1965] Pa. Laws 1552. See note 7 supra.
25. 434 Pa. 507, 254 A.2d 27 (1969). The claim in Brown arose prior to the
effective date of the amendment which expressly conferred employer immunity on its
carrier and thus was not controlled by it. However, the Brown court acknowledged
the legislative intent expressed by the amendment and the vast weight of foreign
authority in agreement with it and, therefore, ruled that the Act prior to the change
impliedly conferred the employer's immunity on its insurer. Id. at 515-16, 254 A.2d
at 30. In so ruling, the Brown court rejected the analysis employed by the Third
Circuit which was called upon to interpret this phase of the Pennsylvania Workmen's
Compensation Act 3 years before the amendment at a time before any Pennsylvania
appellate court had ever been confronted with this problem. See Mays v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1963). In Mays, the Third Circuit ruled that the statutory term "employer" could not be read to include an insurer. Id. at 177. See note
23 supra.
26. 434 Pa. at 510, 254 A.2d at 27.
27. Id. at 514, 254 A.2d at 29-30. Self-insurers, as employers, are automatically
immune. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 481 (1952). Similarly, the State Workmen's Compensation Fund, a state-operated alternative to private insurance companies, has
always been expressly entitled to all of the defenses of employers under the Act.
Id. § 362.
28. 434 Pa. at 515, 254 A.2d at 30. Though the court conceded that such safety
programs are offered primarily for the insurance carrier's own pecuniary benefit, they
were still found to be valuable since the insurer often had greater expertise than the
insured employer in spotting potentially dangerous circumstances. Id.
Of course, the possible discrimination alluded to by the Brown court would
not exist for very long since the 1966 amendment to the Act brought the private
insurers into parity with their state counterpart. See notes 7 & 27 and accompanying text supra.
It should be noted that the Brown court seemed to approach the problem as
merely one of statutory interpretation. However, the following year, validity of the
Brown decision and the constitutionality of the statutory amendment, which had, in
effect, codified the Brown result, were challenged in DeJesus v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
439 Pa. 180, 268 A.2d 924 (1970). In order to allow the Pennsylvania Legislature to
pass a workmen's compensation law, the state constitution, which forbade the denial of
an individual's right to sue for personal injuries, had been amended to read in pertinent part:
The General Assembly may enact laws requiring the payment by employers, or
employers and employees jointly, of reasonable compensation for injuries to employees arising in the course of their employment . . . regardless of fault of
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Thus, subsequent to Brown, insurance companies in Pennsylvania had
reason to believe that any liability they might incur as a result of the
negligence of their own employees would be dealt with only under the
state workmen's compensation law. However, such blanket immunity is
no longer assured as a result of the new approach followed by the Trdpiano
court in examining the use of employer immunities by a carrier. In the
past, when confronted with a third party tort action against an insurer,
Pennsylvania courts would base their decisions on whether, under the
relevant portion of the Act, the employer's immunity could be extended to
its insurer.29 The answer to this question was seen as the key to the ultimate adjudication of the controversy. Obviously, had this analysis been
followed in the instant case, the defendant would have prevailed since this
question is affirmatively answered by the Act's carrier immunity section.80
However, the Tropiano court, after conceding that the defendant
could assert its insured's immunities, looked to the basic application section
of the statute8 ' to determine when such defenses could be raised.3 2 For
a common law action to be barred against anyone under the Act, the alleged
injury must have occurred "in the course of employment. 833 Generally,
because of the remedial nature of the law, the Pennsylvania appellate courts
have given a liberal construction to this phrase.34 Notwithstanding this
trend, and without discussing the precise meaning of the statutory lanemployer or employee .. .but in no other case shall the General Assembly limit

the amount to be recovered for ... injuries to persons ....
PA. CONST. art. III, § 18. The plaintiff in Delesus argued that the last clause of the

amendment prevented the abrogation of common law suits against any nonemployer.
However, the DeJesus court disagreed and interpreted the above constitutional limita-

tion to apply only to nonworkmen's compensation situations. 439 Pa. at 184, 268 A.2d
at 926; accord, Aceto v. Zurich Ins. Co., 440 F.2d 1320, 1321 (3d Cir. 1971) ; Jadosh
v. Goering, 442 Pa. 319, 275 A.2d 58 (1971).
29. Brown v. Travelers Ins. Co., 434 Pa. 507, 254 A.2d 27 (1969). Other state
courts have also employed this analysis. See, e.g., Bryant v. Old Repub. Ins. Co., 431
F.2d 1385 (6th Cir. 1970) (applying Kentucky law) ; Noe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 172
Cal. 731, 342 P.2d 976 (1959); Mager v. United Hosps., 88 N.J. Super. 421, 212 A.2d
664 (1965), aff'd per curiam, 46 N.J. 398, 217 A.2d 325 (1966).
30. See note 7 supra.
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 481 (1952). For the text of this section, see
note 8 supra.
32. 455 Pa. at 362-63, 319 A.2d at 427.
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 481 (1952).
34. For example, in Maher v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 207 Pa. Super. 472, 218
A.2d 593 (1966), the claimant's husband was sent to Downington, Pa., to set up a
card display. Following completion of this task, the employee went to a nearby hotel
for some drinks with his coworkers. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania found that
the claimant's husband was still acting "in the course of his employment" when, some
43/2 hours later, he was killed on his way home to Philadelphia while driving a car
supplied by his employer. Id. at 474-75, 218 A.2d at 595-96; accord, Pater v. Superior
Steel Corp., 263 Pa. 244, 246, 106 A. 202 (1919); Universal Cyclops St. Corp. v.
Workmen's Comp. Adjust. Bd., 9 Pa. Cmwlth. 176, 185, 305 A.2d 757, 763 (1973).
This liberal attitude is fostered by the fact that, unlike other states, Pennsylvania
does not require that the injury both "occur in the course of employment" and "arise
out of employment." See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:34-15.1. See also Horovitz, The
Litigious Phrase: "Arising out of" Employment, 3 NACCA L.J. 15 (1949). Thus,
in Pennsylvania, compensation can be obtained for injuries occurring while the employee's activities are somehow connected with his employer's business although he
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guage,3 5 the Tropiano court decided that the aggravation of the original
injury could not be considered to have occurred in the course of employment and therefore held the carrier potentially liable for that aggravation.3 6
The court reasoned:
The medical treatment of injuries is a separate and distinct function
of the insurance carrier which does not concern the employer and is
not part of the employer's business operations. The alleged acts of
negligence in this case were committed by the insurance carrier subsequent to and independent of the original injury and with no in37
volvement of the employer whatsoever.
Though the Tropiano court dealt with the defendant's liability in a
somewhat mechanical manner, the decision appears to be on firm ground
in terms of the policy underlying workmen's compensation. Basically, the
Act is intended to benefit workers,3 8 and thus, in the usual work injury
situation, the courts have liberally construed the Act30 to allow employees
a certain recovery where common law rules might have prevented it.40
In the instant case, however, the possibility of a successful common law
defense seems less likely 41 and thus, the reasons for denying a worker
a common law recovery are less compelling.
Nevertheless, in light of Tropiano, the fears of the Brown court 42
may be realized in the present context. Insurance companies in Pennsylvania will, no doubt, be increasingly cautious about having their own
physicians treat injured employees. Though such a practice in the past
may have been considerably less expensive than paying for each injured
employee's doctor separately, the spectre of liability thus created may outweigh the savings. In any event, any increased cost, whether it results
from liability for negligent medical care or from private doctors' fees, will
probably be reflected in higher insurance premiums for the employer. 43
Another less obvious implication of Tropiano is its possible impact on
the area of injuries caused or aggravated by the negligence of medical
or she is not actually working at the time the injury occurs. Callihan v. Montgomery,

272 Pa. 56, 63, 115 A. 889, 891 (1922).

35. Indeed, there does not appear to be any all encompassing definition. As c-ne
court has noted: "In resolving [the issue of whether a worker's injury occured in the
course of employment] there is no formula which may be applied to all cases."
Rybinski v. Lebowitz, 175 Pa. Super. 265, 267, 104 A.2d 161, 162 (1954).
36. 455 Pa. at 363, 319 A.2d at 427.
37. Id.
38. See notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra.
39. See notes 33-34 and accompanying text supra.
40. See notes 11-14 and accompanying text supra.
41. Normally, it is unlikely that a patient will be contributorily negligent because
of the passive nature of the doctor-patient relationship. See generally PROSSER, supra
note 11, at 416-27. Furthermore, a patient cannot be said to have assumed the risk
of his physician's incompetence. Id. at 439-57.
42. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
43. However, this type of problem is somewhat alleviated by the fact that even
under the Tropiano approach, the Brown situation dealing with safety inspections
would still result in immunity for the carrier since there the injuries did arise directly
out of the employer's business while the employee was working.
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personnel employed directly by the employer. Such negligence can arise
either in the context of a company doctor providing "courtesy" medical
care for nonwork-related problems as a fringe benefit or the treatment of
injuries sustained directly in the course of employment. Presently, in most
states, including Pennsylvania, the injuries resulting from incompetent
medical care in either case are held to have a sufficient causal relationship
to employment as to be solely compensable under the workmen's compensation acts. 4 4 Nevertheless, the liberal "but for" causality analysis previously used in reaching this type of result has been severely called into
question by the reasoning employed in Tropiano.
This formerly unquestioned "but for" approach is best illustrated by
the case of Hornetz v. Philadelphia& Reading Coal & Iron Co. 4 5 which
involved a factual situation closely analogous to Tropiano. In Hornets,
an employee fractured his finger while working. Subsequently, he was
taken to a state hospital where he died as a result of the anesthetic administered during an operation intended to remedy the original injury. 40
In ruling that the death was compensable under the Act, the court adopted
the following findings of the trial court:
"The violence caused the injury, the injury caused the operation, the
operation caused the anaesthetization, the anaesthetization caused dilation of the heart and dilation of the heart caused death. Hence there
was a causal connection between the [original] violence and [the
47
subsequent] death."
As recently as 1972, in Vogel v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,48 the
Pennsylvania Superior Court similarly held that aggravation of an injury,
which originally was suffered during the course of employment, by company medical personnel could not be the basis of a common law action
because of a "but for" causal connection with the initial injury.40 Similarly,
in the area of "courtesy" care, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Baur
v. Mesta Machine Cd.50 held that where a decedent became ill at work
and received negligent medical treatment in the plant dispensary, his
dependents' sole remedy was under the Act. 51
44. Baur v. Mesta Machine Co., 339 Pa. 380, 143 A.2d 12 (1958); Vogel v.

Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 221 Pa. Super. 157, 289 A.2d 158 (1972), allocatur

refuased. See also Annot., 127 A.L.R. 1110 (1940); notes 45-51 and accompanying

text infra.
45. 277 Pa. 40, 120 A. 662 (1923).
46. Id. at 41, 120 A. at 663.
47. Id. Of course, it must be noted that in this action the decedent's wife was
suing to collect under the Act, and perhaps, given the "pro-worker" disposition of
courts in interpreting the statute, this may help to explain the result. See note 34
and accompanying text supra.
48. 221 Pa. Super. 157, 289 A.2d 158 (1972), allocatur refused May 22, 1972 by
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
49. Id. at 161, 289 A.2d at 160.
50. 393 Pa. 380, 143 A.2d 12 (1958).
51. Id. at 385, 143 A.2d at 14.
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Notwithstanding the above authority, it is submitted that there is
no valid reason for not applying the Tropiano approach to these situations.
Factually, Tropiano and Hornetz are strikingly similar while the only
real distinctions present in Vogel are the place of treatment52 and the
source of the physician's salary.53 Though the Tropiano court seemed to
have emphasized the latter point, 54 it is suggested that, at best, this is an
artificial distinction. In all three cases the treatment had the same limited
relationship to the employer's business - it was necessitated by the initial
injury.5 5 Moreover, in the case of "courtesy" treatment where the initial
problem is unrelated to work, Tropiano's reasoning is even more compelling
since virtually no connection exists between the employee's work and his
treatment.5 6 Furthermore, such a result would be consistent with the
57
underlying policy of the workmen's compensation legislation.
The most immediate effect of Tropiand will be an adjustment in rates
charged in Pennsylvania for workmen's compensation policies in which
the insurers use their own physicians to treat their insured's employees.
Possibly, this service will no longer be offered. In the future, Tropiano's
application may bring similar consequences to employers who themselves
offer medical treatment. The result here could be the elimination of such
care or an increase in cost to the consumer of the employer's service or
product to offset the possible liability.
Kevin S. Anderson
52. In Vogel, the plaintiff was treated in an industrial clinic, 221 Pa. Super. at
159, 289 A.2d at 159, whereas in Tropiano, treatment was administered in a hospital
by an insurance company's doctor. Brief for Appellant at 3.
53. One possible distinction could be the time lapse between injury and treatment.
However, this element was not considered by either the Vogel or Tropiano courts.
54. 455 Pa. at 363, 319 A.2d at 427.
55. In agreement with this reasoning is Vesel v. Jardine Mining Co., 110 Mont.
82, 100 P.2d 75 (1939). In Vesel, notwithstanding the fact that normally an employer
is immune from suit under the workmen's compensation law of that state, the Montana
Supreme Court allowed a third party common law action against an employer by an
employee for the former's selection of an incompetent physician to treat the employee's
injuries. Id. at 102-05, 100 P.2d at 84-85; accord, Denes v. R.M. Hollingshead,
7 N.J. Misc. 39, 145 A. 321 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (action against employer for negligent
medical treatment recognized). But see Tutino v. Ford Motor Co., 111 N.J.L. 435,
168 A. 749 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933).
56. In fact, if the reasoning in Vogel and Baur defining these injuries as having
occurred in the course of employment were consistently followed, an employee would
be powerless to sue not only his employer, because of the fellow-servant doctrine, but
also the negligent doctor himself. The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act
expressly prevents any suit against a coworker (except for intentional torts) for
injuries compensable under the Act. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 72 (Supp. 1975). But
see Lazar v. Falor, 118 PiTt. L.J. 299, 303 (C.P. 1970) (suit against doctor not barred
by employee liability exemption section because, though the injury caused by the
physician was compensable under the Act, the doctor, for purposes of this section, was
held to be an independent contractor). Also, it is questionable whether an employer
could assert the fellow-servant doctrine successfully in this context. See note 14 supra.
Though no case has been found in which this defense has been raised in such a context,
if it were asserted, it is possible that a court would consider the rendering of competent medical care a "non-delegable" duty, thus rendering the master liable. Cf. W.
PROSSER, supra note 11, at 529.
57. See notes 16 & 17 and accompanying text supra.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1975

83

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 3

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss1/3

84

